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The first women factory inspectors were appointed in 1893. Until 1921 they operated as a 
separate section of the Factory Inspectorate with special responsibility for inspecting the 
working conditions of women. This thesis has examined the work of the women inspectors 
between 1893 and 1921 and has sought to evaluate how far they were able to effect 
improvements in women’s working conditions. The inspectors’ work has been explored 
through a series of four illustrative case studies selected to cover occupational health and 
safety issues which were of particular importance to women workers during the period. 
These were lead poisoning in white lead works, accidents and injuries in laundries, 
ventilation in small workshops and industrial health and safety during the First World War. 
The period of study was marked by important changes in the functioning of the Factory 
Department, occurring in response to increasing state intervention in the conduct of 
industry and a growing awareness of medical, scientific and technical developments which 
began to inform policy and practice.  The work of the women inspectors has been examined 
within this context showing how the approaches they adopted were highly reflective of 
these new developments. Contrary to existing historiography, which considers that the 
women inspectors were operationally ineffective and that their appointment was largely 
symbolic, it is argued that they achieved some notable successes in terms of reducing the 
risks to women workers. Despite their small numbers, they were able to harness new 
knowledge to investigate problems and identify solutions and, in the process, were able to 
contribute to policy development and legislative change. Their work before the First World 
War was indicative of a growing professionalism and expertise. During the war, however, 
their development was interrupted when their resources were diverted away from health 
and safety and towards the administration of a large industrial welfare system. This system 
was established by the government in response to public fears that the recruitment of large 
numbers of young women into factory work might have a morally destabilising effect on the 
nation. The professional progress of the women inspectors was thus largely curtailed during 
this period. Their special remit to investigate the health and safety problems of women 
workers was resumed only briefly after the war and their section was amalgamated with the 
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Chapter 1  
Study Rationale and Objectives 
The British Factory Inspectorate was initially established in 1833 with the appointment of 
four men to inspect working conditions in textile factories and to ensure compliance with 
the terms of the new Factory Act introduced that year. 1 During the following 50 years the 
inspectorate underwent considerable growth and development both in terms of the size of 
its staff and the scope of its work but, despite the presence of large numbers of women in 
the industrial workforce, it remained an exclusively male organisation. In 1893, however, the 
first women factory inspectors were appointed, establishing a separate section of the 
inspectorate with a specific remit to inspect and regulate the employment conditions of 
women. The separation of male and female sections was maintained until 1921 when the 
two were amalgamated to form an integrated organisation in which the duties of male and 
female inspectors were merged. The work carried out by the separate women’s section 
between 1893 and 1921 forms the subject of the current thesis. The objective is to examine 
the nature and the effectiveness of the work carried out by the women inspectors during 
this period in order to assess the importance of their contribution to improvements in 
women’s occupational health and safety.  
The impetus for the present study was provided by the current dearth of literature 
examining the work of women factory inspectors and, more particularly, by the absence of 
texts which consider this work within the context of contemporary developments in 
industrial health and safety. A small body of historiography has emerged in recent years, 
which alludes to the inspectors’ work within the context of women’s history of the late 
Victorian and Edwardian periods and which offers a largely feminist perspective on the role 
of the women inspectors.  Mary Drake McFeeley’s popular history, Lady Inspectors, 
published in 1988, 2 and Susan Yeandle’s Women of Courage, commissioned in 1993 to mark 
one hundred years of women factory inspectors, 3 each present a relatively uncomplicated 
                                                          
1
 Factory Act, 1833 (3 & 4 Will. IV, c.103). 
2
 McFeely, M.D. (1991), Lady Inspectors: The Campaign for a Better Workplace, 1893-1921, University of 
Georgia Press, Athens and London. 
3
 Yeandle, S. (1993), Women of Courage: 100 Years of Women Factory Inspectors, HMSO, London. 
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picture of courageous pioneers establishing a female presence in a previously male world. 
Other historiography has focussed on the issue of protective legislation for women and the 
role of the women inspectors in enforcing this. Here the development and enforcement of 
health and safety regulations during the period has been considered as an aspect of gender-
based power relationships which contributed to the subjugation of women, particularly of 
working-class women.  By selectively regulating women’s employment conditions, but not 
those of male workers, it is argued, legislation ostensibly designed to protect women from 
the most onerous or dangerous work, (for example by limiting their hours of work or the 
particular jobs they could do) was part of a wider state agenda to undermine women’s right 
to participate in the labour market. 4  Early manifestations of this agenda have been traced 
to some of the earliest factory legislation which, in 1842, had prohibited the employment in 
mines of all females and raised the age at which boys could be employed underground to 
ten. 5 This particular piece of legislation appears to have been prompted by a mixture of 
concerns about the health, welfare and also the moral consequences of scantily clad males 
and females working in close proximity underground. 6 The response of the government 
meant that, for the first time, women were excluded from a specific occupation and were 
also grouped with children in terms of the legislation. Historian Alan Heesom has suggested 
that these regulations also contained elements of social control, in the sense that the return 
of women to their child rearing duties within the  domestic environment, as well as  the 
proposed Christian education of young boys excluded from the mines, was intended to 
reduce the risk of civil unrest amongst the working classes. 7  At a time when women were 
entering the labour force in increasing numbers and male employment was coming under 
threat, historian Robert Gray has further argued that early factory legislation was an 
important vehicle for the expression of social norms which assumed the primacy of the male 
breadwinner, 8 Thus two years after the Mines Act of 1842, a further piece of legislation 
again classified women with juvenile workers in terms of selectively restricting their working 
                                                          
4
 Rose, S.O. (1991), ‘From behind the women’s petticoats: The movement for a legislated nine hour day and 
state protection of working women in Britain, 1870-1878’, Journal of Historical Sociology, Vol. iv, pp. 32-51. 
5
 Mines Act, 1842 (5 & 6 Vict. c.99). 
6
 Bryan, Sir A. (1975), The Evolution of Health and Safety in Mines, Ashire Publishing Ltd, Lechworth, p. 34.    
7
 Heesom, A. (1981), „The Coal Mines Act of 1842, Social Reform and Social Control‟, The Historical Journal , 
Vol. 24, Part 1, pp. 69-88. 
8
 Gray, R. (1996), The Factory Question and Industrial England, 1830-1860, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, p. 35.  
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hours, creating a precedent for working time differentials which persisted up to and beyond 
the appointment of the women factory inspectors. 9  Feminist historians have suggested, 
therefore, that female inspectors, appointed half a century later to enforce regulations 
selectively aimed at women workers, were complicit in the maintenance of a well-
established discriminatory agenda.  
The strongest condemnation of protective legislation has come from historian Carolyn 
Malone who has explored the influence of contemporary discourses of maternity and 
domesticity on women’s exclusion from a specific industry, the white lead trade. 10  Malone 
argues that gender-based arguments, which emphasised both women’s supposed physical 
vulnerability and the importance to the nation of their maternal role, provided the 
justification for interventionist legislation which restricted women’s working hours and 
excluded them from certain jobs.  Such protective legislation, she maintains, was politically 
expedient because it accorded with currently popular sentiments about the need to 
safeguard the health of the nation by ensuring that women successfully carried out their 
functions of child-bearing and child rearing. She notes the increasing concern about these 
issues which arose at the end of the 19th century in response to revelations about the poor 
health of large sections of the male population during recruitment for the Boer War. 11  
Within Malone’s analysis the women inspectors appear only briefly and are evaluated 
specifically in terms of their attitude towards protective legislation as an indicator of their 
ideological position on the employment rights of women. This approach leads her to be 
somewhat dismissive of their work which, she considers, reflected the fact that they were 
‘steeped in the dominant social ideal of protecting women’. 12 Historian Helen Jones appears  
to concur with this view arguing that the inspectors ‘saw a need for...improving working 
class women’s occupational health, but within the norms laid down by society’. 13     
                                                          
9
 Factory Act, 1844 (7& 8 Vict. c.15). 
10
 Malone, C. (1996), ‘The Gendering of Dangerous Trades: Government Regulation of Women’s Work in the 
White Lead Trade in England, 1892-1898’, Journal of Women’s History, Vol. 8, Part 1, pp. 15-29. 
11
 Davin, A. (1978), ‘Imperialism and Motherhood’, History Workshop, No. 5, Spring pp. 9-65. 
12
  Malone, C. (1996), ‘The Gendering of Dangerous Trades: Government Regulation of Women’s Work in the 
White Lead Trade in England, 1892-1898’, Journal of Women’s History, Vol. 8, Part 1, pp.15-29. 
13
 Jones, H. (1988), ‘Women Health Workers: the Case of the First Women Factory Inspectors in Britain’, Social 
History of Medicine, Vol. 1, Part 2, pp. 165-181. 
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Historian Barbara Harrison, in her comprehensive discussion of women’s working conditions 
during the late Victorian and Edwardian periods, devotes a chapter to the women 
inspectors, 14 and offers a more pragmatic interpretation of their approach. She concludes 
that they were almost certainly uncomfortably aware of the contradictions inherent in their 
position, with many of their actions reflecting the inevitable compromises and political 
accommodations which characterise the work of public servants.  Thus, she argues, the 
inspectors often appeared ambivalent or at least uneasy about legislation which threatened 
women’s right to work.   She notes, for example, that they frequently countered suggestions 
that employment itself was undesirable for women, or that factory work was necessarily 
damaging to maternity.  Rather they pointed to the benefits of employment, such as the 
extra income it provided for very poor families, as well as the necessity of work for those 
women who were unmarried or widowed. 15 Harrison suggests, in addition, that it was not 
protective intervention per se which threatened women’s employment rights but the nature 
of that intervention. She notes that members of the women’s factory inspectorate, 
alongside male and female union activists, repeatedly urged, not the prohibition of women 
workers, but the prohibition or control of dangerous substances from the workplace. 16  
Harrison’s conclusions are supported by the work of historian Clare Holdsworth who notes a 
highly influential report by two women inspectors in 1897, which recommended the 
development of leadless glazes to reduce problems of lead poisoning in the pottery  
industry. 17 This was a practical alternative to medical suggestions that women, who were 
considered to be particularly vulnerable to lead poisoning, should be banned from the 
industry altogether. 18   
Other historiography in this field has focused on the intersection between class and gender 
and the extent to which class differences effectively negated the inspectors’ efforts to 
improve the employment conditions of working-class women.  As historian Anne Phillips 
                                                          
14
 Harrison, B. (1996), Not only the Dangerous Trades: Women’s Work and Health in Britain, 1880-1914, Taylor 
and Francis, Abingdon, Oxon, pp. 181-199. 
15
 Harrison, B. & Nolan, M. (2004), ‘Reflections in Colonial Glass? Women Factory Inspectors in Britain and New 




 Holdsworth, C. (1997), ‘Women’s work and family health: evidence from the Staffordshire Potteries, 1890-
1920’, Continuity and Change, Vol.12, Part 1, pp.103-128. 
18
 See further discussion of policies relating to lead exposure in Chapter 4. 
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succinctly notes ‘we live in a gender order that is also structured by class, which means that 
women experience their womanhood in different ways, and that their unity as women is 
continually disrupted by conflicts of class’. 19 During the period in question the ‘lady 
inspectors’, as they were often termed, continued to be drawn from the ranks of the well-
educated middle-classes who had no direct experience of employment in  factories and 
workshops. Some historians have concluded that, as a result, it was attachment to class 
rather than loyalty to gender which determined the policies and practices of the inspectors, 
an attachment which led them to pursue a state-sponsored paternalistic agenda towards 
working-class women which alienated female factory workers whilst enhancing their own 
professional opportunities. Historian Ruth Livesey argues that class divisions and 
antagonisms effectively undermined most of the inspectors’ efforts to improve working 
conditions.  She suggests that the appointment of middle-class women evoked a form of 
social maternalism in which the lady inspectors acted as protectors of their vulnerable 
working-class sisters. Thus the initial establishment of women inspectors was an extension 
of the philanthropic tradition, whereby middle-class woman gained access to power through 
social work and the exercise of ‘reformatory authority’ over the working classes. 20 All the 
early inspectors, she maintains, relied heavily for their appointment on the patronage of 
aristocratic or political contacts and, once in post, embarked on a path of increasing 
professionalization, seeking to create an elite organisation by progressive demarcation of 
their area of expertise and the introduction of increasingly stringent entry qualifications. 
Undeniably these factors created considerable barriers to the entry of working-class women 
into the factory inspectorate.  However, the reasons for their prolonged exclusion are 
perhaps more complex than Livesey suggests. Patronage undoubtedly played a major role in 
the appointment of May Abraham, 21 the first women inspector, who was previously 
secretary to Lady Dilke, 22 a significant campaigner for the appointment of women inspectors 
and wife of the Liberal MP Sir Charles Dilke, 23 and neither Abraham nor Paterson, the 
                                                          
19
 Phillips, A. (1987), Divided Loyalties. Dilemmas of Sex and Class, Virago, London, p. 12. 
20
 Livesey, R. (2004), ‘The Politics of Work: Feminism, Professionalisation and Women Inspectors of Factories 
and Workshops’, Women’s History Review, Vol.13, Part 2, pp. 233-255. 
21
 May Abraham (1869-1946), See Appendix 1 which contains short biographical notes of individuals appearing 
in the text.  
22
 Lady Emilia Dilke (1840-1904), See Appendix 1.  
23
 Sir Charles Dilke (1843-1911), See Appendix 1.  
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second appointee, were subjected to the usual Civil Service entry requirements.   However, 
by the time two further women inspectors, Lucy Deane 24 and Adelaide Anderson 25 were 
appointed in 1894, this situation had changed. Both Deane, who had previously worked as 
one of the first women sanitary inspectors for the Borough of Kensington 26 and Anderson, a 
university educated ‘Girton girl’ 27 were required, over two days, to sit examinations in 
dictation, copying, English composition and  arithmetic, followed by an oral examination of 
their knowledge of the principle provisions of the Factory and Workshop Acts. 28 These 
examination subjects were, in fact, largely the same as those which confronted aspiring male 
inspectors who from an early stage had been required to have a relatively high standard of 
education. Suggestions by some authors that, unlike the women, male inspectors were 
drawn from the ranks of working men are not supported by the evidence. Most of those 
appointed in the 19th century were of middle-class origin and many had military 
backgrounds. 29 The possession of professional expertise and high status, it was argued, 
helped them to maintain an important distance between themselves and those who were 
subject to the regulations they enforced, as well as enabling them to hold their own in a 
court of law. They were required to be of good health and moral character, to be free from 
debt and, from 1855, to have passed a civil service examination which in its early years 
included Latin and modern languages. They were, in addition, relatively well-paid, since high 
wages were considered to reduce their susceptibility to corruption. 30 This was particularly 
                                                          
24
 Lucy Deane (1865-1950), See Appendix 1. 
25
 Adelaide Anderson (1863-1936), See Appendix 1. 
26
 In 1893 Kensington Vestry was the first local authority to appoint women sanitary inspectors to visit homes 
and advise on living conditions in an attempt to tackle the problem of high infant mortality in the area. These 
women inspectors were also instructed to visit factories where the women worked and thus Deane would have 
had some experience of this prior to her appointment. Mooney, G. (1997), 'Professionalization in public health 
and the measurement of sanitary progress in nineteenth-century England and Wales', Social History of 
Medicine, Vol. 10, pp. 53-78.    
27
 A graduate of Girton College, the first women’s college at the University of Cambridge, established in 1869. 
28
 Deane, Lucy (30 March 1894), Personal Diary, Modern Records Centre, University of Warwick, MSS.69/1/1-
24. 
29
 Report of the Chief Inspector of Factories and Workshops to HM Principal Secretary of State for the Home 
Department, for the Year 1894, C. 7745, (1895), HMSO, London, p. 226.  
30
 The original four inspectors, appointed in 1833, were paid £1000 per year, (although required to pay all their 
own travel and hotel expenses), while eight additional superintendents were appointed a few years later on a 
salary of £250 per year. Health and Safety Executive, (1983), Her Majesty’s Inspectors of Factories, 1883-1983. 
Essays to commemorate 150 years of Health and Safety Inspection, HMSO, London, p. 69. 
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important since previous enforcement of factory law had been undermined by the use of 
‘factory visitors’ who were often friends or relatives of employers and as such were neither 
well-trained nor impartial.  At a more prosaic level, inspectors were required to produce 
detailed, well written reports, something which required rather more than a basic standard 
of literacy and numeracy. In many ways, therefore, entry and training requirements for the 
women simply mirrored those of the men.  Indeed to waive them for women inspectors 
would have signalled a reduction in their professional status within the Factory Department. 
Not only would this have undermined their authority when confronted with potentially 
hostile factory managers or patronising magistrates but, importantly, it would have 
diminished them in the eyes of their male colleagues, many of whom already doubted their 
competence and suitability for the role. Interestingly, the creation of the grade of 
‘inspector’s assistant’, which occurred simultaneously with the appointment of the first 
female inspectors, represented a concession on the part of the Home Secretary to trade 
union demands for the appointment of working men. However, the duties and 
responsibilities, as well as the promotional opportunities, of the fifteen ‘working men’ 
assistant inspectors appointed in 1893 were relatively limited. They did not have powers of 
inspection, enforcement or prosecution, but simply carried out information gathering duties 
such as the recording of newly established factories and workshops. 31 By contrast, the 
women inspectors were awarded full powers with immediate effect.  
Barbara Harrison and her co-author Melanie Nolan, in their comparison of the work and 
attitudes of women factory inspectors in Britain and New Zealand, appear to have reached a 
different conclusion about the loyalties of the women inspectors. 32  Although first 
appointed just a year later than their British counterparts, female inspectors in New Zealand 
were predominantly working women with backgrounds in trade unionism. Their initial 
appointment originated in an apparently impromptu decision by the Minister of Labour to 
appoint a woman (and specifically a working woman) to oversee the implementation of 
recent legislation limiting women’s working hours.  This contrast provided Harrison and 
                                                          
31
 Report of the Chief Inspector of Factories of Factories and Workshops to HM Principal Secretary of State for 
the Home Department, for the Year 1893, C. 7368 (1894), HMSO, London, p.18. 
32
 Harrison, B. & Nolan, M. (2004), ‘Reflections in Colonial Glass? Women Factory Inspectors in Britain and New 
Zealand, 1893-1921’, Women’s History Review, Vol. 13, Part 2, pp. 263-287. 
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Nolan with a unique opportunity to explore the relative importance of class and gender as 
determinants of the way the inspectors carried out their work. They noted that, in New 
Zealand, the inspectors’ working experience seems to have enhanced their credibility with 
the women whose complaints they investigated. However, it also counted against them in 
official circles where they were accused of being partisan and where they struggled to gain 
respect. Despite differences in class, however, Harrison and Nolan considered that 
inspectors in both countries appeared united in a sense of sisterhood, motivated largely by 
compassion for women workers and sharing a belief that their most important role was to 
provide women with access to other women who would hear and understand their 
grievances and act on their complaints. There was evidence that women did indeed 
complain, in both countries, in increasing numbers, either directly or through women’s 
organisations. In many cases, therefore, it seems to have been this concept of sisterhood 
which prevailed over class origins.  
Notwithstanding Harrison and Nolan’s more sympathetic treatment of the women factory 
inspectors, the picture which emerges from much of the existing historiography is one of an 
elite, well-educated group of middle-class women who operated as agents of the state to 
enforce legislation which often ran counter to working-class women’s employment rights. 
Moreover, the focus on the inspectors’ support for protective legislation and their social 
class has led many historians to conclude that the inspectors were unlikely to have made any 
significant contribution to improvements in working conditions. These factors, it has been 
suggested, would have effectively separated them from any understanding of the needs and 
problems of working-class women. Historian Helen Jones has expressed a further and 
essentially practical reservation about the ability of the inspectors to effect improvements. 
They were, she maintains, far too few in number to have had any significant impact on more 
than a handful of workplaces. 33 
The prominence of a feminist theoretical framework in this historiography supports the 
suggestion by historian Catherine Mills that ideological and/or economic interpretations 
have tended to dominate the recent study of health and safety legislation and the state’s 
                                                          
33
 Jones, H. (1988), ‘Women Health Workers: the Case of the First Women Factory Inspectors in Britain’, Social 
History of Medicine, Vol. 1, Part 2, pp. 165-181. 
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involvement in its development during the 19th and early 20th centuries. 34 Other theoretical 
models, however, have offered a different perspective on the way state intervention has 
evolved within this field and it is argued here that these provide a more appropriate context 
for the work of the women inspectors. Mills, for example, has discussed how far the 
development of statutory hygiene regulation within the mining industry might be 
understood by reference to the early descriptive model proposed by Oliver MacDonagh. 35 
Within MacDonagh’s framework the introduction of state intervention is considered to be a 
largely reflexive process, driven not by ideological or philosophical concerns, but rather 
occurring when the nature of any abuse suffered by one section of society is regarded as 
sufficiently intolerable to compel action. Initially, the response of powerful, threatened 
interests tends to result in the dilution of any proposed action, such that this is invariably 
insufficient to fully address the problem. The reduction of the permitted age of employment 
in mines of young boys, which occurred as the 1842 Mines Bill progressed through 
Parliament, provides a good example of this. The initial proposal for a minimum age of 
thirteen was eventually reduced to ten as a result of pressure from the House of Lords with 
its strong representation of mine-owning interests.36  Nevertheless, MacDonagh argues, 
initial intervention tends to stimulate the need for further measures, provoking a process 
which gathers momentum as successive regulations are introduced to close loopholes and 
address the limitations of earlier legislation.  As a result, state intervention proceeds in a 
cumulative but piecemeal manner. The appointment of officials or inspectors, who both 
oversee the implementation of regulations and identify the need for further action, 
constitutes an essential part of this process. MacDonagh’s model chimes well with the views 
of reformer Sydney Webb who, in the early part of the 20th century, described factory 
legislation as ‘a typical example of English practical empiricism’ which began with ‘no 
abstract theory of social justice or the rights of man’. 37 Webb, himself, despaired of an 
                                                          
34
 Mills, C. (2008), „The Emergence of Statutory Hygiene Precautions in the British Mining Industries, 1890-
1914‟, The Historical Journal, Vol. 51, Part 1, pp. 145-168.  
35
 MacDonagh, O. (1958), „The Nineteenth Century Revolution in Government: A Re-appraisal‟, Historical 
Journal, Vol.1, pp. 52-67. 
36
 Bryan, Sir A. (1975), The Evolution of Health and Safety in Mines. Ashire Publishing Ltd, Lechworth, pp. 33-
34.    
37
 Hutchins, B. L. & Harrison, A. (1903),  A History of Factory Legislation,  P.S.King & Son, Orchard House, 
Westminster, p. vii. 
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approach whereby ‘each successive statute aimed at remedying a single ascertained evil’ 38 
but appeared resigned to the idea that in Britain, at least, this was the way in which state 
intervention proceeded. More recently, historian Peter Bartrip has also noted that, in terms 
of the development and enforcement of British health and safety regulations, MacDonagh’s 
model has considerable explanatory value. 39 Mills has pointed out, however, that the 
direction and pace of state intervention is a complex process and its detailed analysis 
requires the consideration of a wide range of influences. These may, for example, be 
economic, social, scientific or technological.  In many situations, therefore, MacDonagh’s 
model seems insufficiently flexible to account for this complexity. Notwithstanding these 
limitations, however, one of its central tenets, that state regulation develops reflexively, in 
response to situations as they arise, would appear to provide an appropriate context for the 
assessment of the work of the Factory Department during the period under consideration 
here.  As individuals, the women factory inspectors embraced a variety of strands of 
contemporary feminism and varying shades of political allegiance. 40 However, their 
approach to their work was largely a pragmatic one, in the sense that they operated on the 
basis of what was immediately achievable, rather than ideologically desirable.  They used 
their knowledge of existing regulations and the data they collected to identify and highlight 
new problems, and drew on new scientific and technological developments to formulate 
solutions. Historian Kitson Clark has argued that the appointment of factory inspectors in 
1833 constituted a turning point in factory reform since inspectors not only put into effect 
factory legislation, but also reported on how it worked. Thus their reports, which were 
indicative of their increasing specialised knowledge, provided the information on which 
future legislation was necessarily based. 41  This would seem to aptly describe the way in 
which the women inspectors, appointed 50 years later, carried out their work.  
 
 




 Bartrip, P.W.J. (2002), The Home Office and the Dangerous Trades: Regulating Occupational Disease in 
Victorian and Edwardian Britain, Rodopi, Amsterdam, p. 286.  
40
 See Appendix 1 
41
 Kitson Clark, G. (1962), „The Making of Victorian England’, Methuen, London, p. 94. 
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The current thesis 
The current thesis has considered the work of the women inspectors within the framework 
described above and has used contemporary data to consider the extent to which their work 
resulted in actual improvements in the occupational health and safety of women workers.  It 
is argued that the negative evaluation of the inspectors’ work which emerges from the 
existing historiography rests largely on the adoption of a perspective whereby issues of class 
and gender are placed at the centre of the analysis. Thus the inspectors’ support for certain 
forms of protective legislation is equated with state interference in women’s employment 
rights, while class differences are considered to preclude any understanding of the needs of 
women workers, and to undermine any attempts to gain their trust. These factors, together 
with small numbers and inadequate resources are judged to have nullified the inspectors’ 
efforts to improve working conditions.  The current thesis proposes a different perspective 
whereby the inspectors’ work will be examined, not in terms of their ideological position on 
protective legislation or their social class, but within the context of the developments taking 
place within occupational health and safety at that time. During the period, growing 
interventionism on the part of central government led to a plethora of new regulations and 
to different approaches to health and safety management, while the emergence of new 
scientific and medical information made unprecedented demands on the professional 
expertise of the Factory Inspectorate as a whole. A close examination of the women 
inspectors’ work in some specific areas of contemporary concern will be used to 
demonstrate the multifaceted nature of their activities and the way in which these reflected 
both developments within the field of health and safety and their own growing expertise. 
Jones’ concern about small numbers, for example, rests on the assumption that routine and 
regular inspection, accompanied by automatic prosecution when contraventions of the law 
were discovered, represented the only means whereby factory inspectors were able to 
influence working practice. But then, as now, the inspectorate as a whole operated with 
limited resources and increasingly employed an informed sampling procedure in terms of 
the workplaces visited, often using guidance and persuasion rather than punitive sanctions, 
and choosing prosecutions carefully in order to achieve the maximum deterrent effect. 
Further, Jones and others appear to have neglected other aspects of the inspectors’ work 
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such as their investigative role, their representation on special committees of enquiry and 
their contributions to policy development. It is thus argued that an examination of these 
aspects offers a different perspective on the contribution of the women inspectors to 
women’s occupational health and safety. The objectives of the thesis are contained within 
the following research questions. 
 
1. Did the health and safety of women workers improve during the period? 
2. To what extent, and in what ways, did the women inspectors contribute to any such 
improvements? 
3. How far did the work of the women inspectors reflect contemporary developments 
in industrial health and safety practice? 
 
These questions have been addressed by means of four case studies selected to reflect 
different aspects of the work of the women inspectors between their initial appointment in 
1893 and their amalgamation with the men’s inspectorate in 1921. The thesis will focus on 
two important aspects of the inspectors’ work, namely the prevention and control of 
occupational disease and of industrial accidents.  During the period in question the remit of 
the factory inspectorate also encompassed a wide range of employment conditions such as 
working hours, the legally permitted age of workers 42 and the prevention of abuses such as 
the system of ‘truck’. 43  The regulation of industrial disease and accidents has been selected 
                                                          
42
 In the UK, conditions of employment such as hours of work and wages ceased to be part of health and safety 
legislation and became part of employment legislation following the Health and Safety at Work Act of 1974. In 
some other European countries employment conditions have remained as part of the same body of law. This 
difference underpinned the dispute between the UK and the European Commission in the early 1990s when EU 
regulations required all member states to enforce a maximum 48 hour week on health and safety grounds. The 
UK government argued (unsuccessfully) that working time was not a health and safety issue.       
43
 ‘Truck’ was the system whereby workers were paid in goods and not in coin of the realm. This was illegal 
after the Truck Act of 1831, which was reinforced by the Truck Act of 1897. It also refers to the system of 
making deductions from workers’ wages for equipment used, or for heating and lighting costs, or for reputedly 
spoiled work, late arrival at work or other infringements of works rules. The system was often abused by 
employers and, in extreme cases, could result in workers owing ‘wages’ at the end of the week. 
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for study, however, because of the availability of statistics which were regularly produced by 
the Factory Department at this time.  
The definition of the terms ‘disease’ and ‘accident’ has been the subject of considerable 
historical interest. 44 A major driver of the debates surrounding this issue has been the 
development of insurance and compensation systems and discussion of the subject has 
largely taken place within this context. Thus an early lack of equalisation between payments 
for an accident and a disease focussed attention on the need to define the distinction and to 
establish criteria for occupational causation. 45 Should, for example, a ‘disease’ such as acute 
poisoning, occurring at a specific point in time as a result of a well-defined exposure, be 
categorised as an ‘accident’, distinguishable from a ‘chronic’ condition developing over time 
and hence more difficult to attribute unequivocally to occupational causes? 46  The extent to 
which these debates subsequently influenced the classification systems adopted within the 
operational arm of the Factory Department is currently uncertain. However, during the 
period covered by the present thesis, it is clear that the definitions used by the factory 
inspectors in compiling their statistics were different to those employed under the terms of 
existing compensation systems, 47 a difference which derives from their different objectives. 
Thus compensation definitions were intended to determine eligibility for payment, whilst 
those adopted by the Factory Department were intended to inform and monitor measures 
for prevention and control. In the present thesis use has been made of statistics recorded in 
the reports of the Chief Factory Inspector in order to consider changes in the incidence rates 
                                                          
44
 Milles, D. (1997), „What are occupational diseases? Risk and risk management in industrial medicine in 
Germany, c. 1880-1920‟, in Cooter, R. and Luckin, B. (eds.), Accidents in History: Injuries, Fatalities and 
Social Relations,  Rodopi, Amsterdam, pp. 179-195; Bronstein, J.L. (2008), Caught in the machinery. Workplace 
Accidents and Injured Workers in Nineteenth- Century Britain, Stanford University Press, Stanford, California, 
pp. 125-168; Figlio, K. (1985), „What is an accident?‟ in Weindling, P. (ed.), The Social History of Occupational 
Health, Croom Helm, London, pp. 180-206. 
45
 These issues were discussed at the Second International Congress for Occupational Diseases held in Brussels 
in 1910. Leading industrial hygienist, Ludvig Teleky, argued successfully for the equalisation of payments for 
specific diseases and industrial accidents. Subsequently a list of qualifying industrial diseases was drawn up. 
However, implementation of the international agreement on this issue was interrupted by the advent of World 
War 1 and not achieved until 1925.   
46
 The criteria currently employed by the present Industrial Injuries Advisory Council, which advises on the list 
of „prescribed industrial diseases‟ (eligible for Industrial Injuries Disablement Benefit), are based on those 
originally developed by the Samuel Committee in 1906. 
47
 For example, under the terms of the British Workmen‟s Compensation Act of 1906 the definition of an 
„accident‟ required „incapacitation from work for a period of at least one week‟. Within the reports of the Chief 
Inspector of Factories the period was three days.   
 14 
 
of accidents and certain diseases. The definitions employed, therefore, will be those adopted 
by the Factory Inspectorate in their contemporary annual reports.   
The work of the women inspectors spanned a very large number of industries and it has 
been necessary to be selective in terms of those studied here. In making this selection, a 
number of criteria have been employed. First, industries have been selected which were of 
particular importance to women, either because large numbers of women were employed in 
the industry concerned, or because women suffered disproportionately as a result of the 
particular jobs they did. Other criteria relate to the way in which the women inspectors 
engaged with the health and safety problems in particular industries and how this reflected 
developments within the factory department as a whole. On the basis of an examination of 
the annual reports of the Factory Inspectorate, cases have been selected which are 
considered to illustrate the women inspectors’ use of new knowledge, both medical and 
technological, and of new methodology such as the collection and collation of statistics to 
inform prevention and control.  Clearly a selective approach precludes the conclusion that all 
the work of the women inspectors contributed significantly to improvements in the 
occupational health and safety of women workers.  However, the objective of this approach 
is to highlight areas where their work might be considered to have made such a contribution 
and hence to challenge some of the conclusions of the existing historiography. 
 It should be noted that two industries employing large numbers of women during the 
period, the textile industries and the earthenware and china industry, have not been 
included. In the case of the textile industry this omission is based on evidence from the 
factory inspectors’ reports that the women inspectors had little involvement in the 
introduction of health and safety measures in this field.  As one of the original industries of 
the industrial revolution in the 18th century, the textile trade was an old industry by the 
1890s. In the mid 19th century it was the focus of most of the early factory legislation and 
absorbed much of the attention of the first (male) factory inspectors.  A major focus was the 
prevention of accidents by means of machinery guarding, a function traditionally carried out 
by male inspectors who were considered to possess the necessary knowledge of 
engineering. Until their involvement in the problem of accidents in steam-powered 
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laundries, (discussed in chapter 5), women factory inspectors referred all such issues to male 
inspectors.  For this reason their involvement in the textile industries was very limited.   
The earthenware and ceramics industry, by contrast, represented an important focus for the 
work of the women inspectors. By 1901 it employed approximately 23,000 women and was 
a major source of lead poisoning. 48 The inspectors were involved in attempts to reduce this 
from the early 1890s. For example, a dedicated woman inspector was located in the 
potteries for the purpose of overseeing and monitoring the implementation of industrial 
hygiene measures. A major reduction in poisoning was achieved by 1921, an achievement to 
which the women inspectors could be considered to have made an important contribution. 
This industry, however, has already been the subject of several detailed analyses, 49 
including examinations of the development of health and safety measures. It was 
considered, therefore, that an examination of other less well-researched industries would, 
potentially, offer a more useful contribution in terms of exploring new material.  
 
Case studies selected 
Lead poisoning in the white lead industry 
The majority of workers in the white lead industry were women. Although aspects of the 
regulation of this industry have been the subject of previous analyses, 50 these have focussed 
primarily on the exclusion of women from parts of the trade and the examination of the 
relationship between this measure and a purported, ideologically-based government 
agenda.  Little attention has been given to other aspects of factory regulation or to the work 
of the women inspectors.  In the present thesis the different measures adopted by the 
                                                          
48
 Whipp, R. (1990), Patterns of Labour. Work and Social Change in the Pottery Industry, Routledge, London, p. 
18. 
49
 Bartrip, P. (1996), „Petticoat pestering: the Women‟s Trade Union League and Lead Poisoning in the 
Staffordshire Potteries, 1890-1914‟,  Historical Studies in Industrial Relations, Vol. 2,  pp. 3-25; Malone, C. 
(2003), Women’s Bodies and Dangerous Trades in England, 1880-1914, Boydell Press, Woodbridge, Suffolk, 
pp. 52-73; Harrison, B. (1989), „“ Some of them gets lead poisoned”:  Occupational lead exposure in women, 
1880-1914‟, Social History of Medicine, Vol. 2, pp. 171-193; Holdsworth, C. (1997), „Women‟s work and 
family health: evidence from the Staffordshire Potteries, 1890-1920‟, Continuity and Change, Vol.12, Part 1, 
pp.103-128. 
50
 Malone, C. (1996), ‘The Gendering of Dangerous Trades: Government Regulation of Women’s Work in the 
White Lead Trade in England, 1892-1898’, Journal of Women’s History, Vol. 8, Part 1, pp. 15-29. 
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factory inspectorate are considered to provide an example of emerging approaches to 
prevention and control. These included an initial focus on prohibition, but also a subsequent 
and rapid movement towards an emphasis on industrial hygiene. The need to control 
exposure to lead dust was relatively uncontroversial during this period since the relationship 
between the exposure and the disease was well established. This is in contrast, for example, 
to the delay in the introduction of control measures in relation to silica dust, both in Britain 
51 and the United States, 52 where the distinction between tuberculosis and silicosis 
remained a subject of debate. However, the nature of control measures in the lead works 
was affected by other debates. First, there remained uncertainty about the relative 
importance of inhalation or ingestion as the primary means of uptake. Thus it was unclear 
whether prevention should focus on reducing the lead dust in the air, or on the risk of lead 
getting on to the hands, and from there on to the workers’ food.  Second, the question of 




Accidents and injuries in laundries 
 
During the early 20th century laundry work increasingly moved out of the home into 
premises employing steam powered equipment. The development of small workshops 
where groups of women worked under a single employer brought the laundry industry 
under the umbrella of factory regulation, while the introduction of new technology had 
important effects on health and safety. Thus the inexperienced use of new machinery 
resulted in a high incidence of accidents and injuries amongst a predominantly female 
workforce. The laundry industry is a somewhat neglected topic in the field of occupational 
health and tends to be grouped with the so-called ‘sweated trades’, where women worked 
long-hours for low pay, often in their own homes. 53 In addition, those writers who have 
                                                          
51
 Bryder, L. „Tuberculosis, silicosis, and the slate industry in North Wales, 1927-1939‟, in Weindling, P. (ed.), 
The Social History of Occupational Health, Croom Helm, London, pp. 108-126. 
52
 Rosner, D. & Markowitz, G. (1991), Deadly Dust. Silicosis and the Politics of Occupational Disease in 
Twentieth Century America, Princeton University Press, Princeton, pp.19-31.  
53
 Holloway, G. (2005), Women and Work in Britain since 1840, Routledge, London. pp. 22-24. 
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discussed the laundry industry 54 and who have also considered health and safety 
regulations 55 have focussed almost exclusively on the subject of working hours. The 
examination of industrial injuries and the work of the women inspectors in this setting, 
however, illustrate both the increasing use of statistics in the factory department during this 
period and the involvement of women inspectors in engineering control, a subject previously 
confined to male inspectors.   
 
Ventilation in small workshops 
Small workshops provided employment for thousands of women during the early 20th 
century. Discussion of these workshops, however, has similarly tended to be subsumed 
under that relating to the more general title of the ‘sweated trades’. The term ‘sweating’ 
encompassed a range of factors, including not only long hours and low wages but also 
insanitary conditions. As historian Sheila Blackburn has noted, however, both within 
government and contemporary reform groups, the term became largely synonymous with 
only one of these factors, that of poor pay. 56 As a result the political solution concentrated 
on the concept of a minimum wage and the establishment of the Trade Boards. During this 
period small workshops became a major focus for the work of the women factory inspectors 
who attempted to address a different aspect of the problem, notably the insanitary 
conditions. Their work has received little historical attention and has tended to be dismissed 
on the grounds of the assumption that their numbers were too small to have made any 
appreciable difference to working conditions. 57 Moreover, in common with the discussion of 
laundries, there is a tendency in the literature to focus on homeworking and to neglect the 
increasing tendency during the early part of the 20th century for women to be concentrated 
                                                          
54
 Mohun, A.P. (1999), Steam Laundries. Gender, Technology and Work in the United States and Great Britain, 
1880-1940. John Hopkins University Press, Baltimore. 
55
 Kessler- Harris,  A. (2003), Out to Work. A History of Wage- Earning women in the United States, Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, p. 112. 
56
 Blackburn, S. (1991), „Ideology and Social Policy: The Origins of the Trade Boards Act‟, The Historical 
Journal, Vol. 34, Part 1, pp. 43-64. 
57
 Pennington, S. & Westover, B. (1989), A Hidden Workforce. Homeworkers in England, 1850-1985, 
MacMillan Education Ltd, Basingstoke, Hampshire, p. 108. The authors‟ consistent reference to the factory 
inspector as „he‟ and „him‟ suggest that they were unaware of the existence of women inspectors during the early 
20
th
 century.  
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in small groups outside the home, working for a single employer. The focus in this thesis, 
therefore, is on the activities of the women inspectors in relation to such workshops, 
specifically in relation to one aspect of the problem, that of ventilation. This is considered to 
provide an illustration of the extent of their engagement with technological developments 
and new concepts of disease.   
 
Health, Safety and Welfare in World War 1 
The final case study has examined the work of the women inspectors during the First World 
War and is included because the period was a particularly important one in terms of changes 
in women’s employment patterns and in the nature of the inspectors’ role. It offers a 
contrast to the previous three case studies in that it discusses a period when, as a result of 
wartime government policy, there was a discontinuity in the inspectors’ normal work. 
Although developments in industrial health and safety arrangements continued, these were 
increasingly contained within a larger programme of industrial welfare, reflecting an 
increasing preoccupation with Taylorist management techniques 58 and emerging notions of 
overall worker well-being as a means of improving performance. In addition, there were 
concerns about the potential effects on the moral state of the nation as a result of mass 
female employment. These concerns resulted in the diversion of the women inspectors into 
aspects of welfare which contained elements of social control and which seem to have 
placed the women inspectors in a position of moral authority over working women.  It is 
argued, therefore, that there was a discontinuity in their work as health and safety 
professionals during this period and that their contribution to improvements in health and 
safety was correspondingly reduced.    
 In advance of the discussion of the four case studies, chapters 2 and 3 provide the context 
for the examination of the work of the women inspectors in terms of the factors leading to 
their initial appointment in 1893. Thus chapter 2 discusses the development of the existing 
Factory Inspectorate during the course of the 19th century, and the nature of its form and 
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 Sundstrom, E. (1986), Work Places. The Psychology of the Physical Environment in Offices and Factories, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, p. 19. 
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function in the early 1890s, while chapter 3 considers how the appointment of women 
inspectors reflected the aspirations of some parts of the 19th century women’s movement 
and considers the attitudes and expectations which accompanied their appointment as a 
result. These chapters form the backdrop to the case studies contained in chapters 4 to 7. 
The concluding chapter 8 returns to the central questions of the thesis and considers how 
the activities of the women inspectors, as depicted in the case studies, demonstrated both 
an important contribution to women’s occupational health and safety and a growing 





Chapter 2  
The Development of the Factory Inspectorate before 1893 
The very streets which receive the droppings of an ‘Anti-Slavery 
Society’ are every morning wet with the tears of innocent victims of 
the accursed shrine of avarice, who are compelled (not by the cart 
whip of the Negro slave-driver) but by the dread of the equally 
appalling thong or strap of the overlooker, to hasten half-dressed, 
but not half-fed, to those magazines of infantile slavery – the worsted 
mills in the town and neighbourhood of Bradford. 
1 
         Richard Oastler 1830 
 
Richard Oastler, who penned these words in 1830, was a propagandist for the Factory 
Reform Movement 2 which pressed for improvements in the working conditions of children 
employed in British textile mills. Nearly thirty years earlier, the Health and Morals of 
Apprentices Act 3 of 1802 had sought to provide a measure of protection for the moral and 
physical welfare of the pauper apprentices 4 who by the late 18th century formed 
approximately one third of the workforce in British textile factories. 5 While moral 
considerations were prominent, 6 some physical concerns were also addressed. Under the 
Act, children’s hours of work were to be reduced to twelve per day, night work was to be 
                                                          
1
 Oastler, R. (October 16, 1830). ‘Yorkshire Slavery’, Leeds Mercury. Richard Oastler, (1789-1861), was steward 
for absentee landlord, Thomas Thornhill, at the Thornhill estate in Yorkshire. Oastler strongly supported the 
preservation of the traditional estate system whereby property owners maintained control over their workers, 
whilst exercising a duty of protective care. He also campaigned for the abolition of slavery in the West Indies.  
2
 The Factory Reform Movement during this period consisted of an alliance of ideological opponents which 
included radical socialists committed to the reform of the structure of society, some more enlightened factory 
owners and Tory philanthropists, many of whom were also motivated by a desire to curb the power of the new 
factory owning elite.  
3
 Health and Morals of Apprentices Act, 1802 (42 Geo.III, c.73). 
4
 Owners of large textile mills purchased large numbers of children from workhouses who were bound by a 
contract of employment (‘apprenticed’) for several years. They came to be known as ‘pauper apprentices’. This 
reduced labour costs since children were much cheaper to employ than adults.  
5
 Honeyman, K. (2007), Child Workers in England. 1780-1820. Parish Apprentices and the Making of the Early 
Industrial Labour Force, Ashgate, Aldershot, p. 105. 
6
 For example, under the Act separate bedrooms were to be provided for the two sexes and children should 
sleep no more than two to a bed. For the first four years of apprenticeship they should receive at least one 
hour of Christian teaching each Sunday. 
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abolished and factories were to be lime washed and properly ventilated. These proposals 
reflected two overriding concerns of the time, namely the poor health of many child 
labourers and the need to control outbreaks of typhus in places where large groups of 
people were gathered together. Thus, despite an increasing toll of industrial accidents and 
some initial understanding of the hazardous effects of dust and fumes, physical welfare 
during this period was rather narrowly defined, focussing  on the high risk of fever and on 
the generally retarded growth and debilitated constitution of the typical child labourer. Since 
the former represented a risk, not only to the labourers but also to other sections of society, 
and since both problems represented a threat to production, such concerns presumably 
arose from somewhat mixed motives. The Act was, however, notable in the sense that it 
marked a first attempt on behalf of the state to regulate the conditions of labour. 7  
Unfortunately it was equally notable for its lack of observance, not least because its 
implementation was monitored by voluntary ‘factory visitors’, many of whom were 
themselves factory owners or members of the owners’ families.  
In contrast to the 1802 Act, the subsequent Factory Act to Regulate the Labour of Children 
and Young Persons in Mills and Factories, 8 passed in 1833, introduced the idea that the 
state had a role, not only in factory regulation, but also in its subsequent enforcement. In 
1832 Lord Grey’s Reform Act  9 had substantially increased the franchise and granted new 
seats in the House of Commons to industrial towns and cities, replacing those which had 
previously represented small communities with tiny populations (the so called ‘rotten 
boroughs’). The newly formed House of Commons, with an overwhelming Whig majority, 
introduced a series of measures designed to address some of the humanitarian concerns of 
the day. 10  This included the institution of a Royal Commission to enquire into the conditions 
of employment of children in British factories. 11 Evidence collected from sub-
                                                          
7
 The only previous state intervention in employment conditions had been the ‘Statute of Artificers’ (1558-63) a 
group of laws which regulated the supply and conduct of labour in relation to apprenticeships and the 
professions, essentially taking over the functions of the feudal craft guilds.      
8
 Factory Act, 1833 (3 & 4 Will. IV, c.103). 
9
 The Representation of the People Act, 1832 (2 & 3 Will. IV, c.45). 
10
 Significantly, in view of Oastler’s comments, these included the Slavery Abolition Act, 1833 (3 &4 Will. IV, c 
73). 
11
 First Report of the Central Board of His Majesty’s Commissioners for Inquiry into the Employment of Children 
in Factories; with Minutes of Evidence and Reports by Medical Commissioners, (1833), PP 1833 XX & XXI. 
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commissioners, appointed around the country, highlighted the excessive working hours, the 
dirty and dangerous conditions and the cruelty and violence experienced by many child 
labourers at that time. Some historians have suggested that the compelling verbal accounts 
of children contained in these reports were an important contributor to the changing 
perception of childhood around this period. Thus children were for the first time seen in a 
more sentimental light, with less emphasis on their utility as an economic unit. 12 Among the 
recommendations of the report, which formed the basis of the 1833 Factory Act, was the 
replacement of the largely ineffective visitors by officially appointed government inspectors. 
In August 1833, therefore, four men were duly appointed and the Factory Inspectorate was 
born.  
The original appointees were not greeted with unalloyed enthusiasm by members of the 
Factory Reform movement who noted their lack of experience of factory conditions, their 
small numbers and the role of patronage in their appointments. Described by a 
contemporary as, ‘a briefless lawyer, a broken down merchant, a poor aristocrat and an 
intimate friend of Lieutenant Drummond’, 13 it was assumed that they would conspire with 
factory owners to render the new Act ineffective.  Moreover, social reformer Charles Wing 14 
wrote in 1837 that ‘the few inspectors and superintendents that are appointed would need 
the eyes of Argus, the hands of Briareus, the seven-league boots of Jack the Giant-killer, with 
his coat of invisibility, to discharge their duties effectually.’ Despite these difficult 
beginnings, however, at least some of the inspectors appear to have gained a measure of 
respect as the years progressed.  The ‘intimate friend of Lieutenant Drummond’, Leonard 
Horner., had a long and distinguished career and ultimately received this tribute from Karl 
Marx, who maintained a close interest in the inspectors’ reports: 
                                                          
12
 Steedman, C. (1990), Childhood, Culture and Class in Britain. Margaret MacMillan, 1860-1931, Virago, 
London, pp. 63-65. 
13
 Comment made during Short Time Committee at Birstall, West Yorkshire, (1833), quoted in, Health and 
Safety Executive, (1983), Her Majesty’s Inspectors of Factories, 1883-1983. Essays to commemorate 150 years 
of Health and Safety Inspection, HMSO, London, p. 68. The four factory inspectors were respectively Thomas 
Howell, Robert Rickards, Robert Saunders and Leonard Horner. 
14
 Wing, C. (1837), Evils of the Factory System Demonstrated by Parliamentary Evidence.Part 1, Dissertation on 
the Evils of the Factory System, Saunders & Otley, London, p. vi. Charles Wing was a surgeon at the Royal 
Metropolitan Hospital for Children. 
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...he rendered invaluable service to the English working class, 
carrying on a lifelong contest, not only against embittered factory 
owners, but also against the ministers of State, to whom the number 
of votes given by the factory owners in the Lower House, was of 
more importance than was the number of hours worked by the 
hands in the mills. 
15 
As Marx’s comment implied, a primary focus of the early Factory Inspectorate was the 
regulation of working hours. Initially this reflected contemporary public concerns about the 
long hours worked by children, a factor highlighted by the findings of the Children’s 
Employment Commission of 1833 and reinforced by those of the subsequent Commission of 
1842. Thus, the Factory Act of 1844 stipulated that children under the age of nine, as 
certified by specially appointed factory surgeons, 16 could not be employed in textile mills 
(other factories being exempt from the Act), while those under the age of thirteen were 
prohibited from working for more than nine hours per day and were required to have at 
least two hours schooling daily. 17 An unintended consequence of the restrictions on child 
labour, however, was an increase in the recruitment of young women into the textile trade, 
a development which tapped into growing public anxiety about the potential moral 
consequences of female labour.  This had earlier been awakened by sensational reports 
about the employment of semi-naked women and children in coal mines. In 1842 the Mines 
Act 18 had for the first time grouped women and children together in prohibiting their 
employment in underground mining. In 1844 a new Factory Act 19 adopted a similar principle 
in respect of textile factories, restricting the working hours of women and of ‘young 
persons’, (defined as those between the ages of thirteen and eighteen), to twelve per day.  
Subsequently the Act of 1847 (the ‘Ten Hours Act’) 20 reduced this to ten.  In the absence of 
any of the moral concerns attendant on the employment of women, men were excluded 
from all of this legislation. Moreover, there was a prevailing assumption that interference in 
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 Marx, K. (1906), Capital: A critique of political economy. Vol 1. Modern Library, New York, p. 249, note. 1. 
16
 Factory Act, 1844 (7 & 8 Vict. c.15). 
17
 Before the establishment of local School Boards, required by the Elementary Education Act of 1870, (33 & 34 
Vict. c.75), it was also the inspectors’ responsibility to ensure that facilities existed for the provision of this 
education.   
18
 Mines Act, 1842 (5 & 6 Vict. c.99). 
19.
Factory Act, 1844 (7 & 8 Vict. c.15). 
20
 Factory Act, 1847 (10 & 11 Vict c. 29). 
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the contract of employment between a man and his employer was both unacceptable and 
unnecessary. This was well-illustrated nearly fifty years later when pottery worker Edward 
Dunn wrote to a factory inspector expressing concerns about the exposure of kiln men to 
high levels of lead. The inspector replied ‘I beg to inform you that enamel kiln men are adult 
males (inspector’s underlining) and therefore well able to take care of themselves’. 21 With 
the gradual extension of the Factory Acts to a wider range of industries, restrictions on the 
working hours of women and children were correspondingly extended to a larger number of 
occupations and the enforcement of working hours regulations thus became a major part of 
the work of the factory inspectorate.   
A second major focus for the early inspectors was the prevention of industrial accidents. 
Almost from their inception they had begun to collect and record some rudimentary 
accident statistics and their regular reports contained numerous accounts of serious 
incidents involving unguarded factory machinery. An entry from 1842 provides a graphic 
picture of both conditions and workers in a typical textile factory.  
A man named Campbell, the overlooker of the room in which it 
happened, was mending a belt which was held for him by a little girl. 
Another girl named Burns, 14 or 15 years old, incautiously running 
between them and an upright revolving shaft, got her clothes 
entangled with the shaft, and whilst Campbell was trying to extricate 
her, the girl who had been holding the belt for him, being frightened 
threw it down and ran away. The belt getting entangled with the 
teeth of the shaft, caught Campbell also and both he and little Burns 
were drawn up and before the machinery could be stopped, almost 
crushed to pieces. 
22
  
The inspector went on to report eleven further accidents, (four fatal), of whom ten were to 
children under the age of sixteen, which had occurred during the previous quarter. 
Information such as this subsequently informed the development of a series of Acts, 
beginning with the Factory Act of 1844, 23 which required the occupiers 24 of textile factories 
to fence the moving parts of machinery and to institute various other safety precautions.  
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 Dawkins-Cramp, William, Superintendant Inspector for the Midlands, (9 February 1893), Letter to Edward 
Dunn. National Archives HO45/9851/B12393E.   
22
 Annual Report of the Chief Inspector of Factories and Workshops for the Year 1932 (Including a Review of the 
Years 1833-1932), Cmd. 4377 (1933), HMSO, London, p. 26. 
23
 Factory Act, 1844 (7 & 8 Vict. c.15). 
24
 A term for those who owned or leased the premises, usually synonymous with ‘employer’. 
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Moreover, as the century progressed and increasing numbers of workers were employed in 
various forms of manufacturing, 25 early narrow definitions of what constituted a ‘factory’ 
(often negotiated by factory owners seeking exemption from regulations) were gradually 
abandoned. By 1878 the new Factory and Workshop Act 26 interpreted this term in a much 
wider sense. 27 Andrew Ure,  writing shortly after the inspectors first took up their duties, 
reported that there were just over 3,154 textile factories in Britain, which would have come 
under their jurisdiction. 28 By the end of the century this had grown to 233,312 
 workplaces. 29  
From their initial appointment, factory inspectors possessed considerable powers, notably 
the power to prosecute under the criminal law. They also had the legal right to demand 
entry into a factory at any time of the day or night for the purpose of enforcing legislation. 
The obstruction of an inspector in the execution of his duty constituted a criminal offence.   
Historian Peter Bartrip has noted that the confrontational and reforming culture of the 19th 
century Factory Inspectorate was markedly different from that of its parent department, the 
Home Office, which in other areas favoured a more conservative and consensual 
approach. 30 The work of the factory inspectors frequently brought them into direct conflict 
with influential industrialists and with magistrates who failed to impose adequate penalties. 
Thus their views and allegiances were often in opposition to those of their bureaucratic 
masters.  Partly for these reasons and partly because of its small staff and large workload 31 
the Home Office appears to have allowed the Factory Inspectorate to operate almost 
completely autonomously, exercising minimal control over its activities. Historian Jill Pellow, 
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in her discussion of ten Home Office inspectorates created between 1832 and 1876, similarly 
notes a distance between the activities of the central officials of the Home Office and the 
staff of its dependent agencies. 32  She argues that the increasing expertise of inspectors 
during this period discouraged interference from Home Office officials, whose knowledge of 
workplaces was limited and whose social and educational status was relatively low. 
The growing expertise of the Factory Inspectorate assumed a more formal professional 
dimension following the appointment, in 1879, of Alexander Redgrave as Chief Inspector of 
Factories. 33 During his period of office higher educational requirements and improved 
training for inspectors were introduced, recruitment was increased and the Factory 
Department was organised into five separate districts, each presided over by a 
superintendent inspector.  By the 1880s inspectors routinely advised on machinery safety, 
negotiated the implementation of improvements with employers, provided guidance on the 
interpretation of legislation, as well prosecuting under the law.  Annual reports were 
prepared detailing accident numbers and types in various sectors of industry as well as lists 
of prosecutions undertaken. By the early 1890s there were over 60 factory inspectors 
operating throughout the United Kingdom and in 1892, a typical year, they secured 2,376 
convictions against employers for various contraventions of the Factory Acts. 34 For most of 
this period, however, there was little reference to the risk of industrial disease other than 
occasional general statements about foul and dusty air and the need for ventilation,  
reflecting the prevailing public health model of disease causation and prevention which 
emphasised pervasive environmental influences, identified by the presence of dirt and 
offensive smells,  rather than single causes associated with specific agents. 35 By the middle 
of the 19th century a small number of physicians had published various concerns about the 
health hazards associated with particular occupations 36 and industrial medicine pioneer, 
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Charles Turner Thackrah, had produced a first text on the subject, covering 100 trades in his 
native Leeds. 37 However, it was not until the final years of the 19th century that matters of 
occupational health and disease, as opposed to occupational safety, began to receive the 
attention of politicians and policymakers. Bartrip suggests a number of reasons for this. 38 In 
earlier years widespread problems of cholera, typhoid fever and phthisis (tuberculosis) 
tended to dwarf any residual concerns about other sources of ill-health. Moreover, in many 
cases, lack of medical knowledge hindered attempts to determine the link between a disease 
and exposure to particular agents in the workplace. These difficulties, he suggests, were 
exacerbated by the slow progress of many industrial diseases. Hence there was rarely a 
‘body on the floor’ to motivate investigation and prevention.  Rather, the victims of 
occupational disease tended to retreat from the workplace, rendering themselves largely 
invisible.  
During the last years of the 19th century new legislation, which increasingly acknowledged 
the link between industrial conditions and ill health, and thus focussed on the control of 
dangerous substances and processes, began to shift the emphasis in terms of the inspectors’ 
activities on the ground.  In 1882, prompted by an article in the Daily News, 39 newly elected 
Liberal MP Thomas Burt drew the attention of the Home Secretary, Sir William Vernon 
Harcourt, to allegations of lead poisoning in the white lead factories of East London and 
Tyneside and, in particular, to the recent death from lead poisoning of one Hannah 
McCarthy in Shoreditch Infirmary. 40 At Hannah’s inquest Mr Forbes, the Medical Officer of 
Shoreditch Workhouse, had commented that such deaths were a common occurrence and 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Redditch, Thomas Percival wrote about lead poisoning in miners and smelter workers, William Allison wrote 
about respiratory problems in Edinburgh stonemasons and Charles Hastings wrote about diseases among 
porcelain and leather workers in Worcestershire.   
37
 Thackrah C.T. (1832), The Effects of Arts, Trades and Professions and of Civic States and Habits of Living, on 
Health and Longevity: with Suggestions for the Removal of Many of the Agents which Produce Disease and 
Shorten the Duration of Life, Longman, London. Charles Turner Thackrah, (1795-1833), was a physician and 
supporter of Factory Reform who was particularly concerned about the employment of children in textile mills.  
38
 Bartrip, P.W.J. (2002), The Home Office and the Dangerous Trades: Regulating Occupational Disease in 
Victorian and Edwardian Britain, Rodopi, Amsterdam, p. 10. 
39
 Report of inquest (3 April 1882), Daily News. This newspaper was founded in 1846 by Charles Dickens who 
was (briefly) its first editor. It was a mouthpiece for liberal social reformist views and campaigned on issues 
relating to social and factory reform.     
40
 Hansard’s Parliamentary Debates (4 April 1882), Vol. 268, pp. 666-7. 
 28 
 
that little was done to protect the workers. Burt had also received letters from the Chairman 
of the Gateshead Board of Guardians and from the Rector of Gateshead expressing the same 
view. 41 The Home Secretary requested a report on the matter from Alexander Redgrave, 
who personally visited white lead works in London and Newcastle upon Tyne. Largely as a 
consequence of his findings the first major piece of industrial health legislation was passed 
the following year, 42 requiring Home Office certification of all white lead works and 
compliance with certain ‘special rules’ 43 which covered hygiene, ventilation and sanitation. 
A few years later, in 1892, Charles Booth  published the first of his influential reports on the 
living and working conditions of the poor in London, 44 while, in the same year, physician, 
Thomas Arlidge, produced the first comprehensive text on industrial medicine to appear in 
Britain. 45 These developments, alongside increasing industrial unrest and trade union 
activity, 46 fuelled by economic depression and growing unemployment, 47 provided the 
stimulus for the establishment of the Royal Commission on Labour. 48 The Commission 
which, over two years, conducted enquiries into working conditions in a wide range of 
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industries across the United Kingdom, ultimately recommended the establishment of the 
‘Dangerous Trades Committees’ 49 to identify risks to health and safety in particular 
industries and to recommend special rules. However, although such rules were legally 
enforceable, in practice they were rarely implemented, largely because they were open to 
appeal by employers, who then had a legal right to enter into an arbitration process with the 
Home Office. 50  This was a time consuming process frequently viewed by civil servants, as 
well as by inspectors and workers, as a tactic adopted by employers to delay the 
implementation of the rules, or occasionally to achieve their dilution or complete 
circumvention. This situation continued until 1901, when the Factory Act of that year  51 
removed the right of employers to insist on arbitration.   
This brief chronology of 19th century factory legislation reflects a gradual extension of the 
inspector’s remit to include matters of health and disease as well as safety together with a 
more general strengthening of government control over the way in which factories 
operated. This in turn reflected a more general political trend away from earlier laissez-faire 
approaches to economic activity and towards state interventionism and bureaucracy. 52 
Increasingly government policy was underpinned less by the opinions of influential 
individuals and more by scientific and technological information and numerical data. Thus 
the growing national enthusiasm for the collection and collation of statistics which had 
earlier taken hold in the field of public health had, by the 1890s, pervaded the newly 
emerging field of occupational medicine. 53 Within the Factory Department, this took the 
form of a requirement for detailed records of the numbers and types of different factories, 
instances of accidents and disease as well as prosecutions undertaken and fines imposed. 
Changes in the occupants of controlling positions in the Home Office and in the Factory 
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Department brought further shifts in culture and approach.  Alexander Redgrave, Chief 
Inspector since 1879, retired in 1891 and the following year saw the election of a Liberal 
government and the appointment of a new Home Secretary, Herbert Asquith. 54  At this 
juncture the relationship between the Home Office and the Factory Inspectorate appears to 
have undergone a radical change. Asquith was keenly interested in industrial health reform 
and determined to bring the work of the inspectorate into the mainstream of Home Office 
activity. Moreover, he began to institute a change of culture in the Home Office itself, 
creating a more innovative and proactive department. 55 The introduction of competitive 
entry requirements resulted in the recruitment of better educated civil servants. The 
inspectorate thus entered a new phase of development as an accountable part of an 
increasingly interventionist government.  
Redgrave’s successor, 56 R. E. Sprague Oram, 57 had first entered the inspectorate in 1861 
and had worked his way through the ranks of the Factory Department during Redgrave’s 
reign as Chief Inspector. Oram’s tenure in the post was, in fact, relatively short-lived, lasting 
only four years. He retired in 1896 to be succeeded, not by an existing superintendent 
inspector, but by a physician, Arthur Whitelegge, 58 whose appointment appeared to signal a 
recognition of the growing importance of medicine in the practice of health and safety. 59 
Despite his short term of office, however, Oram presided over a significant transition in the 
development the Factory Department and, in particular, was largely responsible for driving 
through one particular reform, the introduction of women inspectors.   Redgrave’s trenchant 
opposition had for many years constituted a considerable obstacle to this development. 
However, his retirement in 1891, as well as the appointment of a new Home Secretary in 
1892, provided a window of opportunity for those women’s organisations, notably the 
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Women’s Trade Union League (WTUL) 60  which for several years had been committed to the 
establishment of a women’s section. Oram, a strong supporter of the idea, immediately 
showed himself both willing and able to prevail against the considerable opposition which 
emanated from senior factory inspectors. 61  Asquith, meanwhile, was also enthusiastic, not 
least because of his close personal connections with a network of reformers dedicated to the 
cause. This included Liberal MP Charles Dilke and his wife Emilia, president of the WTUL, as 
well as Jack Tennant, 62 Asquith’s private secretary, who chaired the Dangerous Trades 
Committee and who, with Dilke, was a prominent parliamentary advocate for occupational 
health regulation. In 1896 Tennant married Emilia Dilke’s secretary, May Abraham, who in 
1893 had became the first woman Factory Inspector, while in the same year Tennant’s sister 
had became Asquith’s wife. In recalling his support for the appointment of women 
inspectors Asquith said later that he considered they would be particularly well-suited to 
investigate problems associated with occupational health. 63 It was a view perhaps 
reinforced by the fact that the first major industrial health issue on his agenda concerned 
the employment of women in the white lead trade. Women inspectors promised to be 
useful allies in his efforts to negotiate a course through this highly charged and controversial 
issue. 64  It was against this background therefore that, in May 1893, May Abraham, the 
daughter of an Irish barrister and Mary Muirhead Paterson, the daughter of a prosperous 
Glasgow bootmaker 65 were appointed as the first female factory inspectors.
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The Formation of the Women’s Factory Inspectorate 
... it has been argued that where women are employed some 
enquiries could be more appropriately made by women…but it is 
seldom necessary to put a single question to a female.  Possibly some 
details, here and there, might be superintended by a female 
inspector... but I fail to see advantages likely to arise from her 
ministrations in the factory...so opposite to her sphere of good work 
in the hospital, the school or the home. ...the general and 
multifarious duties of an inspector of factories would really be 
incompatible with the gentle and home-loving character of a 
woman...Factory inspecting requires activity and acumen and the 




     Alexander Redgrave 1879 
In 1893 the appointment of women to relatively high positions within the civil service was 
almost unprecedented. While local public health departments had occasionally appointed 
women sanitary inspectors, only in the field of children’s education and welfare had women 
previously been appointed at this level in central government. 2 Unsurprisingly Asquith faced 
considerable opposition from a number of Home Office officials and serving male inspectors, 
many of whom doubted the competence of women and considered them inherently 
unsuited to the role. He wrote later that ‘Of all the innovations, the institution of female 
inspectors of factories and workshops was perhaps regarded in the office with most 
misgivings’. 3  In addition, there were administrative concerns about the organisation of the 
women’s work. Instead of appointing the women to particular districts under the supervision 
of a superintendent inspector, as would have been the case with a male appointee, Oram 
elected to designate them as peripatetic, reporting directly to him. Moreover he drew up a 
list of duties largely based on those of a superintendent inspector, albeit at the rate of pay of 
a junior inspector (£200 per year) and omitting any responsibility for machinery safety. The 
latter was presumably regarded as outside the competence of women, given the nature of 
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their educational backgrounds.    They were to focus their inspections on the conditions of 
women and girls but, significantly, they were to inform the Chief Inspector of any problems 
they encountered amongst male workers, in order that these might be referred to the 
superintendent inspector of the district concerned. 4   Their position was therefore highly 
unusual and somewhat ambiguous. It is clear that many superintendents perceived them as 
an annoyance and even as spies for the Chief Inspector, while junior inspectors feared 
territorial conflicts and duplications of work which might generate confusion among workers 
and employers and potentially undermine their authority.   
Certainly the early women inspectors appeared to have had a close and supportive 
relationship with Oram, which many superintendents must have found disconcerting and 
threatening. Inspector Lucy Deane noted in her diary in 1894 that Oram had warned her that 
Mr Dawkins-Cramp, Superintendent in the Midlands, disliked women inspectors and that she 
was to be careful in her dealings with him. 5 On other occasions she reported on the hostility 
and obstruction emanating from male inspectors.  Some were ‘disagreeable and when a 
woman is sent to help them they will send her to those places visited shortly before them... 
thus virtually wasting her time and rendering her position...ridiculous’. 6 Others were more 
subtle in their approach. Mr Arnold, District Inspector for Worcester was, she noted, ‘very 
careless about Forms and Abstracts’. 7 He was also ‘very nice, but evidently wants to 
hoodwink me and keep me “harmless’’’. 8 By contrast, Captain Bevan, the District Inspector 
for Nottingham met her for dinner one evening and ‘at once burst into a furious tirade’. He 
accused her of ‘going into places and finding fault where he had never done so’. He also 
professed himself to be ‘very hurt about Miss Abraham’s prosecutions’. 9  Deane recorded 
that she informed him that she was not his assistant, nor had she exceeded her instructions 
and  at a later stage she reported the encounter to Oram, who confirmed that she had 
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‘behaved correctly’. 10 Male fears that the women sometimes operated as informants were 
perhaps not entirely unfounded. May Abraham seems to have relished the privileged 
position of the women, which rested in large measure on the support of Oram.  Commenting 
on the hostility of some male inspectors she remarked to Deane that ‘the men have been lax 
in their work...they are angry at what virtually amounts to an Inspection of their inspecting 
work’. 11 These examples serve to illustrate some of the attitudes which the early inspectors 
brought to their work as well as the difficulties they faced. Thus their appointment 
presented a considerable challenge to a factory inspectorate already undergoing radical 
change.  
Viewed from the perspective of the Home Office, therefore, the appointment of the first two 
women inspectors was one of a series of significant and sometimes uncomfortable changes 
which took place during the 1890s. For Abraham, Paterson and their supporters, however, 
the perspective was somewhat different.  Essentially these appointments represented the 
achievement of two objectives of which the first was the promotion of employment 
opportunities for middle-class women. Redgrave’s comments of 1879, noted at the head of 
this section, encapsulated the attitudes which they sought to demolish. Secondly, however, 
the campaign for women factory inspectors was driven by wider concerns about industrial 
reform, and it is here that it came into conflict with certain aspects of contemporary 
feminism which, during the final years of the 19th century encompassed a broad spectrum of 
ideological positions. These ranged, for example, from the uncompromising ambition for 
total equality between the genders to the more moderate pursuit of parity, later termed 
‘social feminism’, where the needs, qualities and aspirations of women were regarded as 
different but nevertheless of equal significance to those of men. 12 The tension between 
different ideological stances impinged on a number of feminist issues of the period and 
determined the degree to which they attracted the support of various individuals and 
organisations.  
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It is clear that the campaign for women inspectors was, from an early stage, based on 
notions of parity rather than total equality. By the early 1890s the driving force behind the 
campaign was the Women’s Trade Union League (WTUL), an umbrella organisation which 
promoted and co-ordinated the activities of women’s trade unions of the period. This 
organisation had, however, grown out of an earlier one, the Women’s Protective and 
Provident League (WPPL), which adhered to the view that protective legislation was 
degrading to women and that banding together in trade unions was the primary means by 
which women could protect themselves and win equal employment rights. 13 In 1878, when 
the WPPL was transformed into the WTUL, its founding President, Emma Paterson, 14  
although apparently maintaining support for total equality on various other matters, 
unexpectedly moved the WTUL behind the campaign for women inspectors. Historian Gerry 
Holloway has suggested that Paterson’s uncharacteristic change of stance can largely be 
explained by simple pragmatism. 15 By the 1890s, she notes, it was becoming increasingly 
clear that the organisation of women into trade unions in order to address concerns about 
their employment conditions was an uphill struggle. As late as 1896, after years of 
campaigning by the WTUL, only approximately 142,000 of the two million women working in 
industry were trade union members and more than half of these came from the traditionally 
well-organised areas of the Lancashire textile industry. 16 Given these realities, various forms 
of state intervention, negotiated by women for women, appeared to be the most productive 
route to improvements in women’s working conditions.  Pragmatism aside, Paterson’s 
actions may also have represented an acceptance that the tide of ideological opinion within 
the women’s movement was turning more generally towards a position of social feminism. 
From 1878 Paterson and others pressed the case for women inspectors at successive 
meetings of the Trade Union Congress (TUC) and succeeded in pushing through a series of 
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resolutions supporting the motion. Historian Helen Jones has noted, however, that official 
trade union endorsement was never translated into any form of action, most of which came 
from members of the WTUL with some sporadic support from some of the weaker men’s 
unions. 17 The larger, more powerful, male-dominated trade unions continued to express 
reservations about the suitability of women for the inspectorate, especially if they were 
called upon to inspect workshops where men were employed.  Moreover, pressure for the 
appointment of women inspectors threatened to divert attention from a current union 
campaign to persuade the Home Office to recruit more working-class men as factory 
inspectors. 
The luke-warm attitude of the TUC reflected the uneasy relationship which had often existed 
between male trade unionists and feminist activists. Writing in 1920 on behalf of the Fabian 
Women’s Group, 18 Barbara Drake described the various interchanges between the two 
during the 1880s, noting that many working men were simply dismissive of women’s issues, 
which they regarded as trivial in the context of the wider labour struggles of the time. 19 For 
others, gender equality represented a threat to male employment prospects and wages, 
leading many women activists to suspect the motives of those male unionists who supported 
protective legislation for women. At the same time, historian Lee Holcombe has noted that 
many union men saw middle-class women as ill-informed ‘do-gooders’, ignorant of industrial 
life and of the very real need for protection of both men and women from ruthless 
employers. 20 As historian Ray Strachey observed ‘The men’s very genuine fears were put 
aside by the feminists as plain sex selfishness, while the ideals of the women were derided 
as middle-class ignorance by the men’. 21 Class-associated divisions were brought into sharp 
focus when arguments developed over the type of women who should be recruited to the 
inspectorate. Working women with direct experience of industrial conditions were favoured 
by male trade unionists and by Emma Paterson and other members of the WTUL. Officials at 
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the Home Office, however, were unequivocally of the view that only middle-class women 
were sufficiently well-educated and authoritative to command the necessary respect. This 
was a view shared by many feminist activists who, Jones argues, conceived of the job as part 
of their campaign to increase the employment opportunities of middle-class women, thus 
further alienating male trade unionists. 22  
Paterson’s early death from diabetes in 1886 resulted in her replacement by Emilia Dilke as 
President of the WTUL. Dilke was primarily a social reformer whose strong support for 
protective legislation for women reflected the growing ascendancy of social feminism within 
the WTUL. The ensuing movement away from demands for total equality appeared to be 
broadly helpful to the League in that it encouraged the support of the male-dominated trade 
unions. Thus in 1890 the WTUL was able to organise, jointly with the TUC, a large 
promotional meeting at the Assembly Hall in London’s Mile End Road. The gathering 
attracted considerable public and press interest and Emily Faithful, founder of the women’s 
Victoria Press, 23 published a strongly worded article in The Times which underlined the 
premise that the interests of women workers could only be understood and protected by 
women. 24   In the same year, Emilia Dilke successfully argued that women needed special 
representation on the newly inaugurated Royal Commission on Labour since their limited 
unionisation might result in aspects of their working conditions being overlooked. The 
government agreed to appoint four Lady Assistant Commissioners, specifically to investigate 
the working conditions of women. The group was chaired by Eliza Orme, 25 a radical 
reformist lawyer. The others were Clara Collet 26 who had worked with Charles Booth to 
collect information for his report into working conditions in East London, 27 Margaret 
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 Irwin, 28 a labour activist who was currently the Secretary of the Scottish Council for 
Women’s Trades and May Abraham. How these women were selected is unrecorded, but 
their reformist backgrounds strongly suggest the influence of the Dilkes and their associates. 
Unsurprisingly, their detailed reports repeatedly underlined the need for women inspectors 
to address the myriad concerns of women workers which they identified. 29  
Early in 1893 a deputation of several women’s organisations led by Emilia Dilke met with 
Asquith who finally agreed to the appointment of two women inspectors. Requests from 
women trade unionists that experienced factory workers should be appointed were 
overruled and it was agreed that the posts should be offered only to well-educated, middle-
class women. Dilke, herself, had earlier expressed the view that the backgrounds of working 
women ‘had not prepared them to take the initiative or to organise or to grapple on their 
own responsibility with work’. 30  As Holloway notes, Dilke was unlikely to press for the 
appointment of working women. As a liberal reformer rather than a feminist or socialist she 
was motivated by a desire to ameliorate poor conditions rather than to reform relationships 
dictated by capitalist power. 31  Jones has suggested that the appointment of middle-class 
ladies also offered some form of compromise to those who saw the advent of women 
inspectors as an unwelcome example of governmental concessions to the demands of labour 
activists. 32 Moreover, she argues, women inspectors could be used to defuse potential 
conflict situations in places where women were employed by addressing grievances in 
advance of any political action such as a strike. Certainly the matchmakers strike of 1888, 
widely considered to be the first example of organised action by women workers, had raised 
new issues in relation to the handling of female unionism.  Historian Louise Raw has noted 
that both the police and the Home Office, fettered by social constraints on the physical or 
verbal treatment of women, were somewhat at a loss to know how to deal with female 
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militancy. 33 Women factory inspectors may thus have been regarded as a potentially useful 
governmental negotiating tool at a time of increasing industrial unrest.      
Once appointed, the inspectors, as public servants, were required to maintain, at least 
overtly, a strictly neutral stance on political matters. In 1892 Eliza Orme warned Lucy Deane 
that if she joined the Factory Department she would need to ‘keep clear of public speaking 
or sympathy with anything political or trade union etc’ 34 because the government could not 
employ someone who conspicuously supported a particular cause.  Deane apparently did 
not always heed this advice. She continued to contribute financially to the WTUL and three 
years later, when investigating working conditions in the Irish lace industry, recorded her 
close contacts with the Belfast Textile Workers Union. 35 May Abraham also had connections 
which rendered her vulnerable to accusations of partiality, particularly when a change of 
government in 1895 removed the protection of Asquith.   Abraham was a close friend of 
Vaughan Nash, labour correspondent of the radical newspaper the Daily Chronicle which 
specialised in exposing scandalous working conditions. 36 Both Nash and his wife, radical 
journalist and suffragist Rosalind Shore-Smith, were members of the WTUL committee. 37 By 
contrast, Adelaide Anderson, for most of the period Principal Lady Inspector and thus the 
directing mind of the women’s section, was socially (although not politically) conservative in 
her outlook and tended to stress the need for conformity with government requirements, a 
position which sometimes brought her into conflict with the more radically-minded Deane. 
During an inspection visit to Ireland in 1897, for example, Deane was intent on prosecuting 
the wealthy owners of handkerchief-making factories in Belfast whom she considered 
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colluded with a system of truck, by knowingly allowing sprigging 38 to be placed with women 
outworkers by agents who paid in goods rather than money. Within this exploitative system, 
women outworkers were trapped in considerable poverty and perpetual debt. Deane 
considered that the real beneficiaries were the factory owners who usually claimed 
ignorance of the system and thus escaped legal sanction, while the less powerful and often 
relatively poor agents became the target of prosecution.  Her relentless pursuit of factory 
owners, however, created considerable antagonism amongst influential industrialists at a 
time of delicate Anglo-Irish relations. 39 Her endeavours had to be abandoned when she 
received a telegram from Anderson who, having spoken to Chief Inspector Whitelegge, 
instructed her to curtail her activities. An outraged Deane wrote in her diary ‘This smells of 
the Home Office’. 40  
These examples serve to illustrate the diverse attitudes which different inspectors brought 
to their work as well as the differing expectations of those involved in their initial 
appointment. Over time, as more women inspectors were appointed, this diversity inevitably 
increased.  It is difficult and, it is argued here, ultimately unproductive to categorise these 
women in terms of any political ideological position or to assess their work within this type 
of framework.  What is clear, however, is that the need to protect women from onerous and 
dangerous working conditions was implicit in their approach and that the special problems 
of women within the workplace were not only their primary focus but also the original 
justification for their existence. In their attempts to achieve this protection they employed a 
number of different approaches, which appear to have been determined by practical 
circumstances and by current developments in their professional field, rather than 
underpinned by ideology.  Examples of these are discussed in the following chapters which 
consider four illustrative case studies.
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Chapter 4  
Lead Poisoning in the White Lead Industry 
She was employed in shovelling white lead soaked with water, and 
would not in the performance of this work be brought into contact 
with any dust. The manager stated that she had always been looked 
upon as a healthy girl. All the doctor’s entries referring to Annie Case 
except two are testimonies of good health. On one occasion she is 
marked ‘very pale had better stop away’ From the date of that entry 
an interval of two months elapsed before she recommenced work, 
when the entry is ‘pale but well’. 
1
 
       May Abraham, 1893   
 
In September 1893, four months after her appointment as a factory inspector, May Abraham 
was asked to submit a report to the coroner on the death of 19 year old Annie Case, a 
worker employed at the Millwall White Lead Company in East London. 2  Annie had died on 
the 9th August 1893, having been sent home from work by the foreman on the 18th July, 
because she appeared unwell.  The doctor who attended following her death reported that 
she had died from ‘the cerebral form of lead poisoning attended by colic...the blue line was 
present’, 3 a reference to the blue line which appears on the gums following high exposure 
to lead. 4   Annie Case’s death occurred at a time of heightened public and governmental 
concern about the hazards of employment in the white lead industry. During this period 
white lead was manufactured by the so-called ‘Dutch method’, 5 a process by which metallic 
lead was converted to lead carbonate, otherwise known as white lead.  Some parts of this 
process which involved high exposure to lead-laden dust were carried out primarily by 
women.  In 1883 special rules had been instituted which required the watering down of lead 
during such processes,  thus accounting for Abraham’s perhaps somewhat optimistic 
assessment that Annie Case would not have been exposed to dust during her work. Despite 
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the supposed implementation of these special rules, public concern, fuelled by press 
agitation, remained high. Late in 1892 the Daily Chronicle had published a series of 
sensational articles about the unhealthy conditions in the industry. Under the various titles 
of ‘Death in the workshop’, ‘White cemeteries: Massacre of the innocents’, and ‘Paralysis 
convulsions and death’, the newspaper described how lead was unavoidably ‘gasped into 
the lungs, swallowed in the saliva and absorbed through the skin’ and how the symptoms of 
poisoning progressed through anaemia, headaches, vision problems, convulsions and death.  
Women without any alternative means of support, it was claimed, were forced to accept 
such employment and those fortunate enough to survive often suffered with chronic colic 
and paralysis. 6  
These articles heralded a chain of events in which the newly appointed women inspectors 
were to become central figures and which, in 1898, culminated in the enforcement of new 
special rules governing the production of white lead. 7 These rules contained a range of 
measures designed to prevent the inhalation or ingestion of dust. Significantly, however, 
they also required the exclusion of women from employment in those parts of the process 
where dust exposure was particularly high. This selective exclusion of women was an 
unprecedented and highly controversial approach to disease control. Although women, 
along with children, had previously been subject to a number of restrictions on their working 
hours 8 only in relation to mining and nightwork had the more extreme measure of total 
exclusion been employed, and in both these cases the measure appeared largely a product 
of moral rather than health and safety concerns. 9 Opposition to the exclusion of women 
from parts of the white lead trade came from a number of sources, notably from employers 
concerned about the economic impact on their industry and from the workers themselves 
who feared for their livelihoods. As noted in Chapter 1, some historians have argued that 
this legislation had no basis in contemporary scientific understanding, but rather reflected a 
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belief system that women were the weaker sex in need of protection. The white lead 
regulations, they have maintained, were instituted by a government heavily influenced by 
medical opinion which held that women were constitutionally unsuited to the workplace and 
should be confined to the domestic sphere. 10  This particular interpretation, however, which 
focuses rather narrowly on ideological issues, fails to consider the prevailing political and 
scientific climate of the period which was characterised by increasing state control over 
factory conditions, and by the growing application of medical knowledge to address health 
and safety concerns.  Moreover, the exclusive emphasis on employment rights neglects the 
fundamental question of whether the regulations were, in fact, successful in reducing the 
risk of death and disease from lead poisoning.  This chapter will consider the events leading 
up to the exclusion of women from parts of the white lead trade and examine the role the 
women inspectors played in the process.  It will be argued that the inspectors’ support for 
the measure reflected their agreement with contemporary medical opinion that women 
were more susceptible to lead poisoning than were men, and that female exclusion from 
parts of the trade was, in fact, successful in reducing lead poisoning in women. However, this 
success was tempered by an increase in cases in the men who took over the women’s work. 
Ultimately the approach proved untenable as a long-term solution to the problem and 
attention soon moved to the use of preventative measures within the workplace. Thus, 
while the women inspectors played a central role in the formation and enforcement of 
regulations excluding women from parts of the trade, they were subsequently involved in 
efforts to reduce lead exposure in those parts of the industry where women were still 
employed. In this way their activities reflected the direction in which regulatory policy was 
moving at that time.  
The Dangerous Trade committees of the early 1890s had identified four specific sources of 
industrial poisoning, namely arsenic, mercury, phosphorus and lead. Because of its extensive 
use in many parts of industry, lead represented by far the most serious problem in terms of 
the incidence of disease and the number of fatalities. In 1899, the first year in which deaths 
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were recorded separately, there were 1,258 cases of lead poisoning with 31 deaths. In the 
same year there were 8 cases of phosphorus poisoning and 1 death, no cases of arsenic 
poisoning, and 10 cases (no deaths) of mercury poisoning. 11 Even allowing for inaccuracies 
in the figures, the preponderance of lead poisoning cases was marked. Furthermore, as a 
result of the aforementioned campaign by the Daily Chronicle, the source of lead exposure 
which attracted most public concern during the 1890s was the manufacture of white lead 
and the workers considered most at risk were women. In 1895 lead poisoning became one 
of the initial six notifiable industrial diseases 12 and for the first time there was access to 
some form of statistical data which could be used to determine the size of a particular 
problem and measure the effectiveness of any intervention. An initial perusal of the returns 
from this reporting system (Figure 4.1, below) indicates that total cases of lead poisoning (all 
industries) as well as cases occurring specifically in the white lead industry, decreased 
substantially between 1896 and 1921. Cases in women fell dramatically after 1898 following 
their exclusion from the those parts of the process where dust exposure was particularly 
high, even though they continued to be employed in other parts of the industry. Cases in 
men showed an initial increase following the exclusion of women and then a steady fall, 
almost certainly reflecting the introduction of dust control measures. Data on male and 
female cases separately within the white lead trade were unavailable for the years of the 
First World War (1914-1918 inclusive). However, during the war female prohibition was 
relaxed to some extent in that women over the age of 35 were permitted to work in parts of 
the industry from which they had previously been excluded. 13 It seems likely, therefore, that 
many of the 52 cases which were reported during those four years were in women. By 1920 
official figures suggested that lead poisoning in women had virtually disappeared. None of 
the 17 cases reported that year were in female workers.  
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      Figure 4.1 14  
 
 
In 1934 Dr Thomas Legge, the first specialist Medical Inspector of Factories, published a 
comprehensive review of industrial lead poisoning covering the years since his appointment 
in 1898. 15 He described his cautious optimism at the reduction in poisonings during this 
period, but also some justifiable reservations in his interpretation of the data, pointing to a 
number of limitations and potential sources of bias. 16 Most obviously, the figures lacked a 
denominator in the form of the numbers of people employed in the industry during different 
years. Not only did this make it difficult to compare annual rates, but it precluded any 
meaningful comparison between males and females.  Whilst the numbers of those employed 
were available for the pottery industry, which represented the main source of lead 
poisoning, for the white lead industry they were virtually impossible to obtain. In 1895, May 
Abraham observed that most white lead manufacturers employed both men and women on 
a casual basis, with workers moving in and out of employment at several points during the 
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Cases of lead poisoning notified: 1896-1921 
all industries male 
all industries female 
white lead male 
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year in response to varying degrees of personal economic hardship. 17 Recognising these 
limitations, Legge estimated that approximately 1,201 persons (both men and women) were 
employed in white lead production in 1913 and that 1,119 were employed in 1914. This 
translated into 24 and 26 cases per thousand workers for 1913 and 1914 respectively. 18 If 
one assumes that similar numbers were employed immediately after the war the rate per 
thousand had fallen to 17 by 1920 and to 13 by 1921, an encouraging reduction on pre-war 
figures.  
In the absence of precise figures there are reasonable grounds to assume that overall 
numbers employed in white lead manufacture did remain fairly stable throughout the period 
1890-1920, excluding the war years. Some support for this view is provided by import and 
export figures  (Figure 4.2, below).  
 
Figure 4.219  
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Between 1896 and 1914 imports of pig 20 and sheet lead, from which white lead was 
manufactured, increased from 167,799 metric tons in 1896 to 224,916 metric tons in 1914. 
21 The figures for UK exports of white lead between 1903 and 1913 showed some 
fluctuations but remained around 12,000 tons, with exports peaking at just over 14,000 tons 
in 1912. Overall, therefore, the figures suggest an expansion rather than a contraction in the 
industry and thus it seems reasonable to conclude that the fall in numbers of cases was not a 
reflection of a reduction in the numbers employed. Legge noted that the industry 
maintained regular production up to 1914, at which point it contracted to approximately 
50% of previous output. White lead was predominantly used as a basic ingredient of paint, 
demand for which was considerably reduced during the war. In 1917 the industry was shut 
down completely for six months, but production resumed to about 60% of its former level in 
1918 and increased thereafter. 22 
Legge also drew attention to the difficulties associated with the diagnosis of lead poisoning. 
In his 1934 publication Industrial Maladies he prefaced his section on diagnostic criteria with 
the following caution: 
One difficulty the medical man is faced with is that the cases of 
poisoning he is expected to notify do not present the same 
unequivocal signs that acute infectious diseases like smallpox and 
scarlet fever do. No absolute definition of what constitutes industrial 
poisoning is possible, and each practitioner in reporting what he 




In the early years in particular, therefore, reporting was likely to have been erratic and 
diagnosis uncertain. However, there are indications that for most of the period this may 
have lead to over-reporting rather than under-reporting, resulting in an overestimate of the 
size of the problem. More general experience with occupational disease reporting systems 24 
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suggests that the apparent surge in cases up to 1897, in both sexes, was likely to reflect an 
increasing awareness of the disease notification system introduced in 1895 and compliance 
with its requirements, as well as the reporting of a back-log of pre-existing cases. It may also 
have owed something to an over enthusiastic application of the diagnostic criteria 25 by 
medical practitioners who were paid 2/6d for each reported case and could be fined up to 
£2 for failure to report a case. 26  The equally dramatic reduction in cases after 1900 may 
have reflected stricter adherence to these criteria. Legge noted that in the initial years of 
reporting, on average 6.8% of reports were found to be errors of diagnosis when routinely 
followed up by Home Office Certifying Surgeons. 27 Moreover, many reports were found to 
fall outside the remit of the reporting system, as a result of which, in 1900, the Home Office 
found it necessary to issue a special memorandum to all employers and medical 
practitioners which stated that, ‘The opinion to be notified is not merely that the patient is 
suffering from lead poisoning, but that he is the subject of lead poisoning which the 
practitioner believes to have been contracted in a factory or workshop’. 28 Employers may 
have been more reluctant than medical practitioners to report cases, since each report 
prompted a visit from the Factory Inspectorate to ascertain compliance with special rules, 
often resulting in costly modifications to the workplace. However, they were required by law 
to employ a medical practitioner to examine workers on a regular basis and were thus 
largely unable to escape their obligations in this respect. It seems likely, therefore, that most 
errors associated with reporting practices were more likely to overestimate rather than 
underestimate the number of cases. 
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Significantly the Workmen’s Compensation Act of 1906 29 appeared to have no noticeably 
effect on the number of cases reported after this date. The Act extended compensation 
payable for industrial accidents to certain industrial diseases, including lead poisoning.  
Historian Peter Bartrip has suggested that any effect of the Act would be to increase 
notifications, not only because of the new incentive for current workers to report ill-health, 
but also because pre-existing and hitherto unreported cases of lead poisoning might now 
come to light. 30 However, certain features of the scheme, as it worked in practice, made this 
unlikely as far as white lead workers, and particularly women, were concerned. The 
requirement for the workers themselves to negotiate the claims process, the fact that it was 
the employers from whom the compensation was claimed and the scheme’s non-application 
to cases of precautionary suspension, 31 all acted to discourage claims from poor, 
uneducated workers who were unsupported by organised bodies such as trade unions. Two 
cases described by Adelaide Anderson in 1908 underline the difficulties they experienced. 
 
The case of L.D. a lead worker is an illustration of the rudeness and 
indignity which workers often have to suffer when applying for 
compensation. L.D., aged 20, was attacked with lead poisoning. Her 
mother not knowing the proper method of applying for 
compensation, and being able neither to read nor write got a friend 
to write to the manager of the works, at which her daughter was 
employed and ask for “a little assistance”. In due time came the 
following reply:-“I am in receipt of your letter of the –inst., and regret 
very much your daughter’s illness. I should have been pleased to 
place your letter before my directors, but as you may suppose after 
the hundreds of pounds spent in taking the precautions that have 
been taken, and eliminating all risks they naturally will resent the 
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The position of lead workers suspended as a precaution, and who 
therefore obtain no compensation, is sometimes a bad one. X.Z., e.g. 
a girl of about 20, was suspended on account of anaemia for three 
months as a precaution, and as she could obtain no employment 
outside the lead process, it seemed doubtful whether illness from 





Anderson also noted that many women assumed, wrongly, that compensation applied only 
to men. 34 Perhaps unsurprisingly, therefore, the advent of the scheme appears to have had 
no noticeable effect on notification figures which continued to show a steady downward 
trend after 1906.  
Despite the obvious limitations of the available data it seems reasonable to conclude that 
there was a genuine and substantial decrease in cases of lead poisoning in the white lead 
industry between 1895 and 1921 and that the reduction in female cases commenced after 
women’s exclusion from parts of the industry in 1898. The implementation of exclusion as a 
solution to the problem was ostensibly based on the assumption that women were 
biologically more susceptible than men to the disease.  In the 1890s the adverse 
reproductive effects of lead exposure, in terms of the increased risk of miscarriage or foetal 
abnormality, were well-known, not only to physicians but also to large numbers of women 
who ingested lead in the form of diachylon 35 in order to abort unwanted children. Perhaps 
by extrapolation, many medical practitioners of the period also subscribed to the view that 
women were particularly susceptible to the other, haematological and neurological, effects 
of lead exposure. 36  Thomas Oliver,  consultant physician at the Newcastle Infirmary 37 and 
widely regarded at the time as one of the foremost British experts on lead poisoning, was 
unequivocally of the opinion that women were more vulnerable than men to all 






Diachylon pills contained lead oxide and glycerine. Ransom, W.B. (1900), ‘On lead encephalopathy and the 
use of diachylon as an abortifacient’, British Medical Journal , 1900, pp. 1590-1. 
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manifestations of lead poisoning. 38 He was, however, equally firm in his view that the 
workplace in general was an unsuitable environment for women, 39 and a number of 
historians have concluded that the two subjects were inextricably linked within a broader 
agenda to return women to the domestic sphere. 40 It has been suggested, for example, that 
the governmental decision to exclude women from parts of the lead industry was heavily 
influenced by Oliver’s backing for the Daily Chronicle campaign. However, not all physicians 
shared Oliver’s views. Thomas Legge, who exerted a major influence on industrial health 
policy from 1898 until his retirement in 1925, was keen to maintain a distance from what he 
termed the ‘moral’ aspects of the matter and to base his arguments on the scientific data 
alone. Writing as late as 1934 he noted: 
There is at all events no doubt as to the baleful influence of lead 
compounds on the uterine functions. I personally hold the view that 
the only restriction which should constitute a bar is employment 
directly interfering with the function of maternity, and employment 
in lead is the only one I know. I would prefer to leave it to women to 
say how far moral dangers should lead to restrictions. 
41
 
Legge also noted that those who were malnourished and otherwise in poor health were 
more vulnerable to the effects of all potential poisons, 42 a view endorsed by inspector Mary 
Paterson in 1908 when visiting women who had suffered from poisoning and thus been 
suspended from working in those parts of the lead works still open to women. Highlighting 
the difficult balance to be struck between ill-health and extreme poverty she observed that 
she was ‘impressed from my visit to this woman, as well as others, with the importance of 
nourishing food for these workers. Poverty and consequent want of nourishment, were 
striking features in most cases’. 43    
                                                          
38
 Oliver, T. (1902, reprinted 2004) Dangerous Trades: History of Health and Safety at Work, Continuum Press, 
Chippenham, p. 296.  
39
 Oliver, T. (1916), Diseases of Occupation from the Legislative, Social and Medical Points of View, 3
rd
 Edition. 
Methuen & Co Ltd, London, p. xviii.  
40
 Malone, C. (1996), ‘The Gendering of Dangerous Trades: Government Regulation of Women’s Work in the 
White Lead Trade in England, 1892-1898’, Journal of Women’s History, Vol. 8, Part 1, pp.15-29; Harrison, B. 
(1991), ‘Women’s health or social control? The role of the medical profession in relation to factory legislation in 
late nineteenth century Britain’, Sociology of Health and Illness, Vol. 13, No. 4, pp. 469-490. 
41
 Legge, T. M. (1934), Industrial Maladies, Oxford University Press, Oxford, p. 64. 
42
 Ibid., p. 114. 
43
 Annual Report of the Chief Inspector of Factories and Workshops for the Year 1904, Cd. 2569 (1905), HMSO, 
London, p. 257. 
 52 
 
In 1898 May Abraham wholeheartedly supported the decision to exclude women from the 
dusty parts of the white lead trade. Her report on the death of Annie Case found no 
evidence of blame attaching to the firm in respect of its adherence to existing special rules, 
instituted in 1883, nor did she find any evidence of non-compliance with the requirement for 
regular medical examinations and for periods of suspension. 44 Her report revealed a strict 
adherence to an official brief whereby records of medical examinations, attendance sheets 
and a factual description of the work processes were presented to her and duly reproduced. 
Her only concern seemed, in the circumstances, to have been a relatively trivial one. A 
scrutiny of Annie Case’s employment record and her age, as revealed at the inquest, 
suggested that she had first been employed (illegally) under the age of 18 years. 45  It is 
possible that this report simply reflected Abraham’s inexperience and her inability to detect 
the real situation at the works. However it is important to note that she was also constrained 
by the regulations and, in the event, detailed the only infringement for which she could find 
definite evidence. Others who were less constrained disagreed strongly with her findings.  
The Reverend Newland who, with his wife, ran the Canning Town Evening Home for Working 
Girls wrote to the coroner to say that both Annie and her sister were well known to them. 
Along with many other girls they had frequently talked of the bad conditions at the works 
and were often ill, but he added, ‘they will not always talk in the absence of a lady’, a remark 
which appeared to support one of the main arguments advanced for the initial appointment 
of women inspectors. 46 Annie’s sister, he noted, had periods of sickness when she showed 
symptoms of lead poisoning, but had disappeared when asked to appear at the inquest to 
give evidence. 47  
Abraham was thus faced with a situation in which a woman had died and others were 
apparently ill in a factory where, to all outward appearances, regulations had been adhered 
to. This appeared to provide proof that existing regulations were insufficient to protect 
women from lead poisoning. Added to this, Abraham undoubtedly shared Oliver’s conviction 
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that women and children were particularly susceptible to the lead’s effects, something 
which she considered to have been confirmed by the results of her own investigations. In 
1895 she had been asked by Sprague Oram to collect information on the health of women 
employed in the industry in the Newcastle area. With Mary Paterson she visited six factories 
and reported on cases of lead poisoning in men and women.  Abraham considered that her 
statistics (summarised in Table 4.1, below) showed ‘in a remarkable manner the greater 
susceptibility of women’. 48 
Table 4.149  
Total number of cases of lead poisoning in six white lead works, 1894, 1895.  
 1894 1894 1895 1895 
 Number 
employed 
Number ill Number 
employed 
Number ill 
Male 409 34 409 39 
Female 385 234 385 268 
 
Abraham added a number of comments to support her conclusions.  First she noted that in 
two firms the numbers of cases far exceeded the numbers employed. Essentially, therefore, 
the figures for these firms represented multiple poisonings in some women. Precautionary 
suspensions due to poisoning, usually for between three and six months were, she argued,  
so common that women regarded employment in the white lead works as supplementary 
employment to be undertaken between periods of suspension. She also noted that statistics 
from one firm were omitted on the grounds that their comparison with those of other firms 
would be misleading. Messrs Cookson & Co, she said, had changed their processes in an 
attempt to reduce lead exposure, but following a further female death from lead poisoning 
at the works had decided to remove women from employment in this area altogether.  
According to Abraham’s report the firm experienced no adverse economic consequences, 
having successfully employed eight men to do the work of eleven women. Moreover, she 
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was informed that the women had been re-deployed on other work and reported 
improvements in their health as a result.  Abraham also recounted the details of ten cases of 
married women who had suffered numerous miscarriages or given birth to children who 
subsequently died following convulsions.  
It is difficult to argue with the conclusion that, in these lead works at least, more women 
were suffering from lead poisoning than were men.  However, Abraham’s contention that 
this provided proof that women were particularly susceptible to the disease, while 
understandable within the constraints of the available statistical methodology, is more 
difficult to sustain.  There was an absence of exposure data to determine whether or not 
women were subject to higher exposures, no comparative data from workers unexposed to 
lead and no clear distinction between new and repeat cases.  Consistent diagnostic criteria 
for lead poisoning were yet to be developed and the validity of reports from factory owners 
and women workers cannot be assumed to be reliable. Moreover, Abraham’s information 
source in the cases of the ten married women was Dr. Oliver, a man apparently heavily 
influenced by his beliefs about the deleterious effects of female employment on the health 
and well-being of the family. Notwithstanding this potential source of interpretive bias, 
however, Oliver’s data are questionable on other grounds.  The use of case histories, derived 
from hospitalised patients, to demonstrate an association between an exposure and a 
disease is speculative at best, essentially constituting an exercise in hypothesis generating 
rather than hypothesis testing.   In Oliver’s patients, for example, congenital syphilis, known 
to be common during this period and to result in similar symptoms to foetal lead poisoning,  
would have provided an equally plausible explanation for the reproductive problems he 
described. 50   
In 1896, amid continuing reports of poisoning, the recommendations of a committee (the 
third of a series convened since the Dangerous Trades Committee of 1892) contained the 
proposal that women should be excluded from work in the ‘whitebeds and stoves or any 
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place where white lead is packed’. 51 Significantly this committee (which included among its 
members Abraham’s husband, Jack Tennant) noted that Abraham’s recent report 
considerably strengthened the case for this course of action. Home Secretary Asquith, with 
his personal connections to Abraham and Tennant and, through them, to Vaughan Nash, 
editor of the campaigning Daily Chronicle, 52 was also a strong supporter of female exclusion. 
In 1895 the government passed enabling legislation which effectively allowed the prohibition 
of vulnerable groups from white lead production when and where this was considered 
necessary, without recourse to further legislation. 53 Pressure from conflicting interests, 
however, meant that the actual implementation of this prohibition did not take place until 
July 1898. The majority of employers objected strongly to most of the proposed special rules 
and even more strongly to the exclusion of women from the trade.  Edward Troup, 
Permanent Under-Secretary of State at the Home Office, received numerous letters of 
protest from white lead manufacturers. L Tudor & Co of Hull expressed typical concerns: 
...foreign manufacturers can obtain cheaper labour, are not 
hampered by legislation, and against the free import of his goods 
there is no opposing tariff, besides which the system of through rates 
from abroad will enable him to place his products in midlands and 
other centres at less or practically the same cost as the railway 
company will carry it for the English Maker. The abolition of female 
labour means such an immense addition to the cost of manufacture 
that competition with the foreigner will become nearly impossible, 
and the industry so far as England is concerned will almost become 
extinct in a few years.
54
  
In 1896, Locke, Lancaster and Johnson & Sons Ltd, occupiers of the Millwall White Lead 
works, where Annie Case had been employed, wrote to ask for a year’s grace in 
implementing special rules because of the cost involved, a delay which was subsequently 
agreed to by the government. 55 In the same year a petition was received from workers in 
the North East under the title:  
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We the undersigned female workers employed in the various lead 
works on the Tyne nearby beg to draw your attention to the very 
serious consequences it will be to us if women’s labour is entirely 
abolished in the lead works. Many of us are widows with large 
families to support- others have no means of getting a living except 
by this kind of work therefore should this act come into force the 
consequences will be very serious for us. 
56
  
The petition contained over 500 names, about a quarter of which were represented by an X. 
It is difficult to determine the nature and extent of the influence exerted by employers on 
the preparation of this petition.  However, Troup noted that, in assuming exclusion applied 
to the whole industry rather than to some parts of the process only, the signatories 
appeared to be misinformed as to the nature of the proposed regulations. 57   As this 
correspondence accumulated, Troup embarked on a process of persuasion, informing 
employers that some firms had already re-organised successfully without significant 
economic cost. In April 1896 he informed Asquith that the government was now in a strong 
position as ‘one of leading firms Messrs Cookson has accepted and will give evidence in 
favour’,  adding that  some firms, particularly the smaller ones, were likely to back down 
anyway since this ‘often happened once arbitrators were appointed’. 58 (It was at this point 
that employers were required to lodge details of their objections, with supporting evidence, 
within fourteen days).  Negotiations eventually came to an end in 1898 when the 
government succeeded, without recourse to arbitration, in persuading the majority of white 
lead manufacturers to fall in behind the lead of Cooksons, and regulations specifically 
excluding women from work in the ‘whitebeds’ and ‘stoves’ were implemented.  
The contribution of the women inspectors to the formation of these regulations, notably in 
terms of the information they provided, has attracted suggestions that they were either 
insensitive to or unconcerned with the employment rights of working-class women. 59 
However, there is no evidence that their support for this particular policy reflected more 
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general support for reductions in female employment.   Rather they appear to have been 
motivated by pragmatism derived from their knowledge of the real situation on the ground. 
Their reports contained numerous accounts of the hardship experienced by working women, 
revealing a realistic appreciation of their difficulties as well as an overriding respect.  In 1908, 
for example, Anderson described the fortitude of one woman, struggling to support a family 
while suffering from lead poisoning as ‘nothing short of heroism’. 60 Given these realities the 
notion of preserving the rights of working women was perhaps interpreted first and 
foremost in terms of the right to health and ultimately to life. Abraham, the most senior of 
the five women inspectors in post at the time exclusion was agreed, genuinely believed that 
women were more vulnerable to the effects of lead than were men. In 1898, when the 
measure was implemented, opinion on the matter was divided and remained so for many 
years.  Writing in 1929, Harvard Professor Alice Hamilton, an internationally acknowledged 
expert on occupational health and industrial toxicology, recorded her uncertainty on the 
subject after careful appraisal of the data on lead poisoning from around the world, 
including the British figures. She also recorded the results of an investigation of the pottery 
trade in parts of the USA, carried out in 1921. Observing that this study was ‘far more 
thorough’ than an earlier one carried out by herself in 1912 she noted that ‘although men 
are far more exposed to lead in this trade than women, there is more plumbism 61 among 
the women than among the men’. 62 It is clear, therefore, that even by the 1920s well 
respected occupational physicians were undecided on the matter. 63 
It is undeniable that this legislation may have resulted in the destitution of some female 
workers who were unable to obtain alternative employment, although opinion is divided on 
this point and hard evidence is difficult to find. What is clear, however, is that a number of 
women in other industries who experienced lead poisoning did become destitute, not 
because they were excluded from work by legislation, but because they became too ill to 
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work. 64 Significantly the actions of the women inspectors were strongly supported by trade 
unionist Mary Macarthur, founding president of the National Federation of Women 
Workers. 65  Although opposed to the general principle of exclusion as a means of 
protection, Macarthur recalled and justified her position on the white lead industry at the 
Trades Union Congress of 1909. ‘We have helped get women out of the mines, and out of 
the white lead works,’ she stated. ‘Where there is special danger to women, where there is 
proof of the injurious effects to children, we are prepared to advocate that women should 
not be allowed to work until such time as the trade can be made a healthy one’. 66 For 
Macarthur, the exclusion of women, a measure which effectively highlighted the serious 
risks to their health, was justified in certain circumstances in the interests of pursuing the 
longer term aim of improving conditions in the industry as a whole.  Adelaide Anderson, 
later appointed as Principal Lady Factory Inspector, adopted a similar stance, underlining her 
own opposition to more general female exclusion from employment in 1894 when she 
provided a report to the Chief Factory Inspector on the differences between French and 
British factory regulations.  Noting the long list of occupations from which, under French 
legislation,  women were excluded she observed  that ‘while it is only possible to admire the 
decision which excludes all children and young growing persons from nearly every 
occupation which has dangerous or hurtful possibilities in it, it is impossible to restrain 
astonishment at the considerable list of occupations from which women are excluded, and 
which they might with due care and regulation (Anderson’s italics) work with as much safety 
as men.’ 67   
In the white lead industry the exclusion of women in 1898 was followed by a marked 
increase in male poisoning cases, something which Anderson was quick to highlight in order 
                                                          
64
 Annual Report of the Chief Inspector of Factories for the Year 1908, Cd. 4664 (1909), HMSO, London, pp. 142-
3. 
65
 Mary Macarthur (1880-1921) was a member of the Council of the Independent Labour Party from 1909-1919 
and by 1919 was a member of the Executive of the Labour party.The National Federation of Women Workers 
was a trade union formed from a number of smaller women’s unions. By 1914 it had over 20,000 members. It 
merged with the National Union of General Workers in 1921. 
66
 Mary Macarthur, (1909), Report of the Trade Union Congress. Reported in Drake, B. (1920, republished 
1984), Women in Trade Unions, Virago Press, London, p. 67. 
67
Report of the Chief Inspector of Factories and Workshops to HM Principal Secretary of State for the Home 
Department, for the Year 1894, Cd. 7745 (1895), HMSO, London, p. 11. 
 59 
 
to press home the point that the real solution lay in the improvement of preventative 
measures.  
10 men are now paid 7/6 a day for doing work for which 13 women 
formerly received 2/6 a day – some had to employ as many men as 
women at double the wages and no better results. The immediately 
observable ill effects on men’s health of the dangerous employment, 
to a degree for which no payment can compensate gives rise to the 
hope that the indirectly increased cost of labour will hasten the 
development of new methods in industrial technology to lessen or 
remove its dangers. 
68
   
Following female exclusion, the industry experienced considerable difficulty in attracting 
males to replace female workers, despite the increased wages offered to men. Work in the 
white lead industry, it seemed, was so poorly paid and so unpleasant that only those with 
little alternative would undertake it. In 1893, for example, a pamphlet published by the 
Humanitarian League on the subject of women’s working conditions contained the 
observation that, ‘it is mostly women of the very poorest and roughest class who offer 
themselves to work in the white lead factory. The widow who has a family to support, the 
wife of a drunken husband, the girl whose character will not bear scrutiny – these are the 
candidates for employment’. 69 Thus many men were reluctant to fill the jobs vacated by 
women and as a result large numbers of Italian immigrant workers, previously employed in 
lead smelting works where wages were even lower, were recruited into the trade. 70 This 
appears to have exacerbated the problem of male poisoning. In 1899 the factory inspector 
for East London reported that such workers were poorly fed and ill-clothed as well as 
entirely ignorant of the regulations now operating in the white lead works, factors which 
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rendered them highly vulnerable to poisoning. 71 In that year the Certifying Surgeon 
reported 85 male cases at the Millwall works of which 58 were in Italian workers. 72 These 
observations offered some support for the view that it was the level of dust exposure rather 
than the sex of the worker which was the determining risk factor. This was the conclusion 
reached by Thomas Legge who did not consider that the exclusion of women constituted a 
real solution to the wider problem of lead poisoning.  Rather he concluded that the steady 
reduction in cases up to 1921 and beyond, reflected a range of other measures designed to 
reduce exposure to dust. Thus he observed, ‘I emphasise again after perusal of some 25,000 
cases which have accumulated in the past that locally applied exhaust ventilation is the 
sheet anchor in the protection of workers from leady dust and fume and that these are 
alone the causative agents.’ 73 In 1912 Legge and Certifying Surgeon Dr. Kenneth Goadby 74 
had published a comprehensive text on the subject of industrial lead poisoning 75 which 
included a guide to prevention and control. 76 In this text they described current methods for 
the measurement of dust and fumes, provided recommendations for the installation of 
ventilation ducts, hoods and fans and for the provision of respirators. The importance of 
workplace cleanliness was emphasised, notably the separation of work and dining areas and 
the provision of overalls and washing facilities for the workers. It is clear, therefore, that a 
number of measures for the reduction of lead exposure, based on the assumption that the 
inhalation and ingestion of dust were the primary risk factors, were available by this date. 
Such measures were progressively included in the special rules of 1898, (amended in 1899 
and again in 1911 77) which, having been accepted by employers in 1898, became legally 
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enforceable from that date. 78 Moreover, under the provisions of the Factory and Workshop 
Act of 1901, the right of employers to insist on arbitration was removed. 79  
It is clear, therefore, that despite the initial decision to exclude women from parts of the 
white lead trade, the Factory Department was, by 1898, rapidly moving away from this type 
of approach as a solution to the problem of industrial disease. Instead it turned to the use of 
control measures within the workplace, an approach which involved the women inspectors 
in a central role. From the mid 1890s, their reports were indicative of a programme of 
regular visits to all white lead manufactories, the locations of which were detailed in the 
Annual Reports of the Chief Inspector. 80 Any notified case of lead poisoning required a 
follow-up visit from an appointed factory surgeon to confirm the diagnosis, as well as an 
advisory visit from the factory inspector to ascertain compliance with special rules.  These 
visits sometimes resulted in prosecutions, usually of employers, but occasionally of workers 
who also had legal responsibilities under the terms of the special rules, for example to 
comply with regulations regarding washing and the use of overalls and face masks. In 
general, however, women inspectors seemed reluctant to prosecute in cases involving white 
lead exposure, preferring to act in an advisory capacity. Most appear to have followed the 
lead of Anderson who, in 1909, considered that the reports of the women inspectors 
showed that ‘much good work can be done without resort to prosecution’. 81  In 1897 Mary 
Paterson had brought a case against a Scottish white lead company where a young girl had 
died of lead poisoning. However, under cross examination the factory doctor who originally 
notified the case became less certain of his diagnosis and the case was not proven. Paterson 
commented that the decision of the sheriff in this case ‘did not encourage one to repeat the 
experiment’. 82 In general, prosecutions were rare and usually undertaken by male 
inspectors. Of twelve prosecutions for infringements of the white lead regulations recorded 
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between 1896 and 1900, 83 two related to employment of a young person  84 in a prohibited 
industry, but none to illegal employment of women. Cases of poisoning in women were 
substantially reduced after 1898 but those that did occur were routinely referred for follow-
up to the women inspectors, providing a specific framework for their programme of work. In 
1909 Adelaide Anderson reported that the diminishing number of cases of industrial 
poisoning in women  ‘prevented over-taxing of the resources of the inspectors’ 85 indicating 
that in this field at least they felt equal to the demands made upon them in terms of 
inspection and advice.    
As well as highlighting infringements of the regulations, visits by women inspectors often 
identified the particular difficulties experienced by women workers.  In 1895, for example, 
Lucy Deane drew attention to the reluctance of women to wear respirators 86 since these 
had previously been worn by other workers and were left unwashed. She observed that 
‘most people would object to wearing a respirator which is worn in turn by other persons as 
well, or to wearing one which age, constant handling, use, constant washing etc. has 
reduced to a mere rag’. 87 As a result employers were subsequently required to provide 
women with personal respirators or to make arrangements for them to be washed after 
each day’s work. Mary Paterson observed in 1895 that the requirement for women to 
change their boots before going home failed to take account of the fact that very few of the 
women employed in white lead manufacture possessed more than one pair of boots. 88 
While this reflected her sensitivity to the needs of the workers and also her realism, there is 
no record of how the difficulty was resolved.  More generally, however, the special clothing 
required by the regulations largely became the responsibility of employers. During the 
arbitration process of 1898, the women inspectors successfully argued that employers 
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should bear the cost of providing overalls and ensuring that these were regularly washed, 
something to which employers had been steadfastly opposed and which had for a time 
proved to be a major sticking point in the negotiations. 89  
The provision of washing and sanitary facilities which were suitable for women was 
something the women inspectors returned to repeatedly in their annual reports.  This was 
particularly important in the white lead works because of the regulatory requirement for a 
weekly bath to reduce dust on the skin. 90 In 1898 Adelaide Anderson reported that ‘In one 
works, where elaborate bathing and lavatory appliances had been introduced in compliance 
with the Special Rules, I was amazed to find more unsuitable and inadequate sanitary 
accommodation for the women than I have seen in any but the worst cases in the old 
Lancashire mills’. 91 By 1907 she was able to report that ‘much has been achieved as a direct 
or indirect consequence of the order of 1903’,  92 but that ‘the slowest progress is in making 
arrangements that have due regard to suitability and protection of the modesty of the 
workers, a very serious matter.’ 93 Rose Squire, noting the lack of partitions and doors, 
similarly commented on ‘the unsuitability from the point of view of modesty and morality of 
otherwise excellent, newly erected sanitary conveniences’,  94  while in Glasgow, Mary 
Paterson considered that the facilities were ‘insulting to the respectable girls employed’. 95 It 
is possible to interpret this preoccupation with sanitary arrangements as an imposition of 
middle-class standards of modesty and morality on an unconcerned factory workforce. 
However, it is important to recognise that for much of the 19th century such arrangements 
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were largely absent from workplaces and those that existed had been constructed entirely 
for the use of men. When the 1903 regulations required the construction of improved 
facilities the inspectors found that on numerous occasions these had once more been 
constructed to serve the needs of an exclusively male workforce.    
Inspectors also noted the failure of some employers to understand the practicalities of 
reducing dust exposure. In 1895 Mary Paterson visited a works in Newcastle where she 
observed the presence of a ventilator with a hood in the packing area of the factory but that 
‘unfortunately the actual packing was carried out some distance away from the ventilator, 
the space under the hood being occupied by already packed closed barrels’  96 In 1913 
Inspector Emily Sadler  visited a factory where two cases of poisoning had occurred in 
women employed in stacking and filling the ‘blue beds’, 97 a process considered to be 
relatively free of dust.  She observed, however, that the dust- laden ‘white beds’ were 
stripped in close proximity to areas where the women were employed and that the 
gangways were covered in dust and never washed. Moreover the women carried lead on 
boards on their heads. They carried, she said, ‘between thirty and 50 lbs of lead at a time up 
ladders ten to fifteen feet high’.  98 These boards had previously been used in the ‘white 
beds’ and thus were also impregnated with dust. Other women were employed removing 
these dust-laden boards from the white beds, a process which had been omitted from the 
special rules. Sadler obtained a voluntary agreement from the firm concerned to cease this 
practice, despite the absence of any formal regulations on the subject. 99  A similar 
agreement was obtained by Mary Paterson in 1898 on discovering women employed in 
sweeping passages alongside the stacks, an activity omitted from the terms of the formal 
regulations, but involving high exposure to lead laden dust. 100    
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Finally, the women inspectors were instrumental in the introduction of detailed record 
keeping, whether this related to the time of the required weekly bath, the findings of routine 
medical examinations or the date of any suspensions because of ill-health. 101  Use of these 
records enabled Mary Paterson to draw attention to any escalation in health problems 
occurring in a particular workplace or to the failure of employers to prevent the re-
employment of those with a history of lead poisoning. On visiting some women at home, for 
example, she identified cases where women had been suspended with serious symptoms 
including convulsions, had worked in other jobs such as fish curing for a short period and 
then re-applied to the white lead works and obtained employment. Examples such as these 
illustrate that the role of the women inspectors in addressing the problem of lead poisoning 
went far beyond the initial decision to exclude women from the dustier parts of the trade. 
Moreover, the methods they employed were highly reflective of a developing approach to 
industrial disease which was more in keeping with that already adopted in the field of 
accident prevention and machinery guarding, namely the institution of control measures 
within the workplace.  Ultimately, it was this approach which contributed most significantly 
to the reduction in cases of poisoning.
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Accidents and Injuries in Laundries 
There are many considerations which ought to induce all to attend to 
the duties of cleanliness. It is personal duty, that is to say, a duty 
which we owe ourselves individually; it is a social duty, that is, a duty 
we owe to society; and it is a religious duty, that is, a duty which we 
owe to God. 
1
  
     Reverend G.B. Dickson 1852  
The link between cleanliness and morality which formed the subject of the Reverend 
Dickson’s sermon in 1852, was well-established by the end of the 19th century as was the 
association between attention to personal hygiene and social status. Thus Routledge’s 
Manual of Etiquette in 1860 advised that ‘in these days of public baths and universal 
progress, we trust that it will be unnecessary to do more than hint at the necessity of the 
most fastidious personal cleanliness...a soiled shirt, a dingy pocket handkerchief, or a 
waistcoat that has been worn once too often are things to be scrupulously avoided by any 
man who is ambitious of preserving the exterior of a gentleman.’ 2 By the 1880’s the 
burgeoning urban population in Britain included a substantial middle-class keen to embrace 
the social values which would distinguish them from the lower strata in society. The 
maintenance of clean clothes and household linen represented an important element of 
these aspirations. ‘At the bottom of our social ladder is a dirty shirt’, wrote author Stephen 
Reynolds in his early 20th century novel about family life in Devon, 3 while Robert Roberts, in 
his memoir of a Manchester slum during the same period, noted that clean clothes were an  
important marker of social status within all classes. ‘Tradesmen’, he observed, ‘took pride in 
wearing stiff collars even in the workshop’. 4 Added to this, new knowledge about the role of 
bacteria in the development and spread of disease 5 further reinforced the popularity of 
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cleanliness, not only as a personal aspiration but also as a social duty. The large quantities of 
dirty washing generated by middle-class households during this period, however, frequently 
exceeded their capacity to maintain the desired standards of respectability. 6 Many houses 
lacked the space, the equipment, the staff or the water to provide a regular supply of clean 
linen. Drying was a particular problem since items hung outside in the smoke-laden air of 
large cities rapidly became covered in smuts. The growth of commercially operated laundries 
with established water supplies, employing groups of women who operated increasingly 
sophisticated equipment provided an answer to these difficulties. Thus the urbanisation of 
the 19th century which led to the growth of the so-called ‘sweated trades’ 7 also encouraged 
the rapid expansion of the laundry industry. Not only did laundries provide a service to 
middle and upper-class households but they also found a ready market amongst the 
thousands of clerks and business men living in single rooms, whose rising social status 
required high standards in terms of personal appearance. 8 By the end of the 19th century 
the proliferation of laundries to serve the needs of the wealthy inhabitants of Kensington 
and St John’s Wood had earned for the neighbouring district of Kensal Town the title of 
‘Soapsuds Island’.  9 
The majority of laundries established at this time were small businesses situated in 
basement rooms or on the ground floors of multi-occupancy dwelling houses. Most 
employed no more than a dozen workers of whom the majority were women. Inevitably the 
atmosphere of laundry premises was damp and steamy with fetid odours arising from dirty 
clothes. Any windows were invariably sealed to prevent smuts alighting on newly washed 
linen. 10 Working hours usually exceeded sixty over six days, rarely with any provision for 
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meal breaks and often including night work. 11 The work was both physically arduous and 
hazardous with women frequently suffering scalds from hot water and steam and burns 
from hot irons. In the 1890s new hazards were introduced in the form of steam-powered 
equipment and women began to suffer serious accidents resulting from the use of 
unguarded machinery, reminiscent of those experienced by workers in the early textile 
factories. On their appointment in 1893, laundries rapidly became a special area of concern 
for the women inspectors.  Like the small workshops which will be discussed in chapter 6, 
such premises proliferated in the areas in which the inspectors lived and, as single women 
often living in rented rooms, they would no doubt have availed themselves of their services 
and been aware of the conditions under which they operated. Up to the 1890s, however, 
commercial laundries had been largely ignored by the Factory Department. Washing clothes 
and linen was traditionally viewed either as part of a woman’s domestic duties or as a form 
of homeworking rather than as an industrial occupation. Moreover, prior to the use of 
machinery, the health problems of laundresses, lacking the focus of any specific industrial 
disease, would have been difficult to distinguish from the general problems of the poor. 
Male factory inspectors were predominantly concerned with the more obviously hazardous 
industries which contributed the larger share of accidents and fatalities, and which were 
predominantly the domain of male workers. 12 This chapter, therefore, will consider how the 
women inspectors responded to the safety problems they encountered in laundries, initially 
in terms of bringing the matter to the attention of the Home Office and pressing for 
legislative change and subsequently in focussing the attention of engineers on the challenge 
of designing practical guards for laundry machinery. In the process they employed new 
methodological approaches, involving the use of statistics to investigate the nature of safety 
problems, as well as developing their ability to evaluate the efficacy of safety equipment. 
The incidence of accidents in laundries showed a steady decline between the years 1895 and 
                                                          
11
 Annual Report of the Chief Inspector of Factories and Workshops for the Year 1897, C. 8965 (1898), HMSO, 
London, p. 107. 
12
 In 1895, the first year in which reporting became a legal requirement, there were 8,662 reported accidents 
for males of which 431 were fatal. The comparable figures for women were 1804 reported of which 24 were 
fatal. Report of the Chief Inspector of Factories and Workshops to HM Principal Secretary of State for the Home 
Department, for the Year 1895, C. 8067 (1896), HMSO, London, p. 263. These figures presumably reflect the 
smaller number of women employed overall and the preponderance of men employed in more hazardous 
industries, although it may also reflect lack of reporting in industries predominantly employing women.   
 69 
 
1914 and it will be argued that much of this improvement can be attributed to the work of 
the women inspectors. 
In the early 1890s laundries operated outside the reach of factory legislation. Their gradual 
transformation from a service carried out in women’s own homes to small businesses 
employing several workers had passed largely unnoticed by the Home Office. Any regulation 
of their activities, therefore, was undertaken by the local Sanitary Authorities. In 1895, 
however, the amended Factory Act of 1895, 13 brought laundry workers under the protection 
of factory regulation for the first time. This legislative change represented the culmination of 
a long battle which, in earlier years, had been fought unsuccessfully by the laundry workers 
themselves. In the late 1880s government regulation of the employment conditions in 
laundries was the subject of a vigorous but short-lived campaign which sought an 
amendment to the 1891 Factory Act 14 whereby laundries would be covered by factory 
legislation.  The laundress’ primary objective in pursuing this, however, was not so much the 
enforcement of safer working conditions, but rather the achievement of a ten hour day, 
currently in force for factories and workshops included under the Act.  In 1889, a group of 
London laundresses, with the encouragement of the WTUL, formed the Amalgamated 
Society of Laundresses. 15  Within a year the Society had approximately 3,000 members and, 
having sent delegates to the Trade Union Congress of 1890, gained unanimous endorsement 
of a motion proposing the amendment. Employment in laundries was essentially women’s 
work and thus presented no threat to male unionists who were happy to lend their support.  
A subsequent rally to highlight the issue, held in Hyde Park in June 1891, reportedly 
attracted nearly 30,000 unionists as well as the support of a number of radical MPs. 16  Less 
than a week later Liberal MP David Randell introduced a House of Commons motion 
proposing the amendment. 17 In the event, however, it was defeated following a 
parliamentary debate in which the Conservative Home Secretary, Henry Mathew, argued 
that the laundry industry was too diverse in size to implement universal rules on working 
hours. Moreover, he stated that regulation would undermine those laundries run by 
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institutions and charitable organisations which often depended for their income on laundry 
work and operated under conditions which made it difficult for them to be compliant with 
working time legislation. This particular argument appeared to be a concession to the 
demands of Irish MPs on whom the current Government depended for its majority and who 
strongly opposed any regulation of the numerous laundries situated in Irish religious 
institutions at that time. 18  
With the apparent failure of the campaign the resolve of the laundry workers seemed to 
have evaporated as suddenly as it had arisen. By the end of 1893 less than sixty members of 
the Amalgamated Society out of the original 3,000 remained, and by the beginning of 1895 
the short-lived union had disappeared altogether. 19 The effect of its activities lingered on 
however, not least in the minds of newly elected members of the Liberal government of 
1892, as it struggled to contain the wave of industrial unrest which had begun in the late 
1880s and continued into the early 1890s. The actions of the Amalgamated Society appear 
to have been part of a more general industrial agitation which for the first time had involved 
women workers. 20  Historian Louise Raw has suggested, for example, that the famous 
matchwomen’s strike of 1888 was not, as has sometimes been suggested, a singular 
unprecedented event orchestrated by middle-class reformers, but rather a manifestation of 
the much wider ‘New Unionism’ of workers hitherto unrepresented by existing craft-based 
unions. In London, in particular, this movement encompassed both male and female 
workers. 21 The establishment of the Labour Commission to investigate conditions in 
unhealthy and hazardous industries was largely a response to this industrial unrest and the 
inclusion of a special investigation into the employment conditions of women presumably 
reflected their growing importance within labour activism. Moreover, as noted earlier, one 
of the commissioners appointed to conduct this inquiry was embryo factory inspector May 
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Abraham, who in 1892 was secretary to Lady Dilke, President of the WTUL which had 
supported the formation of the laundresses union. 22 Unsurprisingly, therefore, the report, 
published in 1893, made a number of recommendations for improvements to conditions in 
laundries. 23 When the bill to amend the Act of 1891 was eventually passed in 1895 it 
introduced a new level of protection for laundry workers, albeit not necessarily in ways 
which would have satisfied the central demands of the laundry workers themselves.  The 
amendment contained so many permitted exceptions to the normal ten hour day it was 
rendered virtually useless in terms of protecting laundresses from excessively long hours. 
However, it did contain a legal requirement to notify the occurrence of certain specified 
occupational diseases and, importantly, any industrial accidents which resulted in at least 
two days absence from work. In addition, employers were legally required to install guards 
on dangerous machinery. Both these elements were now applicable to power-driven 
laundries. 24 The terms of this Act which, it is reasonable to assume, were largely based on 
evidence collected by Abraham and her fellow commissioners, were important prerequisites 
for the subsequent work of the women inspectors.   
As the 1895 bill made its way through parliament significant changes were taking place in 
the laundry industry. In pursuit of enhanced speed and capacity, laundry owners were 
increasingly abandoning traditional hand operations and installing power driven machinery. 
By the early 20th century a typical power-driven laundry contained a washing machine in 
which clothes were agitated in a metal drum, an extractor which rotated and extracted 
water via centrifugal force and a heated ‘calender’ or mangle which smoothed and dried 
items at the same time. This equipment was driven by belts and pulleys powered by a small 
steam engine. There was usually a heated drying closet for starched items or items 
otherwise unsuited to mangling which would be ironed by hand using gas-powered irons. 25 
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Figure 5.1, (below), illustrates the change in the numbers employed in hand laundries and 
power-driven laundries between the years 1904 and 1912, for which figures are available. 
Figure 5.1 26 
 
The speed with which these changes were adopted resulted in many employers purchasing 
steam engines without the necessary operational knowledge and a number of explosions 
ensued. Others purchased cheap second-hand and faulty laundry equipment which Principal 
Inspector, Adelaide Anderson, felt contributed to an already rising number of accidents 
amongst laundry workers. 27 It is clear that the introduction of technology into this industry 
significantly shifted the balance from health issues, associated with long hours, poor air 
quality and a hot damp environment, to safety issues where there was a real risk of serious 
injury.  Steam power increased the speed at which processes were carried out and could not 
be turned off rapidly to stop a machine if the need arose. To the ever-present risk of burns 
and scalds was now added the possibility of crushed limbs as workers fed items into the 
rollers of the calenders and death or scalping as a result of hair or clothing being caught in 
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the belts and pulleys which drove the equipment. In 1896, the first year in which an analysis 
of accident figures was carried out, including those occurring in laundries, there were 84 
reported laundry accidents, of which 81 recorded the cause as ‘machinery’. 28 
In the three years which followed the passing of the 1895 Act the women inspectors made 
few comments on these hazards. Their reports were confined instead to observations about 
the hot damp atmosphere and foul air, an emphasis which recognised laundries as one part 
of the wider problem of insanitary basement workshops, and to concerns about working 
hours, the main focus of the complaints received from the laundry workers themselves. Rose 
Squire reported ‘...how far the long looked for Act has fallen short of their hopes. The 
“coming under the Act” has been found not to bring the expected relief but to give sanction 
to the late hours and long day’s work’. 29  At this stage, however, the women inspectors 
were both few in number and relatively inexperienced, particularly in the field of machinery 
safety.  Moreover machinery guarding had long been a central focus for the male 
inspectorate, a factor underlined by the requirement for male (but not female) candidates 
for the inspectorate to sit a paper in ‘applied mechanics’. 30 With the exception of the textile 
trades, where male inspectors had traditionally taken charge of accident prevention, few 
women had worked in power-driven industries. There was, therefore, a tacit understanding 
that women inspectors would not be concerned with issues relating to machinery safety. In 
1899, however, inspector Anna Tracey signalled a break with this tradition by drawing 
attention to the fact that machinery guarding in respect of women’s employment in 
laundries appeared to have been ignored. She reported as follows: 
The adequate and compulsory fencing of laundry machinery is a 
matter which presses greatly on an inspector. So many accidents 
occur which might be prevented, if only proper guards were provided 
by the makers. So far some of these guards are not forthcoming, and, 
in spite of assertions that workable guards cannot be produced, one 
feels that it cannot be long before every worker at a wringer or 
ironing machine can feel that at any rate her fingers are safe if ever 
she should be so careless as to look up from her work for a moment. 
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It is difficult to realise that a moment’s inattention (during the long 
washing day which extends often far into the night) may mean a 
maimed hand for life. Surely the manufacturers of England cannot be 
baffled by the production of an efficient guard for the machines if 
once they give the matter their earnest attention. 
31
 
In the same report inspector Mabel Vines drew attention to another failure 
in the system, the fact that accidents were frequently not reported. She 
provided the following illustration: 
Making an inspection of a steam laundry I noted that the wringing 
rollers of the washing machine were unguarded. The next day but 
one, returning, I noticed on entering that one of the young girls 
employed had her hand in splints, hanging in a sling. She had caught 
her hand in the unguarded ringing rollers on the day intervening 
between my two visits. The accident had not been reported. 
32
  
Arguably it was at this point that the women inspectors elected to extend their field of 
activity into areas previously considered to be the exclusive domain of their male 
counterparts, namely matters concerned with machinery safety. In doing so, and in 
embracing a further new development in the field of occupational health, the collection of 
statistical data, they appear to have achieved one of their most notable successes in 
improving the safety of women workers. 
 In Anderson’s report for 1900 she underlined her opinion that machinery guarding was a 
legitimate area of concern for the women inspectors and that the rapid introduction of 
machinery into laundries, where the workforce was overwhelmingly female, provided 
adequate justification for this. Diplomatically she excused the earlier failures of male 
inspectors to address the issue by pointing to the lack of experience with laundry machinery 
which, she considered, prevailed across the inspectorate as a whole. Thus she declared that: 
...the responsibility for registers, enforcement of notices, and for 
completeness and thoroughness of inspection in general rests 
entirely with myself and my staff, ...the effect of the regulation which 
provides for the consultation of an Inspector outside that staff has 
been to secure a more than redoubled attention to the special 
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dangers of those factories which are mainly so far assigned, namely, 
factory laundries...The rapid recent development of machinery of a 
specialised kind in laundries produces a situation and a class of risks 
which... leaves most Inspectors of any experience almost at the same 
starting point; knowledge has, in fact, to be acquired by all alike, and 




Anderson’s method of acquiring this necessary knowledge indicated an approach which was 
both progressive and entirely in tune with current developments in the field of occupational 
health and safety. In 1900 Lucy Deane had taken up an appointment as inspector responsible 
for the ‘West London Special District’, the only area in the country assigned specifically to 
the women inspectors. 34 In addition to hundreds of dressmakers and fancy goods 
manufacturers the area contained a large concentration of laundries. Anderson elected first 
to carry out an investigation in this district which she argued presented ‘in a small compass 
all the characteristic features of the trade’, 35 to determine the size of the problem and the 
specific nature of the accidents which occurred most often. Essentially she conducted a 
systematic survey on a representative sample to identify the primary focus for preventative 
action. Her approach was no doubt informed by the methodology developed by Thomas 
Legge, appointed as the first Medical Inspector of Factories in 1898. With his earlier training 
and experience in the field of Public Health Legge had introduced into the Factory 
Inspectorate the recording systems already common in the field of sanitary science. Prior to 
1895 accident recording took place somewhat haphazardly at the discretion of individual 
inspectors who sometimes conducted their own investigations into particular problems 
which concerned them. The Factory Act of 1895, however, had introduced compulsory 
recording of industrial accidents, including details of the type, cause and consequences of 
each incident. As these statistics accumulated it became possible to collate national data in 
order to discern trends and thus inform preventative strategies. From the late 1890s, 
therefore, tables of figures and graphs began to appear in the factory inspectors’ reports, 
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replacing subjective opinion as the basis for decision making. Anderson’s initial investigation 
of laundry accidents shows clear evidence of the influence of this approach. 
The women inspectors’ report for 1900 listed the source of each of the thirty-seven laundry 
accidents identified by Deane between February 1900 and January 1901. 36 On examining 
these data Anderson concluded that unguarded calenders and wringing machines were 
responsible for more than half the accidents. Moreover, since accidents of all types 
increased in July and December in accordance with the demands of the ‘season’ 37 and each 
day increased immediately before lunch breaks, safety problems appeared to be 
exacerbated by long hours and fatigue. Two fatal accidents were caused by falls through 
unguarded trapdoors. These stark facts were supplemented by narrative reports of near 
accidents such as the following: 
A worker in a hot  room naturally wears the neck of her bodice loose 
and perhaps finishes it with a lightly knotted ribbon or scarf. Going 
into such a room I found a girl with a face badly scorched (but not 
incapacitated for more than two days).The accident, unreported, was 
due to the long-worn but now discarded scarf caught by the 
unusualness nearness of the girl to the  rollers. Nothing but complete 
control of the machinery and the presence of mind of the forewoman 
saved the girl from a sudden and terrible death. 
38
  
Concerns about the ill-informed use of second-hand steam engines were reinforced by a 
number of reports. One worker whose hand had been crushed commented that, ‘Since the 
boss tied the old mangle up to the new engine she has taken to leaping back and forth that 
alarmin’ and that sudden-like that its a wonder I’ve not been caught out sooner nor I have 
been.’ 39 Deane visited the site of every reported accident to identify possible means of 
future prevention. Moreover, Anderson insisted that all other women inspectors visit these 
sites as a form of training in hazard awareness. 40 Deane’s investigation into the West 
London district thus provided the blueprint for a longer term investigation into trends in 
laundry accidents throughout the country. Inspector Anna Tracey was assigned the task of 
collating data from the reports of Certifying Surgeons in order to discern trends and to 




 The London ‘season’ consisted of a series of annual events attended by the wealthy and fashionable.  
38
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determine the effectiveness of various interventions. Her data for the period 1900 to 1913 is 
summarised in Figure 5.2 (below). Tracey often cautioned that reported accidents were 
likely to represent an underestimate of the total since all the inspectors frequently 
encountered incidents which had not been reported. 41 However, under-reporting is likely 
either to have remained constant, in which case it would not affect an examination of 
trends, or it may have reduced as a result of increased conformity with the system, creating 
a spurious impression that accidents had increased.  Anderson certainly considered that 
under-reporting reduced year by year. In 1912 she noted that ‘although unreported 
accidents still occur, and are not always discovered, prosecutions for failure to report are 
producing an effect, and there is certainly more nearly complete reporting than formerly’. 42                                   
Figure 5.2 43  
 
The accident figures, in fact, show a reduction in 1908 following a previous steady rise which 
had begun around 1904. The downward trend in 1908 was arrested by a sharp rise in 1911 
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which Anderson surmised was related to the increased pressure of work created by an 
excessively hot summer and the celebrations marking the Coronation of King George V.44  
During this period working hours increased substantially and large numbers of temporary 
and inexperienced workers were employed to cope with demand. Following 1911, however, 
the downward trend in laundry accidents resumed. Figures for the number employed in 
specific industries were not routinely recorded in the factory inspectors’ reports and 
opportunities for the calculation of annual incidence rates are therefore limited. Total 
numbers employed in steam laundries were, however, included in the reports for the years 
1903, 1904, 1907 and 1912, and, based on these figures, the annual incidence rates of 
accidents per thousand workers 45 can be seen to have gradually reduced after 1903 (Table 
5.1, below). 
Table 5.1 46 
       Accident incidence rates in steam laundries per 1,000 workers, for 4 years  
Year Total number employed in 
steam laundries in the UK 
Accident incidence rate /1,000 
workers 
1903 52,427 5.6 
1904 71,633 4.2 
1907 85,686 4.4 
1912 104,625 3.8 
Available data, therefore, indicate first that there was steady decrease in overall numbers of 
laundry accidents after 1908 (interrupted only by the unusual situation of 1911), and second, 
that the actual rate of accidents, taking into account the increase in numbers employed in 
steam laundries, began to decline earlier, from 1903. Moreover, if one believes Anderson’s 
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claim that compliance with reporting had increased over this period, the decline may have 
been more marked than is reflected in the figures.  
While, therefore, some historians have suggested that the inspectors were too few in 
number to have effected any real improvements in women’s health and safety, it is clear 
that safety in laundries did improve during this period. It is also clear that the women 
inspectors took over the major responsibility for this field of work and can be assumed to 
have played a significant role in this improvement. The question arises, therefore, as to how, 
with their limited resources, were they able to achieve this. An examination of their annual 
reports suggests that there were several important elements in their approach. First, they 
invested considerable time and effort in carrying out a detailed analysis of the causes of the 
problem. Figure 5.3 (below) summarises Tracey’s data on the distribution of accidents 
between different causes, averaged over the whole period 1900-1913.  
Figure 5.3 47 
 
In adopting this approach and supplementing their findings with regular monitoring to 
determine the extent of any improvement the inspectors were employing a methodology 
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which was at the forefront of developments in occupational health at the time. Thus 
Tracey’s annual analyses highlighted that the majority of accidents were associated with 
indrawing hot rollers (calenders, shirt and collar ironers) and indrawing cold rollers (wringers 
and starchers). There was a relatively high incidence of accidents involving machinery where 
limbs or clothing were drawn into rollers or a revolving drum. Accidents involving 
hydroextractors or shafts, belts and pulleys were less common but invariably very serious 
when they did occur and often fatal. Hand irons, which were used for clothes not amenable 
to machine ironing, were responsible for frequent burns but these often resulted in less than 
two days absence from work and thus went unreported. From 1906 Tracey also included in 
her report the percentage of injuries classified as severe or minor (Figure 5.4, below). 
Figure 5.4 48 
 
*From 1909 institutional laundries were included in the figures. For that year there were 31 accidents recorded 
in these laundries of which 16 were classified as severe. 
Although all reported accidents are likely to have been relatively serious, given the two days 
absence rule, Certifying Surgeons nevertheless classified accidents in this way. No definition 
of ‘severe’ is provided in Tracey’s compilation of these figures but surrounding text suggests 
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that the classification was based on the permanence of the injury. The pattern of severe 
injuries between the years of 1906 and 1913 largely mirrored that of injuries as a whole, (as 
shown in Figure 5.2, above), with a reduction after 1908, a rise in 1911 and a resumption of 
the gradual decline after this date. Perhaps the most striking feature, however, is the very 
high percentage of injuries considered by the Certifying Surgeon to be severe. These were 
presumably injuries which led to a degree of permanent disablement and, as such, are likely 
to have been caused by machinery. 
Taken together, therefore, the data indicated that the major priority for accident reduction 
was the development of effective machinery guarding and it was on this that the inspectors 
focussed much of their attention. The mainstay of their approach in this respect was a 
programme of workplace visiting. Prosecutions were relatively rare (averaging only two or 
three per year) and appeared to reflect a growing ethos within the inspectorate that the 
maximum deterrent impact was achieved by a limited number of highly publicised actions. 
Thus Mabel Vines considered that a successful prosecution of an Edinburgh laundry, in which 
a young girl lost the use of her hand as a result of an unfenced calender, ‘materially 
strengthened administration of fencing requirements in Scotland’. 49 Most effective 
prevention work, however, was achieved by means of advice and education. Despite their 
small numbers the inspectors carried out an extensive programme of workplace visiting. In 
1904, there were eight women inspectors, each working six days per week, who made a 
total of 2,100 visits to factories and 3,776 visits to workshops, travelling 47,671 miles in the 
process.  Inspector Emily Sadler, who during that year took over responsibility for the West 
London Special District, visited 271 power-driven laundries and 300 hand laundries. 50 
Anderson appears to have combined administrative duties with continuing hands-on 
inspection and in particular preferred to undertake the training of new inspectors herself. 
One new recruit described how ‘after a long morning of most energetic inspection of 
laundries in one of the least salubrious of suburbs, and when the inner man called for 
refreshment as one o’clock came, Miss Anderson said brightly: “Now we can take the 
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opportunity to pay some mealtime visits.” It was not until nearly three o’clock that she said, 
“I think a cup of tea somewhere would be pleasant before we go on to the next place.”’ 51 
Inspections were also combined with the delivery of circulars to employers advising them of 
the dangers of laundry machinery, pointing out their obligations under the factory law and 
drawing attention to the availability of suitable guarding equipment. 52  
Machinery guarding had long been part of the safety measures introduced into factories 
where male workers predominated. However, it is possible to discern certain differences in 
approach between the male and female inspectors in their relations with employers. For 
many male inspectors the notion that working men were largely responsible for their own 
health and safety remained the dominant ethos. Officially the responsibilities of workers and 
employers operated in tandem but in practice inspectors varied in the degree to which they 
attached blame to workers who experienced accidents. For example, many would have 
agreed with Mr Seymour, inspector for East London who argued that: 
so many accidents occur purely through carelessness or inattention 
on the part of the operatives. Calender hands in laundries are 
constantly getting one or more fingers drawn in between the roller 
and the iron, and on enquiry I am generally told that the girl was 




By contrast, there is a noticeable absence in the reports of the women inspectors of any 
tendency to censure the behaviour of individual women workers. Rather there appears to 
have been a presumption that the duty of care lay entirely with the employer. Thus 
Anderson pointed out on numerous occasions that it was unreasonable to lay the 
responsibility for safety on the shoulders of the workers. She noted, for example, that these 
were often young, tired girls between the ages of fourteen and eighteen who could be found 
feeding the rollers of calenders for up to sixteen hours a day. ‘For a moment’s inattention to 
                                                          
51
 Martindale, H. Some Victorian Portraits and Others (1948, republished 1970), Books for Libraries Press, New 
York, pp. 48-9.  
52
 Annual Report of the Chief Inspector of Factories and Workshops for the Year 1904, Cd. 2569 (1905), HMSO, 
London, p. 252. 
53
 Annual Report of the Chief Inspector of Factories and Workshops for the Year 1900, Cd. 668 (1901), HMSO, 
London, p. 164. 
 83 
 
their dangerous charge’, she declared, ‘they may have to pay by the loss of the right hand in 
the most horribly painful manner’. 54 Inspector Emily Sadler was similarly firm on this point: 
I have been much struck over and over again by the gratuitous 
comments of occupiers on their accident reports as to the reason for 
the accident. Again and again the phrase occurs ‘due to her own 
carelessness’, or ‘the girl had no right to be using this machine’... I 
have impressed upon the occupier that such phrases should not form 
part of the report...How can a girl of 15 who has had an accident 
after working nearly a five hours’ spell in a steam-laden factory, 
vibrating with machinery, be said to be careless; or how can a girl 
refuse to put clothes through the dangerous ingathering feed rollers 




The need for worker training was another responsibility which the women inspectors laid at 
the door of the employer. Inspector Mary Paterson noted in 1901 that ‘to the lack of 
knowledge or appreciation of the dangers one must attribute in some cases the practice of 
putting young girls to operate the dangerous machines, and that without their having 
previously learned with an experienced worker’. 56 This assumption of employer 
responsibility underlined the inspectors’ ethos that factory legislation was intended to be 
protective of women. However, in this they made no distinction between men and women 
whom they regarded as equally entitled to protection under the law. 57 This uncompromising 
certainty about where responsibility lay is likely to have enhanced their relations with 
workers, although no doubt it will have often provoked hostility from employers.  
An important element in the women inspectors’ success was their ability to secure and 
maintain an important place for laundry safety on the Home Office agenda. Anderson began 
by employing the tactic for which she, as a fluent French and German speaker, had a special 
aptitude, the unfavourable comparison between regulatory control in parts of continental 
Europe and that in Britain. ‘ I have already reported’ she said, ‘on the happy impression 
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given by better practice in certain countries abroad of not employing young workers on 
dangerous unguarded machinery, and of most carefully guarding, particularly in France, 
machinery on which women are employed.’ 58 To underline the point she added that, ‘In 
general one must remember that, in the matter of regulation of laundries, Germany (for 
steam laundries only) and France (all classes of laundry) are several years in advance of 
England, and that we have still in that industry some of the most elementary problems of 
regulation to solve.’ 59 During this period international exchanges of information in the field 
of occupational health, particularly in the form of European conferences, occurred with 
increasing regularity and British deficiencies which might be thus exposed were always 
prone to create unease within the Home Office. Alongside such reports, statistical 
summaries of accidents in laundries always featured prominently in the lady inspectors’ 
special section of the Chief Inspector’s Annual Report. Moreover these were supplemented 
by more traditional narratives where specific points were graphically illustrated by 
descriptions of real events and by suggestions as to the nature of the safety devices which 
might have prevented the occurrence.  Such horror stories would have been difficult to 
ignore. Two cases recounted by inspector Mabel Vines in 1902 are typical of many others 
which appeared in subsequent years. The first underlined the need for a safety device which 
prevented the machine from operating if the cover was open. 
The washer, Mrs T, packed the hydro with dark stockings, started it, 
forgot to put the cover on, and left the wash house.  During her 
absence Mrs S, another washer, not observing that the hydro was in 
motion, intending to pack it with the clothes she was washing, 




The second case was self-explanatory in terms of the safety message it 
conveyed. 
...a very bad accident, caused by an unguarded set screw on 
overhead shafting, and the absence of proper means to adjust 
overhead belts, resulting in partial strangulation, sprained back, 
injury to eyes and may lead to paralysis. After the engine had been 
                                                          
58
 Annual Report of the Chief Inspector of Factories and Workshops for the Year 1901, Cd. 1112 (1902), HMSO, 




 Annual Report of the Chief Inspector of Factories and Workshops for the Year 1902, Cd. 1610 (1903), HMSO, 
London, p. 166. 
 85 
 
slowed down, a boy aged 17, ascended a ladder to throw on an 
overhead belt. There was a small hole in the left hand corner of his 
coat, which was caught by the set screw of the shafting, and first the 
coat was wound round, and then, before the engine could be 
stopped, the lad was partially drawn round the shafting. 
61
   
In highlighting these individual cases the inspectors were bringing the matter not only to the 
attention of officials in the Home Office but also to the notice of manufacturers who might 
have an economic interest in developing new forms of safety guards suitable for the 
particular machines involved. In 1910 a conference was held at the Annual Laundry 
Exhibition in Islington’s Agricultural Hall, where members of the Factory Department 
(including lady inspectors), laundry engineers and employers reached an agreement on the 
most effective methods of safeguarding laundry machinery. This agreement was 
subsequently embodied in the annual Home Office memorandum to employers on 
machinery safety. 62 Anderson noted that the agreement was ‘greatly helped by the many 
beautiful examples of fencing exhibited in the Hall, which were the outcome of past years of 
less formal interchange of ideas between inspectors and engineers’. 63 She maintained close 
contacts with manufacturers and developed a large information base on safety equipment 
which inspectors in the field could recommend to employers. By 1913 she was able to report 
that ‘the whole matter is now so well in hand that every variation in operation or 
construction of machinery, and every variation in method of fencing, is at once brought to 
my knowledge’, adding that ‘every specially striking or instructive accident reported to me 
from one division I bring to the knowledge of the Senior Lady Inspectors in other divisions, in 
order that all may be working towards similar standards of safety, thus imposing equal 
requirements on all occupiers’. 64 This type of dialogue with interested manufacturers 
represented a significant advance on the situation in 1899 when Anna Tracey had remarked 
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that ‘surely the manufacturers of England cannot be baffled by the production of an efficient 
guard for the machines if they give the matter their earnest attention’. 65 
A particular feature of the women inspectors’ approach was their tendency to follow up the 
longer-term consequences of accidents and disease by visiting workers in their own homes. 
No accounts of such visits appear in the reports of male inspectors who perhaps viewed 
these as indicative of an involvement beyond that required by their professional duty. Given 
the middle-class background of all the women inspectors, such visits may have reflected a 
lingering attachment to philanthropic voluntary social work which continued to occupy many 
of the more conventional Edwardian middle-class wives and daughters during this period. 
Certainly many of the inspectors’ reports suggest a strong involvement with the personal 
circumstances of individual workers’ lives and an urge to alleviate their distress. Thus Mabel 
Vines reported that: 
These accidents are terribly pathetic. For not only do they mean pain 
and suffering, and in many cases, permanent injury, but the worker 
losing his or her means of livelihood, is very often suddenly plunged 
into destitution. Such was the case with Mrs. M. whose arm was 
injured in a steam mangle. When visiting her about three weeks after 
the accident I found her starving and cold. No fire and no food and 
her arm was worse than it was a week ago, she told me. 
66
 
Recently I visited the home of a young girl, who 15 months previously 
had been injured in an  accident. Her left hand was entirely gone, but 
with the sound right hand she had been doing all she could to help 
with the family needlework. The family had been nearly starving, the 
father out of work, there were several little brothers and sisters, and 
she had been the only one old enough to give substantial help. 
67
    
Despite the picture of charitable visiting of the sick and needy which these calls perhaps 
evoke, such follow-up visits also resulted in observations which, although largely unheeded 
at the time, signalled the first intimations of a new field of medical knowledge. Many laundry 
workers whose arms were drawn into rollers suffered from crush injuries which were not 
immediately apparent. These injuries were usually reported as ‘slight’ by Certifying Surgeons 
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but often led to amputations weeks or months later. Deane had been informed by a London 
surgeon who had carried out a number of these amputations that: ‘the combination of 
crushing and burning of the flesh...is so destructive that even where the results are at first 
not apparently severe a form of mortification follows, necessitating amputation.’  68 This 
reflected a condition whereby the internal tissue of a crushed limb was virtually destroyed 
while the external tissue appeared to have suffered only minor bruising. Detailed 
understanding of this condition only fully emerged during the treatment of soldiers during 
the First World War. However, in 1902, Deane reported making follow-up visits to determine 
whether workers were suffering from these longer-term consequences of their injuries.  69 
Similarly, laundresses burnt by rollers and irons or scalded by steam suffered injuries which 
varied in severity according to the thickness of the skin affected and which were often 
wrongly classified as ‘slight’.  70 Classification of the depth of burns and the prognostic 
implications of this, as well as an understanding of the problems of fluid loss and infection, 
also awaited advances in medical knowledge acquired during the war. 71  Often, therefore, 
the seriousness of many of the injuries which occurred in laundries was underestimated, not 
only by the employer but also by the Certifying Surgeon. Deane’s observations did not result 
in any immediate changes in medical practice and women continued to suffer permanent 
effects from their injuries.  Importantly, however, with the advent of the Workmen’s 
Compensation Act of 1906, 72 many of the follow-up visits carried out by inspectors enabled 
injured workers to claim compensation payments for injuries which had initially been 
recorded as minor and non-disabling but which had essentially deprived them of their 
livelihood.  
The reduction of accident in laundries represented one of the most significant achievements 
of the women inspectors. Moreover, in successfully addressing this problem, they brought 
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together a range of new approaches and skills developed as they gained more experience. 
Some of these, such as the gathering of statistics to inform preventative measures and the 
engagement with manufacturers to produce effective guarding, reflected on-going 
developments within the Factory Department, while others, such as their follow-up of 
individual cases reflected a uniquely female approach which potentially added a new 










Chapter 6  
Ventilation in Small Workshops 
The underground workplaces are being extended and occupied as 
fast as they are ready. Thus the number of girls working daily for the 
time allowed by law by artificial light, in places where sunlight never 




In workshops where large numbers are employed the atmosphere is 
often simply horrible. Add to this gas in the evening and one can 
conceive nothing more unhealthy. ... at the street end of the cellar 
some air can occasionally be blown in with dust and dirt from the 
roads and pavements, but just here is placed the gas engine. 
2
 
During the second half of the 19th century the rapid growth of urban centres and the rising 
standard of living of many of their inhabitants resulted in an increased demand for ready 
made goods such as household articles, clothing and small luxury and decorative items. 3 
Initially these goods were produced by outworkers working in their own homes and using 
materials provided by middle-men, who subsequently collected and sold the finished 
products. However, increasing concerns about the quality of goods produced in squalid 
domestic conditions resulted in a transition of this form of production to small workshops 
employing groups of workers. In the less affluent north of England the advantages of 
economies of scale encouraged the introduction of the ‘division of labour’ 4 into the process, 
such that each worker completed only one small part of the operation, and production soon 
moved into large steam-driven factories. 5 By contrast, in London and some towns in the 
south of England, where fast changing fashions and the demands of wealthy individual 
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clients exerted a stronger influence on the market, the workshop system continued to 
prevail. Thus by the end of the 19th century large numbers of predominantly female workers 
in London and southern England, and to a lesser extent in other areas of Britain, were 
employed in what came to be known as the ‘sweated trades’, 6 spending long hours in small 
overcrowded workrooms. These workers were employed in a variety of occupations. In 
1897, for example, a total of 249,643 women in the United Kingdom were reported to be 
employed in small workshops carrying out tailoring, dressmaking, millinery and boot and 
shoemaking. A further 2,635 were employed in fancy box making, and 2,927 in artificial 
flower making. 7 A survey carried out in West London by inspector Emily Sadler in 1901 also 
identified ‘sweated’ conditions in the preparation of tobacco, the production of 
confectionary and preserves and in printing and bookbinding. 8 Many workrooms were in 
basements or semi-basements with little or no access to natural light or ventilation.  Some, 
for example, were in the basement kitchens of the multi-occupancy dwelling houses in 
which workers ate and slept in similarly overcrowded conditions. Others were housed in 
lofts over stables or situated below the shops which sold the goods the workers produced. 
Some of the worst conditions were found in crowded basements beneath the elegant 
London showrooms of dressmakers in Bond Street and Sloane Street. 9   
At the end of the 19th century, the sole aspect of Factory Law which reached the 
predominantly female workforce employed in these workshops was that which governed 
restrictions on working hours. Environmental conditions, covering such matters as space, 
temperature and ventilation were regulated, not by the Home Office, but by the Sanitary 
Authorities under the provisions of the Public Health Act. 10 The Factory Act Extension Act of 
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1867 11 had extended factory regulations, including those relating to air quality, to all 
workshops employing at least fifty people, and the Factory Act of 1878 12 had further 
included all workplaces with any form of motive power. However, very few of the ‘sweated 
trades’ fulfilled these requirements and thus their workforce remained outside the 
protection of these aspects of factory regulation. During the early part of the 20th century, 
however, conditions in these workshops became a major focus of concern for the women 
factory inspectors who, as a result of their inspection visits to enforce working hours’ 
regulations, rapidly became acquainted with the poor conditions which prevailed there.  In 
particular, their concerns were centred on the problem of poor air quality and the need for 
adequate ventilation. The end of the 19th century, marked by a growing belief in the value of 
fresh air for the promotion of health, provided a fertile climate in which to raise new 
questions about overcrowded workrooms pervaded by stale air. Moreover, many of the 
wealthy clients who patronised the millinery and dress shops which relied upon these 
workshops would have been known to the inspectors personally. In urging the case for 
reform, therefore, they were able to harness these concerns and also to draw on new 
scientific knowledge about the constituents of air and emerging technical developments in 
ventilation measurement. An examination of their work in this field, therefore, is illustrative 
both of the scientific and technical developments taking place in industrial health at that 
time and the extent to which the women inspectors embraced these developments and 
enhanced their own expertise. This case study also highlights the strains which developed 
between different regulatory authorities charged with overseeing different aspects of a 
workplace, and considers how the women inspectors attempted to negotiate the transfer of 
regulatory responsibility for small workshops from the Sanitary Department to the Factory 
Department. Unlike their activities discussed in the previous two case studies, however, the 
work of the inspectors in this field was less immediately successful in terms of tangible 
benefits to the workers concerned, but rather represented a longer term process whereby 
attitudes towards the working environment and its requirements were significantly changed. 
Thus, in succeeding years, a new prominence was given to factors such as space, lighting, 
temperature and, in particular, ventilation.  
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When the first women factory inspectors were appointed in 1893 union and press agitation 
about ‘sweating’, which subsequently resulted in the formation of the ‘Anti-sweating 
League’ 13 in 1906, was in its early stages. 14 Findings of Board of Trade reports in 1887 and 
1888 15 had led to the establishment, in 1888, of a Select Committee of Enquiry under Earl 
Dunraven, 16 initially set up to enquire into conditions in the East End of London, but 
subsequently extended to cover the whole country. Between August 1888 and May 1890 the 
Committee took evidence from nearly 300 witnesses at 70 sittings and produced five 
reports. Despite the considerable resources invested in this exercise, however, the final 
recommendations were disappointing for those who anticipated that reformatory legislation 
would follow. Members of the committee concluded that legislation was likely to be 
ineffective and that employer self-regulation could be relied upon to achieve what the State 
could not, a view which was largely in tune with contemporary laissez-faire attitudes 
towards the regulation of industrial activity. 17  The Royal Commission on Labour, established 
in the more interventionist political climate of the early 1890s, reached a different 
conclusion, specifically recommending the use of factory legislation to combat the problem. 
However, for a variety of reasons, there seems to have been no immediate political will to 
pursue this. In terms of factory reform it was the industries which used poisonous 
substances which, from the late 1880s, had claimed major press and public interest. The 
health problems of women seamstresses and milliners were less obviously dramatic and less 
well defined than those suffering from the effects of exposure to substances such as lead 
and phosphorus.  In addition, the term ‘sweated labour’ appears to have encompassed a 
                                                          
13
 In 1906 George Cadbury, chocolate maker, philanthropist and owner of the Daily News financed a major 
exhibition in London’s West End, highlighting conditions in the sweated trades leading to the formation of the 
‘Anti-sweating League’. This campaigned for the abolition of sweated conditions and, in particular, the 
establishment of a minimum wage. It had strong Trade Union support. In October 1906, the League organized a 
large conference in London’s Guildhall chaired by Charles Dilke and Earl Dunraven. Subsequently other 
meetings and exhibitions were organized throughout England.  
14
 ‘The Sweating System’, Lloyds Weekly Newspaper, (May 18 1890); ‘Labour Notes’, Bristol Mercury and Daily 
Post, (December 5 1891); ‘The Labour Commission and Employment of Women’, Daily News, (April 3 1894). 
15
 Report to the Board of Trade on the Sweating System at the East End of London (1887, 1888), Cd 361 (1889), 
HMSO, London. 
16
 Select Committee of the House of Lords on the Sweating System. First Report with Reports of the Board of 
Trade (1887-8); Second Report (1888); Third Report (1889); Fourth and Fifth Reports (1889-1890), HMSO, 
London.  
17
 Taylor, A.J. (1972), Laissez-faire and State Intervention in Nineteenth-century Britain, MacMillan Press, 
London, pp. 42-3. 
 93 
 
range of concerns which fell within the bailiwick of different regulatory authorities or none 
at all. This seems to have effectively diluted any focussed action while maintaining an 
impression that the problem was already the subject of regulatory control.  Thus the 
definition of ‘sweating’ adopted by the Select Committee of 1888 was that of ‘any situation 
where workers spent long hours in poor conditions for only low wages’. Within this 
definition, issues relating to excessively long hours lay firmly within the jurisdiction of the 
Factory Department while low wages, unless they involved the abuses of the  
‘truck system’, were a matter for negotiation between employers and workers.  The rather 
general term ‘poor conditions’ could include a range of factors which might be considered to 
fall within the realm of health and safety, for example excessive heat or cold, poor lighting, 
overcrowding and poor air quality. However, in the early 1890s such issues, as they related 
to small workshops, were the concern of the local sanitary authorities who, under the 
provisions of the Public Health Act of 1875, had a duty to deal with ‘nuisances’. 18 For hard 
pressed local sanitary inspectors, struggling with the welter of diverse duties placed upon 
them by the 1875 Act, their obligation to regulate conditions in the ‘sweated trades’ must 
have seemed a relatively low priority.   As well as the removal of ‘nuisances’, sanitary 
inspectors were, for example, required to carry out the inspection of bakeries, dairies and 
slaughterhouses, ensure that lodging houses were not overcrowded and that sewerage 
systems were effective, monitor compliance with building regulations and supervise the 
notification of infectious diseases. From the beginning of the 20th century they were also 
involved in the expanding social service of ‘health-visiting’ to provide assistance and advice 
to the poor. 19  Perhaps unsurprisingly, therefore, factory inspectors who, in the course of 
their enforcement of working hours’ regulations, made frequent visits to small workshops 
were often highly critical of their co-inspectors in the Sanitary Department whose approach 
they regarded as generally ineffective. In 1900 their frequently voiced frustrations prompted 
Chief Inspector Arthur Whitelegge, himself a former Medical Officer of Health, 20  to note in 
his Annual Report that ‘the inertia of many such bodies, to which reference is made in 
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several of the inspectors’ reports is to be regretted’, 21 adding in 1901 that ‘as in former 
years the reports indicate that the co-operation of the Local Authorities was very unequal’ 
and that ‘in most of the smaller districts and in certain important towns there has been 
neglect’. 22  
By the beginning of the 20th century, therefore, there was little sign of progress in terms of 
improving the conditions prevalent in small workshops. However, during the years which 
preceded the First World War, the issue of ‘sweating’ and the environmental conditions 
under which it took place, gained a new prominence, promoted not only by the activities of 
the Anti-sweating League but also, it will be argued here,  by those of the women factory 
inspectors. The report of the four Lady Commissioners appointed as part of the Royal 
Commission on Labour in1892 23 included a substantial section on the problems of the 
‘sweated trades’ and from the outset, therefore, the subject was high on the agenda of the 
women inspectors. From 1894 their annual reports catalogued a range of problems 
associated with small workshops including extremes of temperature considered to result in 
chills and fevers and poor lighting which placed excessive strain on the eyes. 24  Moreover, in 
1906, inspector Emily Sadler reported as follows: 25   
In one case a worker whose family history had shown no hereditary 
tendency towards lunacy had been so affected by the feeling of 
oppression and lack of proper air in the basement in which she was 
continually employed that she became very ill and eventually went 
out of her mind. Others of the workers were also obliged to leave 
from this same cause.  
26
  
Particular attention was focussed on the problem of air quality, an emphasis which chimed 
well with current trends in both public and occupational health. By the late 19th century 
there was considerable public enthusiasm for the benefits of fresh air, and air quality in 
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towns and cities had become a major preoccupation of the Sanitary Authorities. 27 
Moreover, the Home Office had similarly begun to consider that the maintenance of good air 
was part of the Factory Department’s remit of protecting workers’ health. Medical and 
public attitudes at that time, however, incorporated a number of contradictory beliefs about 
the sources of ill-health, reflecting the fact that the theoretical basis for disease aetiology 
was in the process of change, shifting from a ‘miasmatic’ 28 model of disease causation to 
one based on ‘germ theory’, which recognised the role of specific bacterial organisms. 29 The 
terms within which the women inspectors couched their concerns about air quality in small 
workrooms are highly reflective of these contradictions and demonstrate the extent to 
which they were operating in a changing medical and scientific environment. Thus they 
reported initially that many of the women employed in such workrooms were anaemic in 
appearance and complained of persistent nausea, headaches and excessive fatigue. 30  These 
symptoms the inspectors attributed to the malodorous vapours emanating from filthy floors 
and from tightly packed human bodies. They considered that this impure or 
 ‘vitiated’  31 air to be responsible for a range of health problems, a conclusion entirely 
consistent with a miasmatic model of disease aetiology. Elsewhere, however, they showed 
themselves to be equally well-acquainted with the implications of germ theory,  32 as 
witnessed by their concerns about the spread of phthisis  33 where individuals worked in 
close proximity to one another and inhaled each other’s air. 34  Moreover, they understood 
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the risks associated with the inhalation of carbon monoxide emanating from defective gas 
lights and flueless gas stoves. Such devices were the lighting and heating sources of choice 
for seamstresses and milliners worried about smuts from candles and open fires which might 
ruin expensive hats and gowns. 35 In different ways all these problems were associated with 
contaminated air but the model of disease aetiology adopted by the inspectors varied 
between the miasmatic, the bacteriological and the toxicological, demonstrating a 
simultaneous adherence to earlier notions of disease causation and to new scientific 
developments.     
The Factory Act of 1895 was the first to include regulations about ventilation in  
workplaces, 36 requiring the specific control of certain dusts and fumes and more generally 
that ‘sufficient ventilation shall be maintained in factories and workshops.’ 37 ‘Sufficient 
ventilation’, which essentially related to the provision of fresh air, was at this stage, defined 
in terms of the cubic feet of air space allotted to each worker. 38 Like its predecessors, 
however, the Act was limited in scope, applying only to workplaces where the manufacturing 
process itself generated specific toxic gases, vapours or dusts. Again this excluded most 
small workshops where any toxic emissions were likely to be associated with gas heating and 
lighting. 39 The inspectors’ only recourse to action was the notification of ventilation defects 
to the local Sanitary Authorities, an approach which they appeared to pursue vigorously, as 
witnessed by the increasing number of notifications each year. In 1897 the inspectors made 
286 such notifications. By 1913 this number had risen to 1,533. 40 Numerous comments in 
the inspectors’ reports, however, suggest that in many areas these rarely resulted in any 
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form of action, something which appeared to represent a continual source of irritation to 
the Factory Department. In 1903, for example, Anderson stated that ‘sometimes complaints 
relate to cases where the local authority are of the opinion (until persuaded to the contrary 
by the Factory Inspector) that the means of ventilation are sufficient.’ 41 Return visits to 
workshops to monitor action following notification appear to have been spasmodic rather 
than routine, and would presumably have been well beyond the resources of the women 
inspectors. Nevertheless their reports are peppered with examples of subsequent visits 
where they express disappointment at the lack of improvement. In 1906, for example, Mary 
Paterson re-visited a number of small workshops in Glasgow and recorded no evidence of 
action since her earlier inspection. To underline what she considered to be incompetence on 
the part of the Sanitary Authorities she highlighted sections of their Annual Report where 
she noted that of 31,654 visits made by sanitary inspectors to 4,697 workshops in 1905 only 
eighteen had been found to be defective in light or ventilation. This, she observed, 
suggested ‘a state of near perfection not borne out by the senses or workers’ reports’. 42  
In addition to acting dutifully, if often ineffectually, within the terms of the current public 
health legislation, the women inspectors frequently described how they offered advice to 
employers.  In 1897, for example, Anderson reported that 78 cases of defective ventilation 
had been identified. In 57 cases the installation of fans had been suggested, while the 
remainder had been referred to male engineering inspectors for further advice. 43 The 
following year 69 cases were similarly referred and in 1899 she described her advice to an 
employer on the installation of an extraction fan. 44  These reports, although serving to bring 
the problem to the notice of the Chief Inspector,  appear to indicate activity that was both 
beyond their legal remit and probably also beyond their technical expertise.  
Shortly after her appointment as Principal Lady Inspector, however, Anderson translated her 
frustrations into the explicit pursuit of a regulatory goal. In 1897 she included in her Annual 
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Report a proposal that existing ventilation regulations contained in the Act of 1895 should 
be extended to include all workshops, not just those using some form of motive power or 
directly producing dust and fumes. 45  She reiterated this proposal every year until 1900, 
underlining her argument with references to the numerous reports of the women 
inspectors, and adding, for good measure, that legislation pertaining to small workshops in 
France was much more comprehensive than that in England. 46 Anderson’s persistent 
lobbying contrasted sharply with the behaviour of junior male inspectors, whose official Civil 
Service grade she shared, and who confined their activities to routine inspection and 
reporting.  Perhaps as a result of the unique peripatetic position of the women inspectors, 
and also perhaps by virtue of a confidence emanating from their social class and political 
connections, Anderson clearly considered that she, at least, had a legitimate role to play in 
departmental policymaking. Further pressure to bring small workshops under the umbrella 
of factory legislation was provided by the reports of Lucy Deane, inspector for the West 
London Metropolitan District. In 1899 Chief Inspector Arthur Whitelegge had set up a 
‘Factory Staff Committee’ 47 to carry out a re-organisation of the divisions and districts of the 
Factory Inspectorate which had remained unchanged since their original designation by 
Alexander Redgrave in 1875. Anderson seems to have taken the opportunity to acquire 
regulatory control for the women inspectors of those parts of London where the problem of 
small workshops was most acute. Whitelegge accepted her recommendation that, while 
women inspectors should largely continue in their peripatetic role, it would be useful for 
them to assume sole responsibility for one particular district, the West London district, 
which contained scores of small workshops employing women in dressmaking, millinery and 
also laundry work. Lucy Deane, by this stage the most experienced of the women 
 inspectors,  commenced this role in 1900. In keeping with the new departmental preference 
for systematic recording she immediately began furnishing the annual reports of the women 
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inspectors with statistics on visits and findings, such as those summarised in Table 6.1 
(below).  
Table 6.148 
    Defects in small workshops notified to the Sanitary Authorities: 1900  
 Overcrowding Want of cleanliness Want of ventilation Want of fire escapes  
Acton 0 2 0 2 
Chelsea 2 4 2 1 
Chiswick 1 1 0 1 
Fulham 0 22 10 10 
Hammersmith 1 7 3 5 
Kensington 0 2 0 0 
Marylebone 17 26 20 26 
Paddington 7 9 6 4 
Westminster 8 13 8 9 
 
These figures illustrated the improvements recorded since 1893 in Kensington, which initially 
had contained some of the worst workshop conditions. The situations in Fulham, 
Marylebone and Westminster, by contrast, remained very poor. Deane noted that 
Kensington had for a number of years been under close inspection by the women’s section 
of the Factory Department and had also benefitted from joint visits by sanitary and factory 
inspectors. 49 Within this small area, therefore, she was able to demonstrate the value of 
good co-operation between Factory and Sanitary Departments but, more particularly, the 
potential benefits of a well-resourced and experienced programme of visits by women 
factory inspectors. The reports of other inspectors indicated that on a wider scale the co-
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operation and commitment of the hard-pressed local Sanitary Departments could not be 
relied upon. Thus Anderson remained convinced that legislative change which transferred 
responsibility for conditions in small workshops to the Factory Department remained the 
most viable route to reform. She was no doubt aware that during the late 1890s the Home 
Office had embarked on a comprehensive review of factory legislation, with the intention of 
consolidating the numerous existing regulations under a single new Factory and Workshop 
Act. 50 This review offered her an opportunity to press for a change in the law, such that 
small workrooms would be included under the terms of the legislation.   
Paradoxically, however, new scientific and medical developments which had shifted the 
focus of legislation towards the identification and prevention of the effects of specific toxic 
agents made it difficult to justify a simple extension of existing ventilation regulations to 
small workshops. The precise nature of the toxic hazards in such workshops had not been 
defined. Although the existing law required the maintenance of general ventilation in large 
factories (in addition to the control of specific toxic fumes) this to some extent reflected 
earlier beliefs about the general value of fresh air and the importance of avoiding 
malodorous vapours. In the new scientific climate the question was raised as to whether foul 
air itself, although unpleasant, actually constituted a hazard to health if it contained no 
identifiable poisonous substances.  If so, which particular constituents were present, did 
they exist at levels likely to be harmful and did the means to detect and measure these 
currently exist? In 1900, the Home Secretary asked the Chief Inspector of Factories to set up 
a committee to consider these questions. Significantly for those concerned about small 
workshops the ‘Inquiry into Ventilation in Factories and Workshops’ 51  was to consist of two 
phases. These reflected a distinction between general ventilation, the constant renewal of 
air from outside sources to remove ‘impurities due to the presence of employees and of 
lights burning’, 52 and local ventilation involving the use of mechanical means  to remove 
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specific fumes or dust from the breathing zones of workers. 53 The former, the investigation 
of general ventilation, was essentially the problem of small workrooms, and it was agreed 
that this should form the subject of the first phase. Given that, prior to 1893, virtually no 
official attention had been paid to this problem, and that earlier emphasis had concentrated 
almost exclusively on toxic dusts and fumes in manufacturing industry, 54 this was a 
surprising decision. It seems reasonable to assume that it owed much to the persistence of 
Anderson and her team in repeatedly highlighting the subject in their annual reports.  
Advantageously, the subject also chimed well with a developing scientific enthusiasm for 
atmospheric measurement, something which may not have escaped the notice of Anderson 
who appears to have chosen a particularly opportune moment to raise the subject of 
ventilation. By the late 1890s analytical chemistry had advanced to the point where it was 
possible to detect and measure low levels of certain contaminants in the air, notably carbon 
dioxide and carbon monoxide. Added to this, early characterisations of ‘dose-effect 
relationships’ 55 had begun to provide more details of specific effects on the body. This 
methodology, which had been developed to investigate the problem of poisonous and 
explosive gases in coal mines 56 had recently been applied to address public concerns about 
the quality of the air in the tunnels of the recently constructed Metropolitan underground 
railway.  In 1897 the Board of Trade had commissioned an investigation in which the various 
sources of contamination (trains, gas lamps and people) were identified and their various 
contributions to the release of pollutants (carbonic acid, carbonic oxide and sulphurous  
acid  57) were measured. 58 Thus in 1900, the methodology required for the investigation of 
small workshops was already in place and the Chief Scientist in the railway investigation, Dr 
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John Scott Haldane, 59 was ready and willing to conduct a similar inquiry into factory and 
workshop ventilation.  
Drawing on his previous work in mines, Haldane carried out a range of careful experiments 
to determine the levels of carbonic oxide and carbonic acid present in the air of different 
types of workshops under different conditions. 60 Working with specialist engineering 
inspector, Edward Osborn, he concluded that the current criterion for adequate general 
ventilation, the provision of a minimum of 250 cubic feet of air space per person employed, 
was inappropriate having found that ‘the most highly ‘vitiated’ air met with by the 
committee was in rooms with an airspace of 10,000 cubic feet per person’. 61  Instead they 
proposed a standard based on the proportion of carbonic acid in the air, arguing that 
previous research had identified this as ‘the best objective criterion of the sufficiency of 
ventilation in ordinary rooms’. 62 They further recommended the use of a new portable 
method of air sampling, for use by factory inspectors, which had been developed by Haldane 
in the course of the investigation. 63 Significantly this method had been validated by the 
analysis of numerous duplicate air samples, many of which were collected by inspector Rose 
Squire, 64 a factor which both confirms the close involvement of the women inspectors and 
indicates the respect which Haldane apparently had for their work. Finally, and perhaps 
most importantly, the committee recommended that, within the terms of the new Factory 
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Act of 1901, 65 the proposed standard of ventilation ‘should be prescribed for all classes of 
factories and workshops’.  66  
Anderson had thus mobilised the skills of one of the most eminent scientists of the day, 
employing the most advanced scientific techniques, to investigate the problems of small 
workshops.  Moreover, she had also achieved her objective in terms of legislation. However, 
the subsequent implementation of the regulations, proved to be a difficult challenge. A 
particularly disappointing element was that the remedying of defects in ventilation, once 
notified, remained the responsibility of the sanitary authorities..  Moreover, there was 
clearly an initial delay in translating the technical aspects of the regulations to action on the 
ground. In 1902 Anderson reported that she was still awaiting the recommendations and 
advice of the Committee. 67 In 1903 she reported that work towards improvement had been 
‘tentative and halting’, although concluded optimistically that ‘when we have, to guide us, 
recognised tests and standards of sufficiency (capable of being enforced) as to “means” and 
“maintenance” of ventilation ... we shall certainly see a great development’. 68 In 1904 she 
again reported that ‘we wait for recognised tests’ and that ‘the question of general 
ventilation in workrooms stands very much as I reported it to be in 1902 and 1903’. 69 By 
1905, however, the women inspectors were regularly collecting samples and dispatching 
these for analysis of carbonic acid levels. This activity was considerably enhanced by the 
appointment that year of a scientifically qualified inspector, Mildred Power, 70 who began a 
systematic survey of conditions in West London workshops, measuring space, carbonic acid, 
temperature and humidity levels. 71 Her appointment was indicative of the educational 
qualifications, particularly in the field of science, which were increasingly required of women 
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inspectors during this period. Both Miss Power and, a few years later, medically qualified 
woman inspector, Miss Whitlock, 72 were competent, not only to carry out the necessary 
sampling procedures, but also the analysis of the samples they collected. Anderson was 
quick to capitalise on this asset, pointing out in her Annual Report that this provided the 
department with substantial savings in time and money. 73  
The results of this activity, however, were largely in terms of the identification of the scale of 
the problem rather than its solution.  In 1900 Anderson had clearly anticipated that the 
recommendations of the Ventilation Committee would provide real direction, not only in 
terms of measurement but also in relation to intervention. 74  Expectations had been raised 
and requests for assistance from both workers and employers increased, as did notifications 
to the sanitary authorities. In 1902 the women inspectors had notified a total of 651 sanitary 
defects to the sanitary authorities, of which thirty-three related to lack of ventilation. By 
1906, these figures had risen to 816 and 60 respectively. 75 Unfortunately practical 
recommendations from the Ventilation Committee seem to have been confined to the 
second phase of the enquiry which focussed on dust and fumes and offered detailed 
technical advice on fans and ducting, entirely inappropriate to the general ventilation of 
small workrooms which were often situated underground. 76 The difficulty of persuading the 
sanitary authorities to take action remained, not only no doubt because of other more 
pressing priorities, but also, as the Ventilation Committee must have discovered, because in 
many cases practical solutions were difficult to find. Clearly, in recommending the 
installation in most factories of the latest technology in ventilation engineering, the 
Committee were on relatively familiar ground. Many basement workrooms, however, simply 
did not have direct access to outside air and for those above ground the need to keep 
garments and other goods free from smuts precluded the most obvious solution, the 
                                                          
72
 Miss Whitlock was appointed in 1910. She was a qualified doctor with an additional Diploma in Public Health.   
73
 Annual Report of the Chief Inspector of Factories and Workshops for the Year 1911, Cd. 6239 (1912), HMSO, 
London, p. 134. 
74
 Annual Report of the Chief Inspector of Factories and Workshops for the Year 1900, Cd. 668 (1901), HMSO, 
London, p. 367. 
75
 Annual Report of the Chief Inspector of Factories and Workshops for the Year 1906, Cd. 3586 (1907), HMSO, 
London, p. 195. 
76
 Final Report of the Departmental Committee appointed to inquire into the Ventilation of Factories and 
Workshops (1907), Cd. 3553, HMSO, London.   
 105 
 
opening of windows.  In 1906 Anderson observed that ‘the old difficulty of securing any real 
maintenance of ventilation...remains very much in the position held by it for many years’. 77 
She reiterated this general conclusion in various forms in successive annual reports up to 
1914.  
Unsurprisingly there was little further progress during the First World War. As Chapter 7 will 
discuss, compliance with factory regulations in most workplaces deteriorated during the war 
as the numbers of inspectors was considerably reduced. 78 Moreover, the work of the 
women inspectors was radically changed during this period, making it difficult for them to 
focus on issues of previous concern. 79 In 1919 Senior Inspector, Emily Slocock, reported that 
the use of flueless gas stoves in small workshops had increased during the war, despite the 
makers’ recommendation that they should only be used in places where there is ‘full and 
adequate means of ventilation’. 80 During the same period, the reports of male inspectors 
also reflected their discouragement in the face of limited progress. In 1921 inspector Mr 
Lauder in Glasgow commented that ‘the paramount importance of fresh air, as an essential 
for health, is always being urged, but progress towards ideal ventilation is very slow.’ 81 
Moreover, the problem was not always solved by the construction of new premises. In the 
same year Mr Pedler, Inspector for Leicester, observed the erection of several large new 
factories ‘without any adequate provision for ventilation’. 82  In terms of immediate benefits 
to the women workers involved, therefore, the inspectors’ efforts to improve ventilation in 
small workshops appear to have met with little success. From the factory inspectors’ point of 
view, one reason for this was their continued dependence on the ineffective sanitary 
Authorities. A more fundamental difficulty, however, lay in the intractable nature of the 
problem. The inspectors were able to record numerous small improvements in the individual 
workshops they visited personally, but as long as workshops were sited in unsuitable 
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premises and as long as affordable and safe means of heating and lighting were unavailable, 
air standards were difficult to maintain. In 1900, for example, Mary Paterson had reported 
that in Central London the price of land obliged employers to use any area as a workshop 
which could not be used as a showroom 83 while in 1911 inspector Emily Slocock noted the 
benefits but also the prohibitive cost of electricity which only large wealthy employers could 
afford. 84  The on-going tension between economics and health and safety requirements 
represented a significant obstacle to reform.   
The goal of reform was also proving elusive for other organisations interested in the 
‘sweated trades’.  Encouraged by the interventionist political climate which followed the 
Liberal victory of 1905, a vigorous campaign was mounted by the Anti-sweating League, 
supported by the TUC. Although this campaign ran concurrently with the activities of the 
women inspectors, however, its objectives were rather different. Trade union attention 
during this period, as in later years, was focussed primarily on terms of employment 
(working hours and wages) and rather less on working conditions. 85 At an early stage, 
therefore, initial trade union support for factory regulation as the preferred solution to the 
problem was replaced by the pursuit of the minimum wage. In the event this achieved little 
in terms of reform. The Trade Boards set up in 1909 to establish minimum wages dealt with 
only a small number of industries, none of which encompassed the kind of workshops under 
discussion here.  After the war, however, the problem was suddenly and unexpectedly 
solved when the post-war economic slump resulted in the closure of the majority of small 
workshops and, with it, the end of many of the ‘sweated trades’. In common with members 
of the Anti-sweating League, the women inspectors could claim no direct credit for this 
eventual solution to the problem and their practical achievements might, therefore, be seen 
as relatively limited, confined only to those individual workshops which they personally 
visited. Their real legacy, however, requires the adoption of a longer term perspective. By 
1914, the subject of ventilation in small work premises was firmly established on the Home 
Office agenda, due largely to the persistence of the women inspectors. After the war, 
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alongside space, lighting and temperature, it would become an important aspect of any 
good working environment and the subject of major industrial health research. 86 This 
approach was further reinforced by the legislative change, negotiated by the women 
inspectors in 1901, which in part shifted responsibility for small workshops from the Local 
Government Boards of Public Health to the Factory Department. This underlined the 
principal, which at the beginning of the 20th century was only in its early stages of 
development, that all workers were entitled to the same protection under factory law. 
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Health, Safety and Welfare in World War 1 
Earning high wages? Yus  
Five quid a week 
A woman too, mind you,  
I call it dim sweet 
 
Ye’re asking some questions –  
But bless yer, here goes: 
I spends the whole racket  
On good times and clothes 
 
I’ve bracelets and jewellery, 
Rings envied by friends 
A sergeant to swank with, 
And something to lend 
 
We’re all here today, mate, 
Tomorrow- perhaps dead, 
If Fate tumbles on us 
And blows up our shed. 
 
Extracts from: ‘Munition Wages’ (1917) by 





In August 1914 the outbreak of war brought a sharp rise in unemployment as demand for 
non-essential goods declined and many factories closed. 2  This situation was short-lived, 
however, and within months industries began to develop and expand as they adjusted to 
war-related production. With large numbers of men volunteering, or at a later date being 
conscripted for military service, many of the workers recruited into industry during the early 
months of the war were women. In July 1914 only eleven women were employed in the 
existing Royal Ordnance Factories but by October 1916 this number had risen to nearly 
18,000 representing over 20% of the workers employed there. 3 During the same period 
almost 76,000 women (almost 60% of this workforce) commenced employment in the new 
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ordnance factories which were established in 1914 and 1915. 4 While those women 
employed directly in the production of armaments have perhaps received the most historical 
attention, 5 many others were substituted for men in factories taken into government 
control to produce items required for the prosecution of the war. These included industries 
such as electrical, mechanical and marine engineering, aeroplane manufacture and the 
production of metal, wooden, rubber and leather goods. 6 By October 1916, almost 308,000 
women were employed in such factories constituting over 20% of their workforce. 7 Other 
women were forced to adapt their skills to different types of production as existing 
industries closed down or changed their manufacturing focus to chime with military needs. 
Thus in her Annual Report for 1914, 8 Adelaide Anderson described how dressmakers in 
Leeds moved to the production of army uniforms, mattress covers, canvas knapsacks and 
even nose-bags for horses, while London furriers received large government orders for fur 
and skin coats for troops. Similarly Bradford carpet makers adapted their machinery to 
weave army blankets. In Scotland a combination of enemy action and the requisition of 
boats by the government effectively closed the Aberdeen fishing industry and large numbers 
of ‘herring girls’, who previously gutted and packed fish landing at Peterhead, transferred to 
the jute works of Dundee. Many female workers underwent extensive retraining, such as the 
Birmingham pen makers whose employer shifted production to the manufacture of surgical 
dressings and the factory workers in London who were trained in soldering to meet an 
unprecedented demand for metal provision boxes. Some industries began producing items 
which had previously been imported from the continent and were thus no longer available.  
In Redditch, Worcestershire, for example, fish-hook manufacturers recommenced the 
production of hosiery needles, a part of the needlemaking industry which had, in earlier 
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years, played a central economic role in the town, but which had largely moved to Germany 
by the end of the 19th century. 9  
These changes in employment patterns seemed likely to provide new challenges for the 
women’s inspectorate. In 1914 Anderson observed that many of the women newly engaged 
in industrial production had no experience of factory work having previously been employed 
in domestic service. Others had no experience of paid work at all. 10 In these circumstances 
increases in accidents and in the incidence of industrial disease seemed almost inevitable. 
Moreover, as a result of the call to arms the male inspectorate was rapidly becoming 
depleted. By December 1914, thirty-five inspectors out of a total of 195 had been seconded 
to other departments for war-related work, while a further thirty had joined the army, 
alongside thirty-two Home Office clerks responsible for administrative work within the 
Factory Department. 11 In all 62 inspectors and forty one clerks saw active service during the 
war, of which eight inspectors and three clerks were killed. 12  These were challenging 
circumstances for the women’s section which, by 1913, still only numbered twenty 
inspectors of which five were superintendants with district management responsibilities. 13  
However, as indicated in the previous sections, the expertise of the women inspectors had 
developed considerably during the years preceding the war, and by 1914 they were 
competent to carry out most of the duties of their male colleagues.  The huge increase in the 
female workforce accompanied by a reduction in the size of the male inspectorate might 
therefore have been expected to offer an unprecedented opportunity for growth in the 
women’s section. An examination of their work during the war, however, indicates that, in 
the event, this opportunity was denied to them. The much needed increase in numbers did 
not materialise and, instead of taking up the duties of their absent colleagues, the women 
inspectors appear to have been diverted away from their traditional role of health and safety 
promotion  and towards a completely different  sphere of activity, namely that of welfare 
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provision. This chapter will consider the reasons for this change of direction and its 
contribution to a widespread neglect of women’s industrial health and safety during the war. 
It will be argued that a degree of national panic about the potentially destabilising effect on 
women’s behaviour of mass female employment, combined with the new enthusiasm 
among industrialists for enhancing human performance through the provision of social 
amenities, resulted in a government decision to develop a comprehensive programme of 
industrial welfare. This programme, which was aimed primarily at women workers, absorbed 
considerable national resources, including those of the women factory inspectors who were 
reluctantly drawn into its administration at the expense of their normal duties. At the same 
time the promotion of industrial health and safety was relatively neglected and there was a 
rise in industrial accidents and in the incidence of occupationally acquired diseases. This case 
study, therefore, contrasts sharply with those discussed in the previous three sections in 
that it charts a discontinuity with the inspectors’ earlier progress towards increasing 
expertise and growing involvement in the prevention of industrial accidents and disease.  
Largely as a result of government policy the women inspectors’ contribution to 
improvements in women’s working conditions was thus reduced during the First World War 
relative to that in earlier years. 
By the middle of 1915 it is clear that the women’s inspectorate was struggling to meet the 
new challenges created by the war and that Anderson considered an expansion of the 
section to be essential. In June of that year she wrote to Whitelegge, requesting an increase 
in staff and enclosing a number of inspectors’ reports ‘to illustrate some of the special 
problems of women’s employment arising out of the war for which the women inspectors 
have been urgently needed.’ 14 It had, she said ‘been impossible for the inspectors to 
overtake more than a fraction of the work necessary for the health and safety of women, 
and consequently for the nation’ adding that ‘it is impossible for the position with regard to 
Factory Department staff to remain as it is’. 15 She pointed to the impossibility of appointing 
men of above and below military age to replace those on active service whom she 
considered would be ‘useless’, while ‘women of the right age and qualifications could be 
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obtained’. 16 In August Whitelegge embarked a prolonged battle with the Secretary of State 
and the Treasury to secure more staff, asking immediately for twelve additional women 
inspectors. 17 He was initially granted three and offered two volunteers, neither of whom 
had any relevant qualifications or experience but who were nevertheless considered suitable 
on the ground that they were both daughters of Earls! 18  The incident serves as a reminder 
that, despite the level of respect they now commanded within the Factory Department, the 
women inspectors were nevertheless engaged in a continuing struggle for professional 
recognition within other parts of the Civil Service. Whitelegge subsequently secured three 
more women inspectors (who had passed the relevant Civil Service examinations) in January 
1916, and an additional six in August of 1917. 19 Throughout the negotiations on staffing 
levels it was emphasised by Treasury and Home Office officials and agreed, or at least 
conceded, by Whitelegge, that all the new posts were temporary, for the duration of the war 
only, a stipulation emphasised  by the literal underlining of the word ‘temporary’ in all 
official communications on the subject. 20 Moreover salaries were considerably reduced.21 
For her part, Anderson appeared to retain hopes that staff employed during the war might 
obtain permanent posts, arguing that it would be advantageous in the future to be able to 
select from those who already had experience. They would, she said ‘become very useful 
with very short training’. 22   
The reluctance of the Treasury to sanction an increase in the number of female factory 
inspectors, already evident by 1915, suggests that the attention of the government had at an 
early stage shifted away from the promotion of health and safety and towards the provision 
of industrial welfare. Moreover, the presumption that any additions to the staff could be 
sourced from untrained but philanthropic middle-classes ladies, indicated that old attitudes 
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regarding the natural role of female staff had re-surfaced. The assumption that female 
inspectors were the ideal candidates to police the requirements of the welfare system was 
first evidenced by the work assigned to them at the beginning of the war, namely the 
enforcement of ‘Emergency Orders’. The 1901 Factory Act had incorporated a facility for the 
Secretary of State to introduce such Orders, which suspended regulations relating to 
working hours, in times of national crisis. 23 During the war the relentless demand for 
military supplies resulted in the issuing of thousands of Emergency Orders, initially to 
individual firms on a temporary basis, but increasingly, as the war continued, to groups of 
firms within a particular industry for an indefinite period. The task of policing these Orders, 
to ensure that employers did not overstep their terms and conditions, fell to the women 
inspectors. However, the specific focus of this enforcement gave the first intimation of the 
way priorities were shifting, away from the maintenance of health and safety and towards 
the moral protection of the nation, and of women in particular. 24 A particular feature of the 
Emergency Orders was the relaxation of the prohibition of female night work, but only on 
condition that a ‘responsible woman’ 25 remained on the premises throughout, to ensure 
that women and young girls were not left alone with male workers during hours of darkness. 
Inspector Hilda Martindale, who appears to have entered into her new role with a degree of 
enthusiasm, 26 reported a typical case where a firm in West Bromwich infringed the 
regulations by employing ‘two young men and three girls aged eighteen, nineteen and 
twenty from 6.00 p.m. to 6 a.m... Except for these two men and the three girls, and an old 
watchman, no one was on the premises. None of the girls could be considered a responsible 
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woman’, she said. 27 The requirement for such a presence was strongly reminiscent of the 
moral concerns which had underpinned the original prohibition of night work for women in 
1878. 28 The sudden influx of women of all ages and social backgrounds into industry, as well 
as the geographical displacement of large groups of young girls unused to leading 
independent, unsupervised lives, appears to have engendered a degree of national panic 
about the moral corruption which might ensue. The extracts from Madeline Bedford’s poem 
at the head of this chapter neatly summarised these concerns. Bedford was not, as might 
initially be assumed, a munitions worker but a middle-class lady with no experience of paid 
employment. As such she was expressing not the sentiments and actual experiences of a 
worker, but rather a growing national anxiety about the potential consequences of mass 
female employment.  
Alongside these anxieties were new concerns about performance efficiency, emanating from 
the imperative to maximise the production of armaments and other war-related goods. 
From an early stage this was a major political priority for a government increasingly under 
pressure to demonstrate its ability to resource the war. 29 One solution appeared to lie in the 
concept of ‘Taylorism’ 30 which during the early years of the 20th century had increasingly 
pervaded the organisation of larger factories.  This philosophy of management relied on the 
objective analysis of work activities into their smallest components in order to standardise 
procedures and thus minimise effort and maximise performance.  It was an approach 
eminently suited to the organisation of a large munitions factory inhabited by an 
inexperienced workforce. Moreover, the notion that human comfort was also necessary to 
maximise performance had become equally popular with large employers in the years 
immediately preceding the war. The worker was regarded as analogous to a machine and 
thus performed better when in good working order.  As American writer and lecturer, 
Budgett Meakin stated ‘...it is only when high spirits and enthusiasm enter the human 
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machine that, like a well-oiled engine, all parts work smoothly and produce the greatest 
effort with the least friction’. 31 
In the summer of 1915 the government’s response to these different strands of anxiety and 
enthusiasm  found expression in the establishment of the Health of Munitions Workers 
Committee ‘to consider and advise on questions of industrial fatigue, hours of labour and 
other matters affecting the personal health and physical efficiency of workers in munitions 
factories and workshops’ 32 As a consequence of its recommendations, which filtered out in 
a series of twenty-one separate reports, the government embarked on the development of 
large scale industrial welfare. Early in 1916 the Home Office and the newly formed Ministry 
of Munitions jointly established a Welfare Department to develop a system of welfare 
provision which was to be compulsory in all government controlled factories and ‘to be 
pressed upon the attention of all’. 33 The system provided for the establishment of improved 
facilities in factories, notably canteens, lavatories, cloakrooms and washrooms and also the 
provision of housing for geographically displaced workers, necessary transport arrangements 
to and from work and crèches for young children. The system was to be administered from 
London and overseen at factory level by newly appointed welfare supervisors. By 1918 the 
Welfare Department employed over one hundred administrators and many thousands of 
supervisory welfare officers sited in factories and workshops. In Whitehall it reportedly 
occupied ‘all the houses on one side of Northumberland Street’. 34 Although this system 
potentially offered better working conditions it also contained significant elements of social 
control, particularly in respect of communal housing and transport and the supervision of 
female employers by welfare officers. Moreover, the provision of crèches allowed the 
government to encourage women to fulfil their patriotic duty by participation in the 
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workforce, whilst simultaneously addressing lingering social concerns about the adverse 
effects of female employment on child rearing. 35       
The enforcement of the requirements of the welfare system, like those of the Emergency 
Orders, fell to the women inspectors, something which had a profound effect on their ability 
to maintain their role as health and safety professionals.   Essentially duties associated with 
welfare absorbed the major part of their time and resources. In her report for 1916 
Anderson began by summarising the year’s work, recording the activities which the women 
inspectors had ‘been chiefly engaged in (1) ...promoting and guiding the substitution of 
women for men in industry... (2) administration of Emergency Orders (Anderson’s italics) 
which both modify Factory Act requirements for war needs and attach welfare conditions to 
such modifications (3) development of more general conditions of welfare in munitions and 
non-munitions industries, in co-operation with the Welfare Department, Ministry of 
Munitions, and Local Advisory Committees on Women’s War Employment ’ Having 
enumerated these apparently central activities she recorded, almost it seems as an 
afterthought,  that ‘in addition to those above’ the subject which had also ‘engaged the 
attention’ of the women’s inspectorate was the investigation of accidents and industrial 
poisoning. 36  The order of priorities reflected here, presumably dictated by Home Office 
policy, was highly indicative of the direction in which the limited resources of the women’s 
inspectorate were now to be channelled. There was in fact little mention of accidents and 
industrial disease in Anderson’s reports for the period 1915-1918. Instead she devoted large 
sections to negotiations with employers and trade unions about the terms and conditions 
under which women could be substituted for men in a range of different industries. These 
terms and conditions were essentially composed of welfare requirements. Prior to this 
however, in 1914, while describing ‘the almost breathless endeavour to watch over the 
application of the incessantly flowing Emergency Orders’, 37 she had also expressed her 
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concern about the neglect of health and safety, referring to the need ‘to overcome the belief 
which suddenly spread in September that the Factory Acts were ‘in abeyance’’. 38  
Anderson’s concerns about the apparent unofficial suspension of factory law turned out to 
be well-founded. Although data on the incidence of industrial accidents and disease during 
the war was more limited than that for earlier years, the available information points to a 
deterioration in industrial health and safety.  The most dramatic manifestation of this 
occurred in the production of munitions where there were numerous fatalities (see Table 
7.1, below).   
 
Table 7.139 
Fatalities in major munitions factory explosions: 
1916-1918* 
Date Site Fatalities 
1916 Faversham, Kent 105 
1916 Low Moor, Bradford   38 
1916 Barnbow, Leeds   40 
1917 Silvertown, London   73 
1917 White Lund, Morecombe   10 
1917 Ashton-Under-Lyne, Lancashire   43 
1917 Barnbow, Leeds     5 
1918 Chilwell, Nottingham 137 
   
Total  451 
*A further 19 women, employed breaking up munitions after the war, were 
killed at Dudley Port Munitions Factory, Tipton, in 1920 
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A combination of staffing difficulties in the Factory Department and, no doubt, a desire to 
conceal morale-sapping major incidents means that there are no centralised figures for the 
total number of deaths due to explosions in armaments factories. However, the figures 
recorded in Table 7.1, derived from various local sources, represent an approximate, but 
possibly conservative estimate. These deaths, however, are unlikely to have been the main 
contributor to the overall total of industrial fatalities during the war. The collation and 
publication of accident statistics was curtailed between 1915 and 1918 and an indication of 
the situation elsewhere in industry can only be gleaned from reports in 1919. Although, in 
that year, the number of reported industrial accidents was relatively few, newly appointed 
Chief Inspector, R.E. Graves attributed this to an habitual neglect of the reporting system 
which, he considered, had developed among factory managers during the war. This problem 
had been further compounded by deficiencies in record keeping due to an absence of 
trained and experienced clerical staff in the Factory Department. Graves considered that 
fatal accidents, which showed a marked increase (from 1,287 in 1914 to 1,385 in 1919), 
provided a more reliable pointer to the real situation since such accidents were less likely to 
go unreported. 40 Most accident statistics published in 1919, unlike those of pre-war years, 
offered little analysis in terms of accident severity, cause, type of industry or the sex of the 
victim. However, the narrative reports of some individual inspectors provided sobering 
reading. Inspector Wright of the North Eastern Division, for example, reported that 1,040 
out of a total of 1,943 accidents which occurred in the Yorkshire woollen industry involved 
moving machinery. 41 Inspector Jackson, inspecting cotton mills in the North Western 
Division, reported that approximately 50% of accidents in such mills resulted from cleaning 
machines in motion. 42 Graves considered that such reports were indicative of a situation 
where, during the war, many employers and workers had reverted to unsafe practices and 
abandoned the use of machinery guarding and other safety devices. Many deaths, he 
observed, occurred in situations reminiscent of those in the early textile factories where 
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workers were caught in the moving parts of machinery. 43  Although the number of accidents 
to women is not recorded separately, both woollen and cotton industries employed a high 
percentage of female workers  44 and thus they were likely to have been involved in at least 
some of these incidents. Elsewhere, in the construction and shipbuilding industries, 
Inspector Jackson recorded that, of 559 crane workers suffering severe injuries involving 
bone fractures lacerations or crushing of parts of the body, thirty-three were female. 45 Most 
such accidents involved workers being hit by the load or crushed by the overturning or 
collapse of the crane and were, according to Inspector Jackson, entirely predictable and 
therefore preventable.  ‘The analysis of crane accidents’, he noted, ‘proves conclusively that 
many repeat themselves and therefore can be assumed with certainty to occur again. Such 
types of accidents, when the danger is definitely recognised, can be guarded against’. 46 The 
prevailing impression, however, is that dangers went unrecognised or were ignored in the 
face of other pressing priorities. Inexperienced workers were particularly vulnerable and 
inspection resources were inadequate to address the problem. 
Figures for notifiable diseases continued to be collected between 1914 and 1918, although 
they were not published until 1919. Table 7.2 (below), shows how figures for the period 
1914 to 1918 compared with those recorded immediately before and after the war. These 
figures, however, referred only to notifiable diseases and, as such, can be regarded as only a 
rough indicator of the more general state of occupational health. The narrative accounts of 
special problems encountered by the women inspectors, which were such a feature of their 
reports before the war, were entirely absent between 1914 and 1918. Moreover, given the 
depletion of staff in the Factory Department, it is impossible to determine how far the 
published figures represented a reliable estimate of even those few diseases which during 
this period required notification to the Home Office. Eighty-seven Certifying Surgeons had 
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already left for military service by the end of 1914 47 and, while other doctors were 
encouraged to take on this work, they often lacked the necessary training and experience to 
identify industrial disease. Insofar as the figures can be considered as a marker of the more 
general situation, however, they provide further evidence of a deteriorating situation during 
the war.    
Table 7.2 48 
Cases of notifiable diseases: 1912-19* 




























17 14 10 6 18 17 9 7 
Phosphorus poisoning 0 0 0 3 2 3 3 1 

























*Numbers in superscript relate to fatalities, which are included in the total. 
** Ankylostomiasis (hookworm) occurred largely in tin miners who were exclusively male. The infection spread most 
often in mines where conditions were warm and damp and where sanitation was inadequate. Figures were not 
recorded in notification ledgers and those shown here are derived from statistics of compensation cases under the 
Workman’s Compensation Act of 1906. No compensation statistics were available for 1914-18. 
*** Most cases of toxic jaundice were as a result of poisoning by TNT. Toxic jaundice did not become a notifiable 
disease until 1916, following a number of deaths as a result of TNT poisoning.  
   N/A = figures not available.  
   
While the figures for some diseases were unremarkable, 49 others indicated either an 
increase after 1914, or a noticeable shift in gender distribution. 50 For example, a number of 
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processes involving the use of mercury, notably the production of thermometers, electrical 
meters and bronzed field glasses, photoengraving and the carotting 51 of fur used in hats and 
coats, were taken over by women during the war.  Thus, while cases notified before 1914 
overwhelmingly occurred in men, forty one of the 60 cases of mercury poisoning notified 
between 1914 and 1918 were in women. 52  The most concerning figures were those relating 
to the incidence of anthrax in woolsorters 53 and poisoning by trinitrotoluene  
(TNT) in munitions workers. 54 Like most notifiable diseases anthrax was numerically a small 
problem compared with that of lead poisoning. It occurred predominantly in male 
woolsorters and had been the subject of on-going investigations for a number of years. 55 
However, there was a sudden steep rise in male cases during 1916 and 1917, and in female 
cases during the three years 1915 to 1918. 56 The pre-war incidence in woolsorters had 
largely been attributed to the importation of infected fleeces from the Middle East during 
the second half of the 19th century. However, wool imports contracted significantly during 
the war, suggesting that wartime increases in anthrax were unlikely to be explained either 
by a rise in the number of foreign fleeces arriving in the country or by an overall rise in the 
numbers employed in the industry. Rather the figures suggest that the cause lay in 
worsening employment conditions and the fact that women had become involved in work 
which placed them at increased risk.  
Unlike anthrax, TNT poisoning was a new industrial disease, brought about by the 
replacement of picric acid 57 with TNT as a blasting powder. Picric acid, which had been 
employed during the Boer War, tended to stain the skin yellow and caused dermatitis in the 
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form of an irritant rash. 58 More seriously, however, it was an extremely unstable compound 
and the risk of explosion during its manufacture or in shell filling was high. 59 By 1915, French 
munitions factories had already begun to use an alternative compound, dinitrophenol (DNP). 
60 However, it rapidly became clear that DNP was highly poisonous and by August 1916 
twenty seven fatalities had occurred in French factories. 61 Mindful of the French experience 
the British government rejected the use of DNP and decided instead to replace picric acid 
with TNT. 62 Small quantities of this substance had already been used as an explosive before 
the war. It appeared more stable than picric acid and, although it similarly stained and 
irritated the skin, no serious health effects had been observed amongst the workers. Thus in 
one pre-war explosives factory in Lancashire it was reported that TNT had been substituted 
for DNP ‘to the great advantage of the health of the workers concerned’. 63 Confidence in 
the safety of TNT was short-lived however. The first fatality attributed to its use occurred in 
a manufacturing plant in February 1915. 64 Dr. Bernard Spilsbury  65 who carried out the post 
mortem observed that TNT appeared to produce the same changes in the liver and kidneys 
as another substance, tetrachloroethane, used in the doping (varnishing) of aeroplane wings 
and already known to cause toxic jaundice. 66 Medical Inspector of Factories, Dr Edward 
Collis, reported a second case in the summer of 1915 and two further fatalities occurred in 
August and December of the same year. 67 At this point a further 44 cases (7 fatal) which had 
occurred in 1914 and 1915 were identified.   With unusual speed, toxic jaundice was added 
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to the list of notifiable diseases on January 1st 1916 and a number of precautions were 
introduced into factories where it was used. 68 Based on an approximate estimate of 50,000 
workers who by this period were likely to come into contact with TNT, Thomas Legge 
calculated that the incidence rate of the disease was 3.6 per thousand in 1916 and 3.8 per 
thousand in 1917. The case fatality for toxic jaundice in women peaked at 28.6% in 1917. 69  
 
Notifiable diseases, however, represented only the most serious end of the spectrum of 
industrial ill health, not only because of the small number of diseases represented, but also 
because of certain aspects of the notification process. For example, Legge’s stipulation that, 
for notification purposes, TNT poisoning should be confined only to cases of ‘toxic jaundice’, 
effectively masked the incidence of other less serious effects of TNT exposure. In part 
Legge’s approach was to ensure that cases of jaundice arising as a result of exposure to 
tetrachloroethane and those associated with DNP, still used in two small factories during 
1918, would be included in the figures. 70 In addition, he noted that TNT poisoning 
progressed through a number of stages of varying severity 71 and argued that doctors would 
vary in the extent to which they notified these symptoms, engendering inconsistency in the 
definition of a ‘case’. 72 As a result, while the figures reported in Table 7.2 (above), are likely 
to have represented a reliable estimate of the number of cases of final stage TNT poisoning, 
they provided little information about the true incidence of illness amongst munitions 
workers. Diseases included in official figures might, therefore, be regarded only as markers 
of the fact that both men and women experienced ill-health of varying severity in a wide 
range of industries during the war. Clearly these problems were not new, as indicated by the 
earlier reports of inspectors, but it seem reasonable to conclude that they were probably 
exacerbated by the circumstances of the war. Moreover, they extended to a much larger 
percentage of the female population than hitherto. Both anthrax and TNT poisoning 
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attracted a considerable amount of official attention during the war, but significantly there is 
no evidence that the women inspectors were involved either in their investigation or in the 
enforcement of preventive measures. Given the diligence with which they had investigated 
problems relating to women’s employment in earlier years, it is reasonable to assume that 
the increases in these diseases and the propensity for women to be involved in serious 
accidents would have rapidly occupied the attention of Anderson and her team. However, in 
the case of anthrax, a prolonged investigation was undertaken by the Anthrax Investigation 
Board, which included no women inspectors among its members, 73 while the problem of 
TNT poisoning was addressed by a section of the Health of Munitions Workers Committee, 
acting on the advice of Thomas Legge. 74 Anderson’s annual reports, meanwhile, dealt 
exclusively with welfare issues.   
 
It is clear that initially the women inspectors were enthusiastic about the development of 
the welfare system, having emphasised for many years the importance of improving the 
general working conditions of women. As noted in chapter 6 the inspectors were strong 
advocates of the need to improve the whole working environment.  In her report for 1915 
Anderson wrote: 
A question arises, like the riddle of Samson, why has the manufacture 
of munitions of war on a terrible scale led at last to the systematic 
introduction of hygienic safeguards that Factory Inspectors have 
advocated for many years, such as supervision of women by women 
in factories, provision of means of personal cleanliness, proper meal 
and rest rooms, and qualified nurses?  
75
  
Soon, however, the notion of welfare, as it was constituted from 1915 onwards, seemed to 
have become a source of irritation and frustration. Before the war it had encompassed 
relatively basic workplace requirements such as the construction of suitable lavatories and 
cloakrooms and the designation of separate spaces for meal breaks. Now, however, the 
concept was rapidly expanding beyond conditions within the factory. By 1918 Anderson was 
                                                          
73
 Report of the Departmental Committee on Anthrax, Summary of Evidence and Appendices, Vol. 3, (1918), 
HMSO, London.  
74
 Ministry of Munitions. Health of Munitions Workers Committee, Memorandum No. 8. Special Industrial 
Diseases. Cd. 8214 (1916), HMSO, London.  
75
 Annual Report of the Chief Inspector of Factories and Workshops for the Year 1915, Cd. 8276 (1916), HMSO, 
London, p. 15. 
 125 
 
forthright in her criticism of the nature of welfare provision as it developed during the war, 
considering it to have failed to take account of workers’ real needs. In her report for that 
year she implied that the system operated as a smokescreen, concealing real industrial 
problems. The system, she said, was ‘merely a superimposed factor on unreformed factory 
life. The workers knew very well where the shoe pinched and that welfare cannot be either a 
graft or a veneer on poor or bad conditions.’ 76 Anderson was not alone in her criticism. The 
system was unpopular with employers who, mindful of the cost and inconvenience of 
welfare measures, were generally unenthusiastic and unco-operative. Many workers were 
similarly hostile, objecting, in particular, to the welfare supervisors appointed to oversee the 
installation of welfare facilities. These women were selected predominantly from the 
middle-classes and were inexperienced and untrained (indeed no such training existed until 
after the war). They were often incompetent in terms of ensuring good working conditions, 
particularly where their responsibilities merged with aspects of health and safety, for 
example in the provision of appropriate protective clothing. Moreover, many seemed to 
have interpreted their role as incorporating not only the provision of good working 
conditions, but also the supervision of workers’ behaviour both inside and outside the 
workplace. Added to this welfare supervisors were given specific instructions from the 
Ministry of Munitions to consider themselves as part of management, not workers’ 
representatives. 77 It is unsurprising, therefore, that the relationship between supervisors 
and workers was frequently an antagonistic one. The appointment of the paternalistic 
employer, Seebohm Rowntree, 78 as the first director of the Welfare Department appears to 
have brought to the welfare system certain values and attitudes which, by 1916, were 
somewhat out of step with the independence engendered among women workers by 
wartime employment. Women were frequently resentful of the authority exercised by 
supervisors whom they considered both patronising and ignorant of industrial conditions. 
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Munitions worker, Peggy Hamilton, for example, who worked in a number of different 
armaments factories reported that welfare supervisors were often bullying and insensitive 
as well as ineffective. 
The welfare department was staffed by women largely 
unaccustomed to the work. They were asked to design clothes for 
women doing work they had never done... I felt the relationship was 
too much like that between matron and schoolgirls... this caused 
much frustration and annoyance. We were adult women, working 
very long hours, some were married...I remember taking a girl to her 
with a bad attack of asthma brought on by gas escaping from the 
furnace. She said it was purely psychological... 
79
 
Hamilton’s views were echoed by Inspector Isabel Taylor who considered that many 
supervisors were unsuited to the work. ‘It has’, she said ‘become no uncommon thing to 
hear of some stupid act of petty tyranny quoted as an example of welfare’. 80 Welfare 
supervisors, themselves, were often aware of the resentment their presence provoked. Thus 
the supervisor at Armstrong Whitworth’s Munitions Works in Newcastle reported to the 
company management that welfare supervisors ‘appeared to the workers in the light of 
spies who were going to watch and report to management...or as goody-goody people who 
were going to poke their noses into the workers’ private affairs and interfere with their 
liberty and independence’. 81 
This lack of enthusiasm on the factory floor was mirrored by an equal measure of inter-
departmental strife between the Welfare Department and the Factory Department, and it is 
clear that Anderson’s lack of enthusiasm for the system itself was also underpinned by her 
frustration at the role the inspectors were forced to play. These frustrations were evident 
from an early stage. In 1915, at the request of the recently constituted Ministry of 
Munitions, Anderson’s staff had expended considerable time and resources in supplying 
Rowntree with 1,396 surveys relating to 200,000 women detailing the size, structure and 
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welfare needs of the munitions workforce. 82  However, the ensuing Welfare Department 
was set up within the Ministry of Munitions with welfare supervisors assuming the role of 
advisors to determine the facilities, including health and safety facilities, required in each 
factory.  It was the enforcement of the ‘Welfare Orders’, issued to employers requiring them 
to establish such facilities, which fell to the women inspectors.  An account by Anderson’s 
deputy and long-term colleague, Rose Squire, indicated that from the outset there were 
considerable tensions as a result of the ‘overlapping responsibilities of the two 
departments.’ 83 It is clear that the inspectorate resented direction from the Ministry of 
Munitions and considered that welfare should have fallen within the remit of the Home 
Office.  Squire noted that supervisors appointed by the Ministry of Munitions lacked 
experience of industry and of the ‘traditions and status appertaining to officers of an old 
department’. 84 ‘Welfare officers’, she said, ‘had to go into great factories managed by 
autocratic military officers without any of the legal sanctions to secure the maintenance of 
welfare standards decided on by ministries’. 85 Moreover they were inexperienced in ‘the 
handling of large numbers of women’. 86 She was of the opinion that it was unnecessary to 
set up a new department to administer the welfare system. Thus it seemed that a field of 
activity which the women inspectors had been working to promote for several years, had 
effectively been taken out of their hands and given to a new department composed of 
inexperienced staff. The large increase in their workload, which would have considerably 
compromised their ability to focus on the prevention of accidents and disease, must have 
compounded their resentment at having no part in the design of the measures they were 
required to enforce. In her report for 1918 Anderson recorded, if somewhat obliquely, her 
dissatisfaction with this situation, noting that, ‘During the war, while new Departments set 
up large staffs for the new kinds of duties, the Factory Department remained simply expert 
advisers as regards conditions in factories without any net increases in staff’. 87  
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The fact that the Welfare Department itself was beset by internal conflicts and inefficiencies 
would have offered little solace to Anderson, especially since the proposed solution to these 
problems was the removal of her deputy, Rose Squire, on secondment to the troubled 
department. The suggestion came from her former colleague, May Tennant (née Abraham), 
now a government advisor to the Welfare Department and, with Squire, a member of the 
section of the Health of Munitions Workers Committee which dealt specifically with Welfare 
Provision.  In 1916 Medical Inspector of Factories, Dr Edward Collis, had succeeded 
Rowntree as Head of the Welfare Department and had recruited Irene Drury, one of the 
women inspectors, on secondment as a special advisor. The appointment was clearly 
unsuccessful, underlining serious conflicts between factory inspectors and welfare officers, 
and Drury returned to the Factory Department within weeks. Squire reported diplomatically 
that ‘her position among many female welfare officers was too indefinite for her experience 
and gifts of organisation to take effect and she returned to take her place in the Factory 
Department staff, where her services were invaluable’. 88 In the face of a deteriorating 
situation in the Welfare Department Tennant began lobbying a reluctant Home Secretary 
and an equally resistant Chief Inspector of Factories for the deployment of Squire. When, in 
March 1918,  they finally agreed and Squire was asked to join Collis as co-director of the 
department she was clearly unenthusiastic about the idea. ‘I knew very well, ‘she said, ‘the 
troubles that beset the Welfare Department, but I doubted whether anyone could put right 
what, in my private judgement, was due to the fundamental mistake of setting up a separate 
organisation to deal with industrial conditions’. 89 Squire was eventually persuaded to accept 
the post following a long interview with Winston Churchill 90 where she ‘fell victim to his 
importunity’. 91 On her appointment as Director in 1918 she described the staff of over 100 
as ‘an inharmonious crowd’, observing ‘jealousies and gossip’, ‘disintegrating forces’ and 
difficulties which were ‘of mushroom growth’. 92 A few months later, however, the end of 
the war effectively brought the activities of the Welfare Department to a close. Significantly, 
shortly before this, Squire and Anderson appear to have had plans to create a system more 
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conducive to the objectives of the women inspectors. Anderson reported in 1918 that ‘a 
scheme was devised in the Autumn of 1918 which would, if the Armistice had not intervened 
with the consequent closing down of most munitions factories, have resulted in enabling the 
Women’s Factory Department and the Women Welfare Officers to co-operate more fully in 
the controlled factories’. 93 In the event, however, although Squire remained as Director for 
two years, the post-war imperative to provide jobs for returning troops and thus to remove 
large numbers of women from industrial employment, meant that the Welfare Department 
was subject to a number of policy changes. In the process its role moved away from 
responsibilities associated with employment conditions in factories and towards the more 
general issue of the future employment of women. Within a few days of the armistice in 
November 1918, welfare matters were transferred to the newly created Department of 
Demobilisation and Resettlement, which in turn was absorbed into the new Ministry of 
Labour early in 1919. Squire and her staff assumed responsibility for the Women’s Training 
Branch, an organisation required to establish facilities whereby women who had been 
discharged from industry could be trained for future work in what were considered to be 
appropriate fields of female employment, namely tailoring, dressmaking and domestic skills. 
Squire again appears to have been unenthusiastic, recording in her subsequent memoir that 
domestic service was ‘inevitably distasteful to most women’ and that she enlisted the 
support of women trade unionists Mary Macarthur and Margaret Bondfield 94 in an attempt 
to organise more attractive forms of employment and better working conditions. Ultimately 
however the scheme was a failure. Only approximately 2,000 women in total took up the 
opportunity for training, indicative no doubt of the shift in women’s employment aspirations 
which took place after 1918.  
In conclusion, it is safe to assume that the health and safety of women workers deteriorated 
during the war and that the women inspectors were relatively powerless to prevent this. 
Their capacity to highlight specific issues in the workplace, lobby for action and contribute to 
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policy-making, all features of their activity in earlier years seems to have diminished 
considerably. Instead their resources were absorbed into the welfare system which became 
a major focus of government policy. In reality, however, it is unlikely that they would have 
been able to make significant inroads into the escalating problems of industrial disease and 
injury during the war, even if all their resources had been focussed in this direction. Their 
numbers were small and, as a result of the depletion of the male inspectorate, the demands 
made upon them were greater than in pre-war years. For this period, therefore, their 
progress as health and safety professionals and their ability to contribute to the health and 





















This thesis has investigated the ways in which women factory inspectors contributed to 
improvements in women’s’ occupational health and safety between 1893 and 1921. In the 
process it has sought to challenge the prevailing historiographical view that the inspectors 
were unlikely to have contributed to any significant improvements in women’s working 
conditions. It is argued here that this interpretation of the inspectors’ work derives primarily 
from analyses which place the development and enforcement of factory legislation within a 
feminist theoretical framework. In particular, these analyses have focussed on the 
relationship between aspects of factory reform and particular state agenda, notably those to 
improve national efficiency, to safeguard the position of the male breadwinner and to 
reduce female employment.  Within this framework the inspectors’ social position relative to 
most women workers is considered to have precluded or negated any practical 
achievements. Moreover, their support for protective legislation has been represented as a 
threat to the employment conditions of working-class women. The present study, however, 
has attempted to examine the inspectors’ work in terms of the way in which factory 
regulation and the work of the Factory Department was evolving at that time. This is seen 
primarily as a reflexive process, driven by the need to address specific problems as they 
arrived and with new methods as these were developed, rather than a process which was 
necessarily underpinned by broader ideological goals. Within this context, it is argued, a 
detailed consideration of some specific aspects of the women inspectors’ work presents a 
picture which is strongly contradictory of the prevailing negative view.  Rather it 
demonstrates that the women’s section achieved some notable successes, both in 
highlighting the risks to women workers and implementing measures to reduce those risks. 
In three of those areas studied there was a reduction in women’s occupational ill-health and 
in the rate of industrially-related accidents, improvements to which the women inspectors 
made a significant contribution. Moreover, their work was highly reflective of current 
developments in occupational health and safety practice during the period and, as a result, 




Four case studies were selected which were considered to illustrate different aspects of the 
work of the women inspectors and to reflect how their activities were representative of 
policy and practice within the Factory Department at the time. The first of these dealt with 
the subject of lead poisoning. This was not a new disease, its association with certain work 
processes having been identified as early as 370 B.C. 1 What was new, however, was the 
notion that the prevention of industrial disease formed a part of the responsibilities of the 
Factory Department.  When the first women inspectors were appointed in 1893 the subject 
of lead poisoning, specifically in women employed in white lead works, was a matter of 
major press interest and public concern. The two newly appointed women inspectors were 
immediately drawn into the investigation of the problem, collecting data, writing reports and 
giving evidence at inquests and it is clear that the evidence they provided was seminal to the 
decision, in 1894, to exclude women from parts of the trade. Within the wider context of the 
history of occupational health, this particular action represents a very rare example of use of 
employment exclusion to address a problem of industrial disease. The previous 
implementation of this measure, in relation to women and young children in mining in 1842, 
has lead some historians to interpret this as a continuation of a state agenda to restrict the 
employment of women. However, the physical, social and moral environment which formed 
the background to the exclusion of women from the mines in the 1840s was very different to 
that prevailing fifty years later. Although, no doubt, the decision to exclude women from 
parts of the white lead trade was encouraged by a degree of social unease about female 
employment in general, it is also possible to see this measure as a largely pragmatic solution 
to an immediate problem, based on current medical beliefs about the special susceptibility 
of women to the problem of lead poisoning. These beliefs were shared by the women 
inspectors. In addition, the decision was indicative of contemporary attitudes towards the 
rights of industrial workers, notably the assumption that the needs of such workers were 
subordinate to the needs of production.   Essentially, exclusion reflected an approach to 
disease prevention whereby the onus was not on the employer to provide a fit place to 
work, but on the worker to withstand the existing working conditions. In relation to health 
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 In 370 B.C. Hippocrates described the symptoms of lead poisoning in a man who extracted metal from rock. In 
the second century B.C. Pliny described the disease in ship painters who used lead-based paint. Hunter, D. 
(1975), The Diseases of Occupations, 5
th
 Edition, The English Universities Press Ltd, London,  p. 240. 
 133 
 
issues this view was prevalent throughout the 19th century. However, the long drawn out 
dispute provoked by the decision to exclude women from parts of the white lead trade 
marked the first seeds of change whereby attention was gradually shifting towards the need 
to improve conditions in the workplace. In the case of lead poisoning, this focussed on dust 
control,  informed  by emerging medical understanding that lead absorption in an industrial 
setting was largely the result of dust and fume inhalation, and to a lesser extent the 
ingestion of dust on the hands via smoking and food consumption. While female exclusion 
reduced poisoning cases in the immediate term, therefore, a more sustained improvement 
in worker’s health depended on the introduction of preventative measures within the 
workplace. Thus when attention turned to another major source of industrial lead poisoning, 
the production of earthenware and ceramics, a solution was sought in the introduction of 
safe working practices and eventually on the development of a leadless glaze. This approach 
was no doubt encouraged by the realisation that, in an industry which employed 46,000 
people of whom over half were women, 2 female exclusion could never seriously be 
entertained. However, it also represented the beginning of a shift in the underlying 
principles of occupational health practice.  
 
The newly appointed women inspectors were working on the cusp of this change. 
Immediately after women’s exclusion from parts of the white lead trade, therefore, they 
were occupied in the development and enforcement of measures in other parts of the white 
lead industry which reflected a different approach, namely workplace improvement by 
means of dust control. A few years later they were central figures in the development of a 
similar policy in the potteries. 3 Lead poisoning was the first major industrial disease to 
confront a Home Office inexperienced in the matter of industrial disease prevention and 
lacking much of the medical and technical knowledge which informed later decisions in this 
field.  Thus in contributing to the case for female exclusion, the inspectors were not, as has 
been suggested, acting out of an ideological attachment to the removal of women from the 
workplace. Rather they were supporting the first tentative governmental steps towards 
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 Whipp, R. (1990), Patterns of Labour. Work and Social Change in the Pottery Industry, Routledge, London, p. 
18. 
3
 Bartrip, P. (1996), 'Petticoat pestering: the Women's Trade Union League and lead poisoning in the 
Staffordshire Potteries, 1890-1914’, Historical Studies in Industrial Relations, Vol. 2, pp. 3-25. 
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intervention in the field of occupational health, within a climate where public concern was 
great and options were limited. The approach adopted in 1898 was undoubtedly informed 
largely by 19th century assumptions about the importance of the worker relative to 
production, but the lessons learned in implementing this policy paved the way for a different 
approach to industrial disease prevention in the future.   
 
In contrast to disease control, accident prevention, the subject of the second case study, had 
been an overriding concern of the Factory Department since its inception. Accident 
reduction, however, had focussed primarily on male workers who predominated in the more 
dangerous industries and as a consequence suffered many more accidents than women. 4 
When the women inspectors were appointed there was an assumption that this subject 
would not fall within their remit. Accident prevention was considered to be a minor issue for 
most women workers and, in those parts of the textile trades where it had greater 
prominence, it was assumed that the problem would continue to be addressed by male 
inspectors. Moreover, women inspectors would be unlikely to possess the necessary 
mechanical skills to understand machinery and machinery guarding. Their discovery of a 
rising toll of accidents in laundries, however, unexpectedly thrust the issue of industrial 
accidents onto their agenda and provided them with an opportunity to develop a new level 
of competence in the field of investigation and prevention.  To address the problem they 
harnessed a range of approaches which were rapidly gaining currency within the Factory 
Department. Notably they carried out research on a representative sample of laundries to 
determine the number and types of accidents. The primary objective here was to identify 
the main causes of accidents rather than the specific nature and severity of the injuries, 
although it is clear that they used the latter descriptively and anecdotally in order to draw 
attention to their concerns.   As a result they were able to mobilise the interests of 
manufacturers in developing machinery guarding and to provide advice and education to 
employers. The result was a heightened awareness of the risks to laundry workers amongst 
employers, government officials and manufacturers and, importantly, a marked reduction in 
the number of serious accidents. In the process the inspectors also acquired for themselves 
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 For example, in 1889 there were 432 fatal accidents reported of which 11 were in women. Report of the Chief 
Inspector of Factories and Workshops to HM Principal Secretary of State for the Home Department, for the Year 
1889, C. 6060 (1890), HMSO, London, p. 217. 
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considerable experience in the use of statistics and a level of expertise in the field of 
machinery safety, both factors which helped to reinforce their credentials as progressive 
health and safety professionals.  
 
Two aspects of their work during this period presaged future changes in the approach of the 
Factory Inspectorate and contrasted sharply with the approach taken by many of their male 
colleagues at the time. The first was their propensity to follow-up accident cases, an 
approach which gave the first indication that the physical effects of accidents were not 
always immediately apparent. This observation, which pre-dated current medical 
knowledge, had limited implications for treatment and prognosis. However, it had 
immediate implications for the award of compensation payments, since an important 
element of injury definition in this context was the degree of disablement, as well as the 
amount of time away from work which ensued. Secondly, the women inspectors were 
consistent in their view that it was inappropriate to blame the worker when an accident 
occurred. Although, in principle, safety was a joint responsibility of worker and employer, as 
reflected in the terms of contemporary factory regulations, it is clear from the comments of 
many male inspectors that they frequently considered the workers to be largely responsible 
for their own misfortunes. This placing of the primary responsibility for safety on the worker 
was a concept that changed only slowly in succeeding years, but it was clearly one to which 
the women inspectors were strongly committed at an early stage.   
 
Although the situation in laundries left room for considerable further improvements, the 
accident figures derived from notifications after 1895 suggested an on-going reduction from 
1900 to the beginning of the First World War.  Anderson generously observed that this 
reflected ‘credit on the way laundry occupiers and engineers have responded to Inspectors’ 
demands for better fencing’. 5 It is reasonable to argue that it also reflected credit on the 
persistence of the women inspectors in highlighting and tackling the problem.  Perhaps one 
of the best personal legacies of their work came in 1921 when a Miss Miriam Pease was 
appointed as District Inspector for Nottingham. Several employers and trade unionists 
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 Annual Report of the Chief Inspector of Factories and Workshops for the Year 1913, Cd. 7491 (1914), HMSO, 
London, p. 82. 
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complained that women were not competent to inspect the work of men. In his reply Sir 
Malcolm Delevingne, Head of the Industrial Branch of the Home Office, stated unequivocally 
that the work of factory inspection could be dealt with as well by women as by men, 
reminding them, in particular, that women inspectors had been dealing with machines and 
machinery guarding for a long time. 6           
The 19th century focus on the working hours of women and children meant that the early 
routine work of the women inspectors was dominated by the requirement to enforce these 
regulations. Much of this aspect of their work was concerned with the regulation of the so-
called ‘sweated trades’. The progressive movement of these trades out of the home during 
the early part of the 20th century meant that, increasingly, they came within the remit of the 
Factory Department, enabling existing public concern to be translated into state 
intervention. The women factory inspectors were central to the enforcement of regulations 
which initially focussed on working hours but subsequently extended to aspects of the 
physical working environment. One such aspect was the question of air quality and 
ventilation, the subject of the third case study.  It is clear from the inspectors’ work in this 
field that here they were operating at the forefront of changes in medical knowledge, 
moving from an essentially miasmatic model of disease causation to an understanding of the 
associations between certain bacterial and chemical factors and the development of specific 
diseases. Moreover, this field of work further enhanced their scientific and technical 
knowledge as they engaged with problems of flueless gas stoves, defective gas lighting and 
ventilation ducting. In the immediate term they were able to effect many improvements in 
the workshops they visited personally, although the number of these was inevitably rather 
few and the wider problem remained. The real legacy of the inspectors’ work in this field 
requires the adoption of a longer term perspective which looks beyond the tangible effects 
on the specific workshops with which they were personally concerned and considers the 
wider implications both for the working environment and for the technical expertise of the 
women inspectors themselves.  The economic depression of the 1920s which followed the 
brief industrial boom created by the need for post-war reconstruction, resulted in the 
closure of thousands of the small workshops discussed here. Ironically, therefore, the 
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 Malcolm Delevinge (15 December 1921), Response to the Federation of Lace and Embroidery Employers’ 
Association on behalf of the Secretary of State. National Archives HO87/52. 
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problem, which for many years the women inspectors had struggled to solve, disappeared 
within a few months. Importantly, however, by that stage, the question of general workplace 
ventilation, beyond the specific consideration of poisonous dusts and fumes, had been 
placed irreversibly on the agenda of the Factory Department. This had been instigated in 
1900 when Anderson’s persistent lobbying had resulted in its inclusion in the terms of 
reference of the Ventilation Committee. The basic principle, that unventilated workrooms of 
any type were unhealthy and unacceptable, had been firmly established and thus general 
ventilation and related factors such as space, temperature and lighting came to be accepted 
as basic constituents of a good working environment.  
By 1914, the Annual Report of the Chief Inspector contained a section entitled ‘Sanitation’ 
which covered all these factors as well as sanitary arrangements, a section which, after the 
war, became a permanent feature.  Significantly, it was written by a male inspector, 
underlining the fact that the subject had assumed an importance beyond that normally 
accorded to issues affecting only women workers. 7 Its importance had been further 
enhanced during the war with the establishment of the Health of Munitions Workers 
Committee, which considered diverse aspects of the workplace in terms of their effects on 
the health and performance of the workers. During the 1920s this work was continued with 
the establishment of the Industrial Fatigue Board, later transformed into the Industrial 
Health Research Board in order to reflect the wider scope of its investigations. 8 The nature 
of the Board’s work signalled a new attitude towards the working environment which 
aspired to standards of comfort well beyond those which were considered acceptable in 
earlier years. The requirement for good ventilation was a central feature of these standards.  
These developments were thus part of longer-term process which had begun several years 
before the war when the women inspectors were one of the first official bodies to draw 
attention to the subject.  Importantly, the requirement for good general ventilation in the 
workplace was underpinned by a new regulatory position, an achievement also attributable 
to the work of the women inspectors. In 1901 Anderson had successfully spearheaded a 
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 Annual Report of the Chief Inspector of Factories and Workshops for the Year 1914, Cd. 8051 (1915), HMSO, 
London, pp. 1-9.  
8
 Shimmin, S. & Wallis, D. (1994), Fifty Years of Occupational Psychology in Britain. British Psychological Society, 
Leicester, pp. 3-6.   
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change in factory legislation, such that the standards of air quality already required in large 
factories should be applied equally in small workshops, thus opening the way for such 
workplaces to be regulated for the first time by the Home Office.  
Despite the activities of the aforementioned Health of Munitions Workers Committee the 
evidence suggests that the health and safety of women workers, which previously had 
undergone steady improvement, deteriorated considerably during the First World War. The 
last case study, which dealt with this period, showed that the women inspectors were 
diverted, increasingly reluctantly, into activities associated with a burgeoning industrial 
welfare system and that their role in the maintenance of health and safety correspondingly 
diminished. The extensive development of welfare provision, encompassing measures which 
went well beyond the relatively modest pre-war proposals of the women inspectors, was 
perhaps an unexpected consequence of the First World War. If one examines the concept of 
welfare, as historian Helen Jones has suggested, first in terms of its aims and second in terms 
of its amenities, 9 it would seem that in the early part of the war two separate aims, the 
protection of women from moral danger and the maximisation of industrial performance 
came together to create a single agenda, that of providing a range of workplace facilities. 
These exceeded, and perhaps in the process neglected, the basic requirements of a safe and 
healthy workplace. For the women inspectors the provision of welfare measures initially 
appeared to represent the fulfilment of a long-held aspiration. Paradoxically, however, they 
became highly critical of the system established during the war and appear to have been 
marginalised in terms of its organisation.  
It is difficult to assess how far welfare provision itself, particularly as it was constituted 
during the war, could be considered as contributing to the health and safety of women 
workers or indeed of workers in general. H A Waldron, in his discussion of occupational 
health during the Second World War, argues that certain aspects of the welfare system 
which were developed during World War 1 both contributed to the health of the workforce 
and influenced the introduction of similar measures when war broke out again in 1939. 10 
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Waldron’s analysis, however, focuses specifically on the role of occupational physicians and 
the consequences of wartime welfare activities for the subsequent development of the 
profession. There is an assumption that such activities were the remit of the factory medical 
officers whereas the evidence presented here suggests that it was the specially appointed 
welfare officers who were charged with administering the various elements of the welfare 
service, while it was the women factory inspectors who advised on the nature of these 
measures and monitored the compliance of employers. Medical officers, by contrast, were 
situated primarily in large factories and were preoccupied with the prevention and control of 
specific diseases such as TNT poisoning. As Waldron concedes, when health is defined in 
these terms, the notion that it improved during either war is more difficult to sustain.  
The reference to the ‘health and efficiency’ 11 of the workers as interpreted in the work of 
the Health of Munitions Workers Committee appeared to imply that welfare engendered a 
sense of general well-being rather than offering protection from specific industrial diseases 
or accidents. Although welfare supervisors in large armament factories were responsible for 
certain aspects of health and safety such as the provision of overalls, masks and gloves and 
of milky drinks 12 they were relatively untrained, inexperienced and prone to focus on the 
moral rather than the physical protection of women. Moreover, it is clear from the reports 
of Thomas Legge that the prevention and control of industrial disease in these factories was 
administered primarily by medical doctors, permanently installed on site and advised by the 
Home Office. 13 The reduction in cases of toxic jaundice between 1915 and 1918, largely as a 
result of dust control measures and regular medical examinations, represents the only 
evidence of successful disease prevention during the war and anecdotal reports suggest that 
many workers continued to suffer from less severe symptoms. There was little information 
on disease and accident prevention in other industries recorded in the Chief Inspector’s 
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Annual Reports during the war and data on inspection visits went unreported. A perhaps 
telling indicator of the low priority accorded to most areas of industrial health and safety 
was the recourse to a policy of self-regulation in an attempt to compensate for the reduction 
in inspection. This took the form of the establishment of local Safety Committees and the 
proposed joint involvement of workers and employers in the promotion of a safety culture. 
Unsurprisingly the policy appears to have met with little success. Despite an extensive Home 
Office campaign involving the distribution of thousands of information leaflets to employers 
and Trade Union representatives, neither group showed much enthusiasm for the scheme. 
Inspector Brothers of Warrington reported that ‘safety committees are not at present much 
in favour with employers owing to the reluctance to add to the number of committees of 
one sort or another’, adding that ‘workers are not keen to join...when they aim rather at a 
share in the control or conduct of the business itself’. 14  Meanwhile Inspector Lauder of 
Newcastle-Upon-Tyne recorded his disappointment at overhearing the Safety Committee 
referred to by one workman as ‘the whitewash committee’. 15  
The limited effectiveness of the women inspectors during this period, therefore, is perhaps 
not entirely explained by the demands of the welfare system.  Given their small numbers, it 
is unlikely that they would have been able to make significant inroads into the escalating 
problems of disease and injury during the war. Throughout the period the Treasury refused 
to sanction significant increases in the number of either male or female inspectors, reflecting 
both the financial constraints imposed by the war and the low priority accorded to industrial 
health and safety, relative to the needs of the military and the unprecedented slaughter on 
the battlefields.  The paucity of information in the Annual Reports of the Chief Inspector 
underlines the extent to which the work of the Factory Department as a whole contracted 
between 1914 and 1918. Moreover, of the two specialist medical inspectors in post at the 
beginning of the war, only one remained in the Factory Department between 1914 and 
1918. Like Rose Squire, Dr. Edward Collis, who for many years had assisted Dr. Thomas 
Legge, was seconded to the Welfare Department. In a sense, therefore, the limited 
achievements of the women inspectors during the war simply mirrored those of the Factory 
Inspectorate as a whole.  
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These case studies serve only as a snapshot of the work of the women inspectors during the 
period in which they operated as a separate section of the Factory Department. The full 
range of issues with which they were involved is beyond the size and scope of the current 
thesis. It is acknowledged that the contribution of the inspectorate may have been 
insignificant in some of these other workplaces and thus the examination of such industries 
might have resulted in different conclusions about the women inspectors’ overall 
effectiveness. The intention here, however, has been to highlight some areas where they do 
appear to have made a substantial contribution, primarily in order to challenge suggestions 
in the existing historiography that their appointment was largely symbolic and their work 
insignificant.  Moreover, the women inspectors’ reports for the period indicate that some of 
the approaches described here were, in fact, applied to a range of other problems. For 
example, the problem of lacerations from shattering bottles in aereated water factories was 
addressed in a very similar fashion to that adopted in laundries, with the routine collection 
and collation of statistics and the progressive introduction of machinery guarding.  16 The 
women inspectors also contributed to a substantial and ultimately successful programme of 
work to reduce lead poisoning in the earthenware and china industry, as noted in chapter 1. 
Other work involved the installation of exhaust ventilation where women were exposed to 
neurotoxic carbon disulphide in the vulcanisation of rubber. A report by Rose Squire, that in 
1911 she had visited every vulcanising works in the North West, testifies to substantial 
coverage of at least some industries where there were serious health risks. 17 Meanwhile in 
the area of policy development, Anderson worked with medical inspector Thomas Legge to 
produce a report on lead poisoning in the tinning of metals, the recommendations of which 
formed the basis of special rules developed the following year. 18 Like the first three case 
studies described here, therefore, the response of the women inspectors to different 
problems demonstrate how their activities went far beyond the routine inspection of 
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individual workplaces. Indeed, given their limited numbers, it is unlikely that such an 
approach would have produced much in the way of workplace improvements. Rather they 
were involved in a much wider range of activities which included investigative work, worker 
education, liaison with employers and equipment manufacturers and, significantly, with 
policy development. They were forced to be selective in the projects they undertook and, no 
doubt, some of their activities had little immediate benefit for many of the workers 
concerned. Indeed, their attempt to solve the problem of ventilation in basement workshops 
might be viewed as one such project. However, in the approaches they adopted their work 
largely mirrored the developments taking place within the Factory Department as a whole, 
where advances in medical and technical knowledge were, with varying degrees of success, 
increasingly being incorporated into the way new health and safety problems were 
addressed.  Working within this process the women inspectors increased their own 
knowledge and skill and on many occasions were able to effect some real improvements in 
women’s working conditions.  
Perhaps unsurprisingly, these developments, both in the women’s inspectorate and in the 
inspectorate as a whole, were arrested during the First World War with the inevitable shift in 
government priorities. The final case study has shown how the resource problems of the 
women inspectors during this period were compounded by a government policy which 
emphasised the provision of wider welfare measures over the basic needs for industrial 
health and safety. Essentially, therefore, the inspectors’ role appears to have degenerated 
into something resembling that of a moral police force and their ability to effect 
improvements in terms of disease and accident prevention was significantly curtailed.  
Despite this, however, the legacy of the pre-war years remained, both in terms of inspectors’ 
expertise and the respect which increasingly they commanded within the Factory 
Department. Somewhat ironically these attributes appear to have contributed to the 
decision, in 1921, to amalgamate the men’s and women’s sections into a single Factory 
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Biographical notes on selected individuals 
Women factory inspectors 
 
May Abraham, (Tennant), (1869-1946), was born in Dublin, the daughter of a barrister. She 
arrived in London in 1888 with letters of introduction to Lady Dilke, who employed her as a 
secretary. On Lady Dilke’s recommendation, she was appointed to the Labour Commission in 
1892, and became the first woman factory inspector in 1893. She married Jack Tennant in 
1896 and resigned from the inspectorate in 1897 on the birth of her first child. She 
subsequently became a member of the Dangerous Trades Committee and had a long career 
in public service, serving on various official committees concerned with women’s 
employment, health and welfare. These included the Royal Commission on Divorce on 1909, 
the Central Committee on Women’s Employment in 1914, sections of the Health of 
Munitions Workers Committee in 1916 and the Maternal Mortality Committee set up in 
1928 to investigate ways of reducing the risks to women in childbirth.   
 
Mary Muirhead Paterson, (1864-1941), was born in Glasgow, the daughter of a prosperous 
boot manufacturer. She studied at Queen Margaret’s College, Glasgow and subsequently 
travelled extensively in America, surveying industrial conditions with her uncle, Henry 
Muirhead, who later became a member of the Independent Labour Party. Mary Paterson 
began her career as a London schoolboard teacher and in 1892 was appointed as a clerk and 
précis writer for the Labour Commission. In 1893 she was appointed as one of the first two 
women factory inspectors, based in Scotland. In 1908 she became Deputy Principle Lady 
Inspector but resigned in 1911 when, following the National Insurance Act, she became one 
of the first National Health Insurance Commissioners for Scotland. She was particularly keen 
to bring women into the scheme. During the 1920s and 30s she held various public offices 




Lucy Deane (Streatfeild), (1860-1950), was born in India, the daughter of an army officer 
who was killed in the Anglo-Transvaal war in South Africa in 1881. During the 1880s she 
trained at the National Health Society, a charitable institution set up to train women for 
health-related voluntary work and worked as a nurse at the Chelsea Infirmary before 
becoming a sanitary inspector for Kensington and Chelsea. She applied for the post of 
factory inspector in 1894. She retired because of ill health in 1906. In 1911 she married 
former army officer and architect, Major Granville Streatfeid.  Subsequently she worked as a 
commissioner for the National Health Insurance Service. She was a socialist by conviction, a 
member of the WTUL and of the National Union of Women’s Suffrage Societies and held 
various public appointments following her retirement from the Factory Inspectorate.   
   
Adelaide Anderson, (1863-1936), was born in Australia, the daughter of a banker and 
shipping merchant, and came to England as a young child. She was educated at Queens 
College, Harley Street and subsequently studied Moral Sciences at Girton College, 
Cambridge, and French and German in Dresden. She developed a commitment to the reform 
of labour conditions when she began lecturing to the Women’s Co-operative Guild in the 
1880s. She was appointed as a clerk and précis writer to the Royal Commission on Labour in 
1892 and subsequently applied for a position as a factory inspector in 1894. She became 
Principal Lady Inspector in 1897. She retired from the Inspectorate in 1921 following the 
amalgamation of the men’s and women’s sections which she opposed. During the 1920s and 
early 1930s she carried out investigations on behalf of the League of Nations into child 
labour conditions in the International Settlement in Shanghai, China and in Egypt. She was 
awarded a DBE in 1921. 
 
Rose Squire, (1861-1938), was the daughter of a Harley street physician who was well-
known for his work in the field of public health and preventive medicine. In 1893 she trained 
as a lecturer in hygiene and first aid and subsequently worked as a nurse. In 1894 she gained 
a qualifying certificate as a sanitary inspector and became the first woman to be allowed to 
practice in this capacity. Her work brought her into close contact with the newly appointed 
women factory inspectors. She considered that their work offered more opportunities to 
improve conditions and she applied successfully for a post as a factory inspector in 1895. In 
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1906 she served on the Royal Commission on the Poor Laws, investigating the relationships 
between industrial and sanitary conditions and pauperism. In 1912 she was appointed 
Deputy Principal Lady Inspector. Following her secondment to the Ministry of Munitions 
during the First World War she did not return to the Factory Inspectorate but became a 
senior administrator in the Home Office, the first woman to hold such a position. She was 
awarded an OBE in 1918.  
 
Male factory inspectors 
Sir Alexander Redgrave, (1818-1894), was the son of a manufacturer of wire fencing. His 
family were poor and he attended a local day school. He joined the Home Office as a clerk in 
1834, becoming a clerk in the Factory Department in 1844. He became a sub-inspector in 
1847 and a full inspector in 1852.  From 1861 to 1878 he was joint Chief Inspector with Dr 
Robert Baker and became sole Chief Inspector in 1879. He was conservative in his attitudes 
towards issues such as gender equality and female education but radical and progressive in 
his organisation and development of the Factory Department. He was particularly concerned 
to address the problems of those occupations which became known as the ‘Dangerous 
Trades’, and also keen to introduce the collection and use of statistics into the department. 
He was made a Fellow of the Royal Statistical Society in 1856. He was a capable 
administrator and is widely credited with the development of the Factory Department into a 
professional organisation with an efficient organisational structure, which formed the basis 
for the present day Health and Safety Executive. 1 He was knighted in 1877and retired in 
1891, having spent 57 years in the Home Office.  
Richard E Sprague Oram, (1830-1909), was born in Devon, the son of a Superintendant 
Registrar and from a strongly non-conformist background. He initially joined the Customs 
Department in Devonport but, in 1861, moved to London and became a sub-inspector of 
Factories. By 1871 he was a full inspector and by 1881 a superintendant. When Redgrave 
retired, in September 1891, Frederick Whymper was initially appointed as his successor but 
                                                          
1
 His continued importance is underlined by the naming of the building, opened in 2006, in Bootle, Liverpool, to 
house the new headquarters of today’s Health and Safety Executive, ‘Redgrave Court’.    
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retired through ill-health four months later and Oram was appointed to replace him. He 
served as Chief Inspector for only four years, retiring in 1896, following the appointment of a 
new Conservative Home Secretary. However, he presided over major changes in the Factory 
Department instituted when Herbert Asquith became Home Secretary as part of the Liberal 
Government of 1892-5. Labour activist, Violet Markham, in her biography of May Abraham, 
presented a picture of Oram as rather old-fashioned and eccentric. 2 However, he was a 
strongly committed social reformer and friend of influential Liberals such as Sir Charles and 
Lady Dilke. In particular, he was a strong supporter of the appointment of women 
inspectors, standing firm against criticism and opposition and effectively establishing their 
position within the Home Office.  
Dr (Sir) Arthur Whitelegge, (1852-1933), was born into a relatively wealthy family in 
Manchester. He was educated at a grammar school and subsequently obtained a BSc and 
medical qualifications at London University. He was particularly interested in infectious 
diseases and public health and in 1881, following various hospital appointments, he 
obtained a Diploma in Public Health from Cambridge. He subsequently took up 
appointments as Medical Officer of Health for Nottingham and for Yorkshire. As a result of 
his experience in public health administration in industrial districts and his growing 
reputation in the field of epidemiology he was appointed Chief Inspector of Factories in 
1896.   The appointment of a medical doctor from outside the Factory Department was 
initially unpopular amongst existing inspectors. However, under his leadership the Factory 
Inspectorate was greatly expanded and was re-organised into districts which more closely 
mirrored those of the local Sanitary Departments, in order to facilitate better co-operation 
between the two.  He also greatly expanded the use of statistics and epidemiology to inform 
the policies of the Factory Department, working closely with Dr. Thomas Legge, the first 
specialist Medical Inspector of Factories, appointed in 1898. Whitelegge was knighted in 
1911 and retired in 1917.  
                                                          
2
 Markham described how he wrote with an enormous quill pen and had a tendency to wave this about 
enthusiastically when talking, spattering ink over the floor. Markham, V. R.  (1949), May Tennant, A Portrait, 
Falcon Press, London, p. 25. 
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Dr (Sir) Thomas Legge, (1863-1932), was born in Hong Kong the son of a missionary and 
Oxford academic. He was educated at Trinity College, Oxford and St Bartholomew’s Hospital, 
London and subsequently trained in public health. He initially travelled widely in continental 
Europe investigating the different causes of public health problems. In 1896 he was 
appointed Secretary to the Royal Commission on Tuberculosis. He was appointed as the first 
Medical Inspector of Factories in 1898 and in subsequent years became a highly respected 
expert on the identification, treatment and prevention of industrial disease. He established 
the use of statistics to inform preventative measures and is credited, in particular, with 
significantly reducing the incidence of lead poisoning in the potteries and anthrax in the 
wool industry. He received a CBE in 1918 and was knighted in 1925. However, in 1926 he 
resigned from the Factory Inspectorate on a point of principle when the British government 
bowed to pressure from manufacturers and refused to implement an International Labour 
Association agreement to limit the use of lead in paint. Subsequently he became an advisor 
to the TUC.  
 
Women trade unionists 
 
Emma Smith (Paterson), (1848-1886), was the daughter of the headmaster of a National 
School, who educated her at home.  Subsequently she became an assistant in the school. 
She believed strongly that women should achieve equality through trade unionism rather 
than government intervention and, assisted by Emilia Dilke, she contributed to the 
establishment of five women’s trade unions. She also strove to persuade men to allow 
women to join existing unions on equal terms. She was responsible for the establishment of 
the WPPL, the forerunner of the WTUL and served as its first President. As a result of its 
activities, a number of other women’s trade unions were established during the 1880s. 
However, they struggled to attract members and few survived more than a few years. 
Paterson experienced considerable poverty following the early death of her husband, 
cabinet maker Thomas Paterson, in 1882, and lived primarily on a small income from the 
Women’s Printing Society Ltd. which she had founded in 1876. She continued to work for the 
development of women’s trade unionism but reluctantly conceded that protective 
 160 
 
legislation offered the best prospect for improving women’s working conditions. She died 
relatively young, as a result of diabetes, in 1886. 
 
Lady Emilia Dilke, (1840-1904), was born in Devon and brought up in Oxford where her 
father was the manager of the London and County Bank. Her father was also an amateur 
artist and friendly with many of the leading artistic figures of the Victorian period and she 
grew up in an atmosphere dominated by artistic and cultural pursuits and radical politics.  
She studied at the Government School of Design in Kensington and subsequently developed 
a significant career as an art critic and historian. She was committed to social reform and, in 
particular, concerned about the rights and working conditions of women. In 1885 she 
married Sir Charles Dilke who had been a Liberal reformist MP in Gladstone’s second 
government.  His ambition to become Prime Minister had been curtailed by a scandalous 
divorce case and he had resigned his seat. However, he returned to Parliament in 1892 as 
the member for the Forest of Dean and continued to campaign for reforms such as women’s 
suffrage, the legalisation of labour unions and universal schooling. Emilia Dilke became 
President of the WTUL in 1886, a position she held until her death, and the Dilkes’ house in 
Sloane Square, London, became the League’s headquarters. In addition to presiding over the 
activities of the League she pursued a career of writing and public speaking to promote the 
interests of women workers and the formation of women’s trade unions.   
 
 Women labour commissioners 
 
May Abraham (see above) 
 
Eliza Orme, (1848-1937), was the daughter of a wealthy distiller and educated at Bedford 
College and the University of London, becoming the first woman in England to gain a law 
degree, in 1888. She had a prosperous law practice and was also a prominent writer and 
lecturer on feminist issues. She was a supporter of women’s suffrage and of increasing 
women’s educational and employment opportunities. She opposed protective legislation for 
women, arguing that women should not be excluded from any workplace. She was a 
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member of the Society for the Protection of Women’s Employment Opportunities which 
remained committed to total equality for women. In 1892 she was chosen to supervise the 
work of the other three lady Commissioners on the Labour Commission, while herself 
carrying out investigations into women’s work in Ireland, the Black Country iron industry and 
in London’s public houses.  
 
Clara Collet,(1860-1948), was the daughter of a non-conformist journalist who ran a radical 
monthly journal called the The Free Press: A Diplomatic Review. She was a close friend of 
Karl Marx’s daughter, Eleanor and of reformer Beatrice Webb. She received a Unitarian 
education and subsequently was one of the early women graduates of London University. 
Initially she worked as a teacher and campaigned for the provision of secondary education 
for girls and for working class women.  Following her work with Charles Booth during the 
1880s and her service on the Royal Commission on Labour, she gained a post at the Board of 
Trade and remained there as a statistician and economist, eventually being elected as a 
Fellow of the Royal Statistical Society.  
   
Margaret Irwin, (1858-1940), was born at sea, the daughter of a Scottish Master Mariner. 
She studied French, German and English at St Andrews University and in 1880 gained a ‘Lady 
Literate in Arts’, the only degree equivalent then available to women at Scottish universities. 
She subsequently studied political economy at Queen Margaret’s College, Glasgow and in 
1890 was appointed as full-time organiser of the Scottish branch of the Women’s Protective 
and Provident League (WPPL), the forerunner of the WTUL. It was during this period she was 
appointed as one of the Lady Commissioners on the Labour Commission. In 1895 she 
became the secretary of the Scottish Council for Women’s Trades and worked to promote 
the formation of the Scottish Trade Union Congress in 1897. She was committed to the 
suffrage movements and the rights of women workers and particularly interested in the 
conditions of rural seasonal workers. She owned a fruit farm in Scotland and established 







   
Dr (Sir) Thomas Oliver, (1853-1942), was born in Ayrshire the son of a grocer. He received 
his medical education at Glasgow University and, after a short period of medical practice in 
Lancashire, he moved to the Newcastle upon Tyne where he became physician to the Royal 
Victoria Infirmary and the Princess Mary Maternity Hospital. He became Professor of 
Medicine in 1911.  He developed a strong interest in industrial disease, particularly lead 
poisoning which he encountered in the white lead works in the area, but also other 
dangerous trades. During his career he served on a number of official enquiries and 
conducted numerous investigations both in Britain and abroad.  He was widely renowned as 
a world expert on industrial poisoning, receiving numerous awards for his work in improving 
industrial conditions, for example the Freedom of the City of Boston, USA in 1923 and the 
Légion D’honneur in France in 1929. He was knighted in 1908. He was also JP for Newcastle 
upon Tyne and Deputy Lieutenant for Northumberland. He retired from medicine in 1927 
but became Vice-Chancellor of the University of Durham in 1928.  
  
Dr. John Scott Haldane, (1860-1936), was born in Edinburgh and studied medicine at the 
University of Edinburgh, qualifying in 1883. He was interested in medical research rather 
than medical practice and in 1887 obtained a post at the Department of Physiology at  
Oxford University, remaining there for the next twenty-six years.  He carried out numerous 
experiments on the composition and physiological effects of expired air, work which had 
direct applications in the field of public and occupational health.  During the war he worked 
on the treatment of gas poisoning and the design of respirators. However, much of his 
research focussed on the various gases contained in coal mines and he is regarded as a 
significant contributor to mine safety. From 1917 -1924 he was a member of the mine rescue 
apparatus research committee set up by the newly established Department of Scientific and 
Industrial Research. In 1921 he became Honorary Professor at the Mining Research 
Laboratory when this was transferred to the University of Birmingham and was responsible 
for initiating and supervising a wide range of health and safety projects relating to the 




White lead manufacture 
The ‘Dutch method’  
White lead, otherwise known as lead carbonate, was used primarily as a paint additive. The 
process used in the 19th and early 20th century, whereby metallic lead was converted into 
white lead, was known as the ‘Dutch method’.  Thin sheets of metallic lead were formed into 
coils and placed in earthenware pots containing vinegar (acetic acid), such that the lead was 
held slightly above the level of the vinegar. The pots were covered with a further sheet of 
metallic lead and placed in a bed of tanbark. This first layer of pots was then covered with 
boards and a further layer was placed on top. Several layers formed a ‘stack’.  This stack was 
also known as the ‘blue beds’ because of the bluish colour of the metallic lead. Since the 
lead was in sheet form at this stage little dust was generated and working in the ‘blue beds’ 
was not, therefore, considered to be particularly hazardous. The ‘stack’ was then left for 
several weeks during which time the metallic lead reacted with the acetic acid to form lead 
acetate and, in the presence of the carbon dioxide generated by the fermenting tanbark,  
was converted to lead carbonate. When the conversion process was complete, women 
workers shovelled the white lead carbonate out of the stacks, which were then known as 
‘white beds’. This process generated large amounts of dust and therefore produced high 
exposure to lead.  Subsequently the lead carbonate was crushed to a uniformly fine dust 
between rollers and washed in the ‘washbecks’ and then dried in the ‘stoves’.  Women then 
shovelled the white lead out of the stoves and into sacks.  Thus women carried out the work 
which involved the highest exposure to lead dust and it was from these parts of the process 
that they were excluded in 1898. In 1883 special rules had been introduced which required 
the watering down of the ‘white beds’ during shovelling, thus accounting for Abraham’s 
observation in 1893 that Annie Case would not have been exposed to lead dust during the 
shovelling process. Subsequently, however, the continuing toll of disease and death 




White lead works showing the ‘stacks’ 
Source: Robert H. Sherard, (1897), ‘The White Slaves of England, Being true pictures 







Views of Wolverhampton Steam Laundry during the 1890s. 




Area showing washing machines, powered by steam with unguarded 





Area showing large  for drying and pressing sheets and table linen, 
powered by steam, with unguarded belts and pulleys. 
 





Portable monitor for measuring ‘carbonic oxide’ (carbon dioxide) levels 
in the air, developed by J.S.Haldane  












Table of results obtained by Inspector Mildred Power, 
inspecting workshops in West London in December 1906. 
Source: Annual Report of the Chief Inspector of Factories and Workshops for the Year 1906, Cd. 3586. 
(1907), HMSO, London, pp 155-6. 
 
Conditions in dressmakers’ workshops in West London. 
Samples taken 18
th
 December 1906, 6 pm to 8 pm, Barometer, 30.38 (anticyclone);  
dry bulb 50˚F; wet bulb 49˚F; humidity, 93 per cent. 

























1 9,758 15 650.5 14.1 67 65˚F 55˚F close 
2 5,760 14 411 12.4 54 72˚F 62˚F very close 
3 4,784 13 368 15.9 57 70˚F 61˚F close 





Dry bulb temperature is the temperature measured with a normal thermometer. Wet bulb 
temperature takes account of the water vapour in the air. It is the minimum temperature 
which can be reached when there is cooling of a ventilated surface by evaporation of the 
water in the air. A wet bulb thermometer has its bulb wrapped in a cloth which is kept wet.  




Appendix 5:  
Notified industrial diseases during World War 1 
Source: Data derived from Anderson, A. (1922), Women in the Factory. An Administrative Adventure 
1893-1921, John Murray, London, Appendix II. 
 
Notified cases of lead poisoning: 1900-1919 
















































Notified cases and deaths from anthrax: 1900-1919 
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